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THE INFINITE AS ORIGINATIVE OF THE HUMAN AS HUMAN: 
A TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXPLICATION OF THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS 
 
Few philosophers, today, are doing more than simple recognition of Levinas’s 
debt to phenomenology when a thorough explication of how phenomenological 
methodology impacts Levinas’s work is needed.  This dissertation is the needed 
discussion of methodology that has been so absent in Levinas as well as in so many of his 
interpreters.  The purpose, herein, is to synthesize Levinas’s work, explicating it in terms 
of transcendental methodology, the result of which reveals Levinas’s claims to be more 
defensible when understood in these terms than when the full rigor of this methodology is 
not properly grasped. 
First, to connect Levinas to transcendental phenomenology a correct perspective 
of the phenomenological tradition is needed.  I argue that phenomenology is a 
methodology that discloses those horizons that condition experience such that appearance 
takes on meaning.  I further argue that it is important to see this disclosure as something 
open-ended and ongoing rather than a method capable of fully revealing a final telos.  
Levinas fits into this methodology by providing the ethical as just such a horizonal 
condition, while his constant returning to this theme highlights the need to keep re-
working the description of its meaningful impact on experience. 
Second, I defend Levinas from those who claim his work cannot be 
phenomenological, based on what they see as an implied Jewish tradition informing his 
description.  I argue that what must be understood is that Levinas’s reference to God, 
Biblical stories, and Jewish wisdom impose an unsettling language that is introduced to 
replace traditional phenomenological language that does not always allow for the goals 
phenomenology sets for itself.  This imposition does not use the Jewish tradition to make 
his argument but as a vocabulary far better at describing the ethical condition than what is 
commonly used in phenomenology.   
The final step of explication involves the actual application of the methodology, 
now understood aright, to Levinas’s claims about the other, the self, and the ethical.  The 
result is that once we understand the ethical as the infinite originative horizon out of 
which the conscious ego emerges, later interpretations of Levinas will be able to 
successfully move beyond his work. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
What Should We Say about Levinas? 
 
 
 
Emmanuel Levinas begins Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence with the 
following dedication: 
To the memory of those who were closest among the six million 
assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions on millions of 
all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other 
man, the same anti-Semitism.1 
 
If anything should be said about Levinas, it must be that he hoped, in some small way, to 
speak a word of hope to the pain of the world in the wake of the atrocities of Nazi 
fascism.  In the year 1939, Levinas, a naturalized French citizen, was drafted and fought 
against the German invasion as a member of the French Tenth Army.  After the Tenth’s 
capture by German forces, he was put to hard labor at Hanover, Germany, as a prisoner 
of war, escaping the fate of so many Jews in Germany by virtue of the fact that Hitler 
observed the provisions governing the treatment of prisoners of war written at the Geneva 
Convention.  With the war having ended, Levinas set to his word of hope with the tool he 
had been honing for the past two decades: philosophy.  The first publications after his 
release, Time and the Other and Existence and Existents, set down the basic direction that 
would be his journey until his death in 1995, a phenomenology of human life with an 
ever watchful eye for the origin of ethics.  From these first steps, we realize that 
Levinas’s word of hope is not simply a backward-looking expression of shared grief and 
desire for a more peaceful future but rather a promise to take on the Herculean task of 
finding the beginnings of the human as human, which are the beginnings of the human as 
                                                 
1 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), v. 
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humane.  From this ground, one can see a forward-looking vision that hopes beyond hope 
to begin a journey towards a more ethical eschaton for not only those closest to the 
Holocaust but for all victims who have been alienated and hated. 
 Many readers of Levinas might find the difficulty of his philosophy to be less than 
consoling.  Words of hope should be emotionally uplifting, and to be beaten down with 
the weight of unusual vocabulary couched in a phenomenological methodology hardly 
seems fair.  Nevertheless, the search for an origin requires tremendous digging, but when 
the origin happens to be a condition of life rather than a simple object in life, then the 
search requires tremendous phenomenological digging.  This dissertation serves as an 
explication of the intense mining operation Levinas has undertaken.  While simple 
explication may hardly be something that justifies a dissertation, some would be grateful 
for any work that adds in some small measure to the comprehensibility of the Levinasian 
corpus.  Truly, most neophyte readers would find Levinas’s paradoxical claims 
maddening: 1. somehow the Ethical has nothing to do with determining ethics but 
everything to do with making ethics possible; 2. somehow the other has everything to do 
with the person standing before me (face-to-face) but has nothing to do with anything I 
might know about the person right before my eyes; 3. somehow God, who absolutely 
retains ineffability for Levinas, becomes a central figure for a phenomenological 
methodology that supposedly begins from all the things we experience as effable.  
Regardless of whatever comprehension I might add, the explication to come cannot 
simply translate difficult language into simpler language.  Such a translation cannot be 
done at all.  These paradoxical difficulties and the impossibility of simplification have led 
several commentators to wonder whether or not Levinas is doing phenomenology at all – 
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perhaps it is some mystical theology trumped up in phenomenological language.  I was 
recently asked at a conference at Villanova if I still thought Levinas was doing 
phenomenology.  The answer is a resounding, Yes!  What is so often sorely 
misunderstood is the phenomenological problematic with which Levinas is working.  In 
short, he intends to uncover a lost horizon of the subject that conditions the human being 
and prepares for the very possibility of ethics; however, such conditions are always 
constitutive of the meaningfulness of my experiences and not proper objects of my 
experience (this theme will be oft repeated).  My explication is aimed much more at 
explicating what Levinas is attempting to do on the whole as it is with what he means 
according to chapter and verse.   
 Let us begin with a brief introduction to some of the most common Levinasian 
themes.  For Emmanuel Levinas, the very event of being is first a response, an answer to 
that which is always, already there but is also always, already beyond being, transcendent 
to the ego that capitulates.  Levinas begins his philosophy from the event of being, being 
in its verbal sense, and ends with the emergence of the “devoting-of-oneself-to-the-
other,” and in so doing, the “human, as such, begins.”2  In this one quote concerning the 
event of the coming and becoming of the human as human, I began to see Levinas’s work 
in a new light and discovering how he discusses the origination of the human, as such, 
will remain my theme throughout. 
In order to grasp the verbal point of origination for human being, Levinas 
investigates the relationship the self has with the other, an other that cannot be reduced to 
                                                 
2 Emmanuel Levinas, “Preface,” in Entre Nous: Thinking of the Other, trans. Michael B. 
Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), xii.  
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theoretical knowledge, an other that must always remain outside the confines of 
ontology.3  While commentators have often described Levinas’s philosophy as a 
philosophy of otherness, it does not help that this simple word, other, is used by Levinas 
in a variety of different ways.  Perhaps the least important to his philosophy is the 
recognition that the “I” can be an other to itself.4  Each person goes through many 
alterations in life such that one can say, “I am not the same person I was yesterday, a year 
ago, or even moments ago.”  These different aspects or phases of life can be 
distinguished as other than what the ego now is.  This otherness, however, is always 
rightly reduced to the ego, for “the I is identical in its very alterations.  It represents them 
to itself and thinks them.”5  Consequently, “the difference is not a difference; the I, as 
other is not an ‘other.’”6 
 More important for Levinas’s philosophy, and yet, more problematic, is when he 
uses the term “other” to refer to an undisclosable transcendence.  At this early stage in 
our investigation, the best way to broach the question about ways to speak about an 
unspeakable otherness is to look at the word choice he makes in indicating the unsayable 
other.  Levinas discusses the other (autre), the absolutely other (l’absolument autre), and 
                                                 
3 Let us make a passing note that I have not haphazardly placed in parallel a “reduction to 
theoretical knowledge” and the “confines of ontology” in this sentence.  Levinas suggests 
a strong link between the two, a congruence, that philosophy done in theoretical terms 
first draws the confines of ontological philosophy in such a way that within them the 
entirety of human experience is not circumscribed and, second, attempts to marginalize 
out or subsume into the circumscription this remainder of human experience.  
 
4 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1961), 37.  
 
5 Ibid., 36. 
 
6 Ibid., 37. 
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the personal other (autrui).7  When Levinas uses autre, only context can tell if he is 
alluding to transcendent otherness.  When he discusses being an other to oneself, the non-
transcendent variety, he employs autre.  Often, in order to clarify the usage of autre, he 
adds on the appellation of l’absolument, eliminating the equivocation and purposefully 
referencing an otherness otherwise than being.  Unfortunately, as soon as it seems that the 
confusion may be resolved, Levinas once again makes a problematic equation: 
“L’Abolument Autre, c’est Autrui.”  What is obviously problematic about this equation is 
that one must question why the personal other does not appear before the ego.  It 
becomes immediately apparent that what is truly other about the other person is what is in 
fact personal to the other and can never be brought into the phenomenal world of a 
watching ego.  Otherness, then, does not appear because it is not present in the manner of 
objectification.  What Levinas can discuss is the nature of the subject and the subject’s 
relation to the other.   The subject, then, always finds one’s ego confronted by the 
otherness of the person, an otherness that demands an ethical response.   
The next question is how the person before me places a demand upon me by 
being other than I.  In what Levinas will identify as the mainstream philosophical 
understanding, my ego imposes a totality that allows for whatever confronts me to be 
subsumed under my theoretical eye and to destroy, consequently, otherness.  The face of 
the other, however, always signifies that which cannot be subsumed.  The other is always 
                                                 
7 “Autre” and “Autrui” are both rightly translated as other, but the personal nature of the 
second is not easily conveyed.  In an attempt at making a distinction, Alphonso Lingis, in 
his translation of Totality and Infinity, capitalized “Other” in reference to “Autrui” and 
left “other” uncapitalized when referring to “autre.”  This convention hinders as much as 
it helps.  Lingis changed his practice for his translation of Otherwise than Being or 
Beyond Essence and left all instances of “other” in the lower case.  I prefer to follow his 
later practice and have altered other translations accordingly. 
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there and demands its right to be so.  Attending to the otherness implied by the face of 
another human being discloses the ethical relationship, a relationship that can never be 
satiated.  No amount of attention will be enough; no amount of response will be 
sufficient.  In this sense, the ethical relationship is infinite, for the task of respecting 
otherness is always incomplete; it is the infinite task that is imposed in facing the face. 
Finally, we must understand something of the sense of the human.  If we intend 
our investigation to uncover the nature of the human as human, then we might expect a 
series of hypothetical definitions which could be tested and then discarded or affirmed 
according to the results of our analysis.  With a look at Levinas’s major themes as already 
indicated, we should understand the human as being intricately tied to ethics and to 
others.  Indeed, the terms “humanity” and “humane,” which all rely upon a person’s 
relationship to an ethical principle, reflect the idea that the “human” is somehow defined 
by the ethical.  However, phenomenology attempts to go back to the things themselves 
without preconceptions, which necessitates that we not begin with any set of definitions 
for the human.  Instead, we will see how Levinas himself exemplifies this approach, only 
being able to offer something like a definition in his later works, but any hope for a 
formal definition of the Aristotelian sort should be abandoned post haste.  While the 
conditions of the human as human will indicate an ethical demand at the origin of the 
human as human, this very basis will not work anything like a rigid rule.  Consequently, 
we must put away hopes of a hard and fast definition in favor of an understanding that 
can only be indicated in the fullness of our explication. 
As a consequence of the difficulty of Levinas’s problematic, my dissertation will 
traverse the same ground numerous times but with the effect of making each pass a fresh 
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look at increasingly familiar material.  The first pass will be a question of methodology, 
asking whether Levinas has truly understood and applied the fundamental teachings of 
phenomenology or whether his philosophy is nothing more than theology in disguise.  
After answering yes to the first and no to the second, we will start over with Levinas to 
investigate the content upon which the phenomenological methodology is focused.  This 
does not mean that the question of method will be easily addressed nor finally addressed 
in the chapter on phenomenology.  Levinas’s association with methodology has always 
been more implicit than explicit, arguing that too much good philosophy was not written 
on account of some authors’ over heightened infatuation with writing about method.  His 
resulting stance to avoid writing much about methodology is certainly frustrating, even 
for those who find serious value in his work, but it should not come as any surprise since 
Levinas feels as though there is no “transparency possible in method.”8  Consequently, 
we will have to tweak our conclusions in the first chapter as our discourse on content 
leads us into an ever broader and deeper understanding of Levinas’s implicit method.  
What this second pass into content will reveal is that once we have fully explicated 
Levinas’s phenomenology, we will realize that the question of theology returns, not as 
something insidiously hidden but as a question to which one must return once the origin 
of the human is explicated. 
 Chapter one, “Phenomenological Groundwork,” attempts to unravel the mystery 
of Levinas’s involvement with phenomenology, which he obfuscates by acknowledging 
his already mentioned distaste of overdoing method as well as his assertion that he 
                                                 
8 See Levinas’s comments in “Questions and Answers,” in Of God Who Comes to Mind, 
trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 86 ff. beginning with 
Theodore de Boer’s question. 
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follows the spirit of phenomenology if not the letter of its law.  The latter obscuring 
principle, of course, assumes, on the part of Levinas, that phenomenology has a strict law 
to which it must adhere.  In order to place Levinas back within phenomenology’s fold, I 
will undertake a softening of the view that phenomenology is a rigid structure on the one 
hand and that Levinas’s philosophy is a liberal use of the system along the lines of a 
smorgasbord from which he has only chosen bits and pieces, ignoring some of the most 
fundamental issues.  In fact, what we will see is that Levinas’s approach to 
phenomenology is most affected by the thrust and parry of the Husserl/Heidegger 
disagreements, lending to him the notion that Husserl’s basic methodology is still 
something to be challenged.  What makes Levinas such a keen student of Husserl and 
phenomenology is not that he finds much to be criticized in Husserl’s work but that he 
finds many answers to his critiques within Husserl himself.  That Husserl can be used 
against (or perhaps better, upon) Husserl suggests the softening of any rigid law in 
phenomenology, while Levinas’s ability to discern these tensions for a broader and 
deeper understanding of phenomenology suggests his proper inclusion as a 
phenomenological thinker. 
 Even if we can successfully argue that Levinas uses phenomenological 
methodology, his willingness to make reference to God brings into question whether or 
not the method has been properly applied given Husserl’s own apparent proscription 
against discussing God as manifest phenomenon.9  References to God are neither few nor 
insignificant such that one might simply ignore them as stylistic.  The very heart of 
                                                 
9 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy – First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. 
Kersten (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), §58. 
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Levinas’s claim takes shape in the language of religion.  The I, itself, as that which is not 
self caused but which has an independent view of the world capable of constructing the 
totality Levinas finds to be at the root of the unethical is described as “atheistic”: “By 
atheism we thus understand a position prior to both the negation and the affirmation of 
the divine, the breaking with participation by which the I posits itself as the same and as 
I.”10  The origin of the human as ethical stands in sharp contrast to the atheistic 
orientation of the I insofar as the transcendent other provides the very condition for the 
ethical, calling the ego to ethics from a dimension of moral height as though from the 
divine, making the foundation of ethics a primordial tying together (etymologically, a 
primordial religion).  The questions, then, for chapter two, “Levinas and Judaism,” is 
whether or not Levinas has made God an object for phenomenological study and whether 
or not he has employed a pre-supposed Judaic theology in his descriptions of the ethical 
relation.  Either would disqualify his philosophy as properly phenomenological.  
However, our argument will clearly demonstrate such concerns, while understandable 
from the phraseology, are unfounded and in some sense an attempt at avoiding the greater 
pitfall of ontology. 
 Ontology, dasein, absolute consciousness, and the same all represent for Levinas 
philosophy’s inability to properly deal with ethics, in view of the fact that these concepts 
subsume creatures under a greater, comprehensive totality, erasing difference, 
uniqueness, and otherness.  Even in his earliest writings, when explicating 
phenomenology in order to deliver the philosophy to France was his primary goal, there 
are hints of a discomfort with the tendency of phenomenology to search for those 
                                                 
10 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 58. 
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conditions that brought an adequation between individual things and thought or between 
things and being because the dichotomy appeared to Levinas to prefer thought and being 
over the individual, de-valuing the individual.  Chapter three, then, will be a discussion of 
the way in which Levinas attempts “Ontic Reparations.”  The move to re-value or re-
deem the ontic individual will move us away from primarily methodological 
considerations into an explication of the concrete.  The move will also delineate the hard 
and fast distinction Levinas draws between his own work and the work of Martin 
Heidegger, whose stint with the Nazi party was one anecdote of the misconceptions an 
ontologically oriented philosophy could produce.  As re-valued, the ontic other, no longer 
adequately defined in totality, can be seen as constitutive of the I in the manner of a 
transcendental, sometimes named a quasi-transcendental. 
 The final chapter, “Infinite Constitution,” pieces together all the advances we can 
make in method and concrete description as we culminate our explication with an 
argument for how to understand the centerpiece of Levinas’s second, which was also his 
last, major work.  The concept of substitution, which names the constitutive horizon of 
the human that gives rise to the human as ethical – as human, moves the focus of 
Levinas’s philosophy from its previous focus on the transcendent other to the forgotten 
horizon of the individual.  This move necessitates a brief encounter with another 
phenomenological thinker that has had a greater influence on Levinas than what many 
writers have given credit: Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy offered 
Levinas a better understanding of the constructive element of transcendental 
phenomenology such that Levinas’s own worries concerning the rigidity of 
phenomenology were appeased.  Understanding this influence, we will be able to show 
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the manner in which substitution is the formal indication of the self’s constitutive ethical 
horizon as disclosed by the previously made phenomenological descriptions and the 
manner in which substitution is the guiding indicator for future analyses, analyses which 
once again open up the question of the theological.    
 With the mention of Merleau-Ponty we are reminded of Levinas’s obvious 
geographical situation in France, which would almost certainly bring him into contact 
with France’s own gadfly of the late twentieth century, Jacques Derrida.  Inasmuch as 
Husserl, Heidegger, and phenomenology are constantly referenced in Levinas’s 
philosophy, Jacques Derrida, in contrast, is just as much not referenced.  As is so 
appropriate for Derrida, Levinas keeps Derrida in the margins, but as marginal, Derrida 
frames a great extent of Levinas’s thinking.  Derrida has often been read as an amiable 
critic of Levinas, liking what has been attempted but finding fault with the specifics.  
Chapter one will set up the parameters of this possible critique.  Chapter three, however, 
will not only attempt to undermine those who read Derrida as critic but will also show 
how he can be read as complementary of Levinas’s program.  Indeed, Derrida’s own turn 
toward ethics out of his earlier discussions of language and difference are only possible in 
the wake of his reading of Levinas.  Nevertheless, if Derrida were completely innocent as 
a writer, he would not be so noticeably absent in the margins.  With all the focus on 
method and the concrete in chapter four, it will also be noted how Derrida’s work is, in 
some sense, just as instigative of Levinas’s new emphasis in his second work as any 
reconceived notion of transcendental phenomenology.    
 
 
Copyright © Ronald Lynn Mercer, Jr., 2007 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Phenomenological Groundwork 
Introduction 
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas’s first major philosophical work, he ends his 
preface with the explanation that the preface itself is a corrective “attempting to restate 
without ceremony what has already been ill understood.”11  As evidenced by the explicit 
note of indebtedness earlier in the preface, one of the misunderstandings that Levinas 
desires to correct is that he is not rooted in phenomenology, for as he claims about his 
book “the presentation and the development of the notions employed owe everything to 
the phenomenological method” (my italics).12  We have here, then, a hint that Levinas 
and phenomenology are not the most obvious of allies.  It may seem more appropriate 
that Levinas appears to back off this strong claim in his second major work, Otherwise 
than Being or Beyond Essence, to one slightly less committed when he declares his work 
to be in the “spirit of Husserlian philosophy,” but he immediately reaffirms his debt by 
stating that within this book phenomenology has been “restored to its rank of being a 
method for all philosophy.”13  If it is true that Levinas has the education in 
phenomenology, has published works on phenomenology, and claims that his works are 
inspired by phenomenology, then why should there be any question concerning Levinas 
and phenomenology?  In short, if Levinas is already correcting misunderstandings about 
his philosophical roots before a book is even published, then there must be something 
                                                 
11 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1961), 30. 
 
12 Ibid., 28. 
 
13 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 183. 
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throwing his use of phenomenology into doubt.  Take this excerpt from an interview with 
Levinas conducted by Philippe Nemo as reason enough, given that the “face” and the 
“other” discussed here are central themes throughout Levinas’s writings: 
 I do not know if one can speak of a “phenomenology” of the face, since  
 phenomenology describes what appears. . . I think rather that access to the face is  
 straightaway ethical.  You turn yourself toward the other as toward an object  
 when you see a nose, eyes, a forehead, a chin, and you can describe them.  The  
 best way of encountering the other is not even to notice the color of his eyes! . . .  
 The relation with the face can surely be dominated by perception, but what is  
 specifically the face is what cannot be reduced to that.14 
 
Levinas is apparently admitting that he is doing phenomenology on that which one 
cannot do phenomenology.  Adept readers of Levinas seem to accept his confession.  
Simon Critchley, in his introduction to the Cambridge Companion to Levinas, agrees: 
“Levinas’s big idea about the ethical relation to the other person is not phenomenological, 
because the other is not given as a matter for thought or reflection.”15   If it is the case 
that phenomenology is simply a way of bettering the sciences by improving the way 
description is done, then Levinas and others are right about his assertion.  For 
phenomenology to be philosophy, however, it must be more – do more.16       
                                                 
14 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. 
Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 85 - 86. 
 
15 Simon Critchley, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, eds. Simon 
Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 8. 
 
16 The “more” which phenomenology must do concerns Levinas’s worry that the “face” 
can be dominated by perception, as though phenomenology was an analytical tool for 
carving up experience into its components and the phenomenologist was somehow apart, 
making the dissection from a point outside experience.  Levinas challenges this as the 
purpose of phenomenology.  What we will see by the third section of this chapter is 
Levinas uncovering horizons of experience that add to the sense of the whole of 
experience rather than components, a whole which, he claims, has been overlooked and 
forgotten. 
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 When Merleau-Ponty asks the question, “What is Phenomenology?” he reminds 
us that phenomenology has yet to be totally embraced in one comprehensive form.  We 
might first look to Husserl for an answer, but that would involve deciding whether to 
follow “Husserl I” (before 1913), “Husserl II” (1913 to around 1930), or “Husserl III” 
(after 1930).  Perhaps, we might simply see Husserl as seminal to Heidegger who 
“corrects” and “reorients” phenomenology to its proper course as something existential 
and ontological.  Neither possibility takes into account the various disciples of Husserl: 
Levinas, Fink, Derrida, to name a few, who claim to take phenomenology beyond being 
to something “otherwise,” “meontic,” or “differant.”  Phenomenology surely started with 
Husserl but has grown beyond him.  In truth, Husserl approached his own work with near 
“fear and trembling,” meaning that while his analysis of psychologism and western 
science appears sure, none of his published works act as proffering an alternative with 
which he was entirely satisfied.  Phenomenology, then, seems destined to be without 
themes and principles to which all practitioners of phenomenology would adhere.  If we 
take a moment to view Levinas’s early introduction to phenomenology, we will see that 
his moment of greatest exposure to the discipline also comes during the time of 
phenomenology’s great divergence as Husserl and Heidegger occupy influential positions 
at Freiburg, each holding to his own understanding of phenomenology. 
Levinas’s Education in Historical Context 
 Levinas’s journey towards a phenomenological education began in 1923 when he 
left Kovno, Lithuania, for the University of Strasbourg.  Not only was Strasbourg the 
closest French university to Kovno, but France also represented a land of equality and 
opportunity, a welcome thought for Levinas who had long endured the anti-Semitic 
  
  15
sentiment of the Russian government.17  Philosophy, however, was not Levinas’s first 
choice.  During his first year, he studied Latin and spent his private time studying French 
and German, pursuits that would later prove very beneficial.  As Levinas entered his 
second year at Strasbourg, he had his first encounter with philosophy, and from this point 
on, philosophy would remain a central passion.  Levinas recalls learning the essential 
teachings of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant while in France - the pillars of any 
philosophical education - but he was also drawn to the contemporary thinkers en vogue at 
the time: Durkheim and Bergson.18  Bergson, specifically, caught Levinas’s attention for 
both his philosophy and the fact that he was born a Jew, assimilated into French culture, 
and made significant philosophical contributions.  This kinship of a shared tradition also 
helped draw Levinas to the works of Edmund Husserl.  While in Strasbourg, Gabrielle 
Peiffer, with whom Levinas would later co-translate the French version of Husserl’s 
Cartesian Meditations, introduced Levinas to Husserl via Husserl’s Logical 
Investigations.  Levinas admits entering into this work with difficulty and without 
guidance, but after much perseverance in this phenomenological direction, he took the 
advice of his teacher, Jean Hering, and left Strasbourg to attend Freiburg and learn from 
the master himself.19  The year was 1928. 
                                                 
17 Biographical information concerning Levinas is sparse, and no one work tells the 
complete story.  This general background comes from Richard Cohen, “Emmanuel 
Levinas: Philosopher and Jew,” in Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig 
and Levinas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 115 ff. 
 
18 Levinas testifies to the significant influence of his early philosophy teaching as well as 
his year at Freiburg in Ethics and Infinity, 19 - 44. 
 
19 The only author I have found who mentions any relationship between Levinas and Jean 
Hering is John E. Drabinski in Sensibility and Singularity: The Problem of 
Phenomenology in Levinas (New York: SUNY Press, 2001), 2. 
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 Levinas’s arrival at Freiburg in 1928 was hardly the most anticipated arrival of 
the year.  Earlier, in May of 1927, Husserl was contemplating the possibility of 
retirement as well as the logistics of naming Martin Heidegger as his successor.20  With 
the publication of Heidegger’s Being and Time, his subsequent promotion at Marburg 
and then, owing to Husserl’s personal and enthusiastic recommendation, Heidegger was 
officially named to the faculty at Freiburg on February 7, 1928; his first class began in 
the winter semester of the same year.  When Levinas entered Freiburg, hoping to hear 
phenomenology from its originator, he became immersed in perhaps the most important 
transition year for phenomenological thought.  With only a general knowledge of the 
Logical Investigations and Ideas I, Levinas was not in the least familiar with Being and 
Time, the talk of Freiburg, but with the author’s presence and proffered classes, Levinas 
became a quick study.  As a result, Levinas became aware of two phenomenologies at 
odds.   
 Husserl was only beginning to see what a fundamental critique Heidegger offered.  
In April 1926, Heidegger honored his teacher’s birthday with a gift of his yet unpublished 
Being and Time, which Husserl read that same month, finding the difficult piece alien to 
his own way of phenomenology.  If this was Husserl’s first sign that the ground between 
Heidegger and himself was no longer so common, the second sign would come in 
October, 1927, when the master invited his named successor to collaborate on an article 
                                                 
20 Biographical information concerning the interplay between Husserl and Heidegger 
stands in contrast to the meager offerings about Levinas.  I have taken my information 
about this well known period in philosophy from three basic sources:  Ronald Bruzina, 
Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology 1928-1938 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), chapters 1 and 3.  Theodore Kisiel, “Husserl 
and Heidegger: Two Phenomenologies?” paper presented at the University of Kentucky, 
November 19, 1999.  Donn Welton, The Other Husserl: The Horizons of Transcendental 
Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002). 
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that would define phenomenology for the Encyclopedia Britannica.  The effort disturbed 
Husserl with the now palpable differences.  Nevertheless, Husserl still welcomed his 
choice of successor, but Heidegger’s new way of doing phenomenology was no longer a 
printed word or private conversation, it was taught in the very classrooms once 
dominated by Husserl.  That Heidegger’s classes often took the form of a critique of 
Husserlian phenomenology seemed common knowledge - common to everyone with the 
possible exception of Husserl himself.  At this time, Husserl was so centered on his work 
that he failed to notice that Heidegger had undertaken a fundamental critique even within 
his offered courses that brought the very issue of phenomenology into question. 
 Heidegger’s influence upon Levinas during the year Levinas spent at Freiburg is 
indubitable, for not only did Levinas read Being and Time, but he attended all of 
Heidegger’s courses.  Nevertheless, Levinas also heard phenomenology from Husserl 
himself.  He attended Husserl’s summer course in 1928 and the professor’s last course on 
intersubjectivity in the winter semester of the same year.  Unfortunately, for unspecified 
reasons, Husserl cancelled this course after a few weeks into the semester.  Of course, 
one might speculate that Husserl’s age, health, and personal ambitions for completing a 
definitive work that described his concept of phenomenology all played a part in his final 
withdrawal from teaching.  Husserl’s absence in the classroom did not hinder Levinas 
from approaching him as a mentor.  Husserl’s hiring of Levinas as a French tutor for his 
wife helped to make Levinas welcome in Husserl’s home where he felt free to approach 
Husserl on all matters of phenomenology.  At the end of the academic year, Levinas left 
Freiburg and went to Paris, France, where he completed his doctoral dissertation under 
Jean Wahl.  His thesis, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, was 
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published in 1930.21  He followed this up with translating the fourth and fifth meditations 
of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations into French; his classmate from Strasbourg, Gabrielle 
Peiffer, translated the first three.22 
 We might expect that Levinas was quite proficient in phenomenology considering 
the exposure Levinas had to Husserl’s personal tutoring given his year at Freiburg when 
he could refine his understanding of Husserl’s published works and his close work with 
phenomenological methodology with which he worked in his dissertation and translation 
of the Meditations.  However, Husserl’s rethinking of phenomenology achieved new 
fervor after the French translation of the Meditations appeared.  It is well known that 
Husserl spent the years 1923-25 considering alternative ways, i.e. non-Cartesian ways, 
into the phenomenological reduction, but with the publication of the Cartesian 
Meditations in 1931, in France, many interpret this book as definitively grounding all of 
phenomenology in a Cartesian vein.  Certainly, in 1929, Husserl remarked in a letter to 
Roman Ingarden that he considered this work to be “my main text.”23  However, 
considering the Meditations to be indicative of Husserl’s work as a whole grossly 
underestimates the significance of Husserl choosing not to have his “main text” published 
in German.  Levinas’s principle dealings with Husserlian phenomenology, namely Ideas I 
and the Cartesian Meditations, sets his education firmly within the Cartesian way, but  
                                                 
21 Emmanuel Levinas, La théorie de l’intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl, Paris: 
Alcon, 1930.  The Theory of Intuition in the Phenomenology of Husserl, trans. André 
Orianne (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
 
22 Edmund Husserl, Meditations Cartésiennes, trans. Gabrielle Peiffer and Emmanuel 
Levinas, reviewed by Alexandre Koyré (Paris: Armand Coline, 1931). 
 
23 Edmund Husserl, Letter to Ingarden, May 26, 1929, Briefwechsel, 3/3, 248. 
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Husserl’s decision not to publish the Meditations in German suggests that he felt his 
Cartesianism, as represented in this text, was vulnerable and not appropriate for the 
German audience.24  Of course, the main reason for why Germany would not be receptive 
once again falls to the widespread influence of Heidegger.  Husserl’s Cartesianism as 
expressed by the Meditations could not offer a refutation for the miscomprehension 
apparent to Husserl in Being and Time.  In effect, Heideggerian phenomenology was 
increasing its hold upon Germany, and Husserl was, at the moment, defenseless.     
 In order to determine what Levinas is in fact doing when it comes to 
phenomenology, we are going to have to understand the basics of phenomenology in their 
initial formulation (yet with an awareness of the seeds of limitation within them); and for 
this we must begin with Edmund Husserl (Chapter One: Phenomenology 101).  We then 
have to turn to Levinas’s relationship to those figures who most shaped his 
phenomenological outlook: not only Husserl, but above all, Heidegger (Chapter One: 
Levinas and Heidegerrian Phenomenology).  Finally, we will follow Levinas’s return to 
Husserl, as Levinas himself does time and again to show how he engages the basic truths 
of phenomenology (found in “Phenomenology 101”) but also attempts to go beyond the 
limitations of phenomenology (Chapter One: Levinas and the “Spirit” of 
phenomenology).   
Phenomenology 101: Basic Ideas of Edmund Husserl 
 As I have already cautioned, looking at Husserl’s work means determining which 
period one should emphasize for what is really phenomenological.  The first period prior 
                                                 
24 In December of 1930, Husserl wrote Pfänder explaining, “In place of a German edition 
[of the Meditations] I am thinking in the next year of publishing a larger work that is 
appropriate for the German public.”  Letter to Pfänder, December 6, 1930, Briefwechsel, 
3/2,177. 
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to 1913 and the release of Ideas I features the Logical Investigations which investigates 
logic and language without featuring the egoic Cartesian bent of his later publications.  
Jacques Taminiaux has shown that this period, most specifically the “Sixth 
Investigation,” was instrumental in Heidegger’s thought.25  The period between 1913 and 
1930 highlights the core of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.  Most philosophers 
have taken this seminal period as central, focusing on Husserl’s influential introduction to 
phenomenology, Ideas I.  Nevertheless, all the works of this period from Ideas I to the 
Cartesian Meditations and including even the Crisis-texts may simply compose an entry 
into phenomenology rather than a complete definition of it.  Finally, the period after 1930 
highlights the move from transcendental phenomenology to genetic phenomenology with 
a new emphasis on his concept of the life-world and a reemphasis on horizons.26   
 Husserl’s final period of work features manuscript notes and correspondence 
rather than publications; however, a noticeable shift occurs in the published Crisis-texts, 
which are suggestive of some of his new direction.  As is the case with most manuscript 
                                                 
25 Jacques Taminiaux, “Heidegger and Husserl’s Logical Investigations: In Remembrance 
of Heidegger’s Last Seminar,” in Dialectic and Difference: Modern Thought and the 
Sense of Human Limits, eds. James Decker and Robert Crease (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1985).  Taminiaux argues convincingly that even though Heidegger 
rarely and indifferently makes reference to Husserl’s Logical Investigations, Heidegger 
relies very heavily on this work.  The one real admission to this comes in Heidegger’s 
work, “My Way in to Phenomenology,” where he claims, “When I myself began to 
practice phenomenological seeing, teaching-and-studying at Husserl’s side, 
experimenting at the same time with a new understanding of Aristotle in seminars, my 
interest began to be drawn again to the Logical Investigations, and especially to the sixth 
in the first edition.” 
 
26 The roots of this move come much earlier.  From 1918 – 1926, Husserl’s lectures on 
Transcendental Logic are already seminal for the concept of a genetic phenomenology.  
These lectures have been collected in Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: 
Lectures on Transcendental Logic, trans. Anthony J. Steinbock (Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2001). 
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material, Husserl does not follow an explicit or definitively written out methodology.  It 
has, in fact, been effectively argued that if one wants to understand what Husserl was 
doing in his investigations during this period, one must turn to the work of Eugen Fink, 
Husserl’s last assistant, who examined Husserl’s manuscripts and what Husserl did in 
order to piece together a methodological how.27  It is clear that Levinas was aware of 
Husserl’s manuscripts as well as Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation - Fink’s published 
effort to come to a conclusive synthesis of Husserl’s work in phenomenology - but it is 
also clear that Levinas makes little substantial reference to either.  This should not, 
however, deter us from linking Levinas’s thinking with this final period.  On the one 
hand, Fink endeavored to see Husserl’s introductory material as broadened and deepened 
rather than superceded or excluded by Husserl’s later thought.28  Consequently, if 
Levinas’s familiarity with Husserl and the published material really does comprehend the 
“spirit” of Husserl, then he, too, could move toward a deeper conception of 
phenomenology, methodologically speaking.  Secondly, Fink’s work to abstract from 
Husserl’s manuscripts a comprehensive methodology takes into account the important 
work of Heidegger.  Fink was able to communicate Heidegger’s purpose to Husserl as 
                                                 
27 Ronald Bruzina introduces his translation of Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation with a 
historically and philosophically informed argument that establishes Fink as not only 
Husserl’s last assistant but also a co-collaborator in phenomenology.  With such a 
connection, it is important to read Fink’s work on phenomenological methodology as 
indicative of the manner in which Husserl was doing phenomenology.  See Ronald 
Bruzina, “Translator’s Introduction,” to Eugen Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), vii – xcii.  
 
28 Ronald Bruzina, The End of Phenomenology – The Beginning of Philosophy 
(unpublished). 
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well as help him see the importance of it to phenomenology.29  While Husserl certainly 
never embraces Heidegger’s phenomenology, Levinas’s own tutelage under Heidegger 
links him to a sense of the subject as transcendentally constituted, a sense in contrast with 
Husserl’s transcendentally constituting subject of the phenomenological reduction.  
Finally, Levinas has a more direct connection to Fink through the very atmosphere of 
French philosophy at the time in the person of Merleau-Ponty who apparently drew from 
Husserl’s final period after a trip to Louvain where he read Husserl’s manuscripts and 
met with Fink.30  Levinas read and knew Merleau-Ponty, although only as an 
acquaintance, and he also had occasion to hear him present papers.  Therefore, even 
though Levinas’s connection to this third period of Husserl is tenuous at best, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that Levinas’s phenomenology underwent a broadening and 
deepening of its own. 
 Husserl did not find any of his creative periods to be definitive of 
phenomenology.  His Cartesian Meditations were meant to showcase the sum of his 
offerings in phenomenology, but after further work, Husserl did not even publish them in 
German.  After hopes of simply amending the Meditations had faded, Husserl planned a 
final cumulative effort which went unfinished.  The last years of Husserl’s life were 
complicated with illness and the infirmities of age, hampering his plans for a decisive 
treatise on his work which, ultimately, were ended by his death.   What we find instead of 
a single conclusive opus in Husserl’s works is a constant reworking of themes and 
                                                 
29 Ronald Bruzina, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Sixth Cartesian Meditation, l – lii. 
 
30 Merleau-ponty twice makes reference to Fink’s as of then unpublished work in his 
introduction to The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), vii and xx. 
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method, some of which last throughout his philosophy in one form or another while 
others that once took a prominent place fade into the background.  Rather than focus on a 
single period, I will try to offer what I see as integrally important to the 
phenomenological agenda as a whole, those issues which survived Husserl’s revisions as 
well as those that appeared important at the end after reworking his philosophy time and 
time again.   
 The simplicity of Husserl’s phenomenology stems from his famous phrase, also 
employed but reappropriated by Heidegger, that we must return “to the things 
themselves,” “zu den Sachen selbst.”  The necessity of making such a return suggests that 
philosophy once considered things themselves but has done so inadequately or wrongly 
or through eyes that thought they saw things themselves but were in fact unfortunately 
cluttered with presuppositions that could not allow for a clear, distinct, or pure viewing.  
Husserl’s impact, then, begins with the inauspicious plea to go look again, or in 
philosophical parlance, to study the appearing of a thing, which gives birth to 
phenomenology.  With a claim to speak honestly, Husserl states his seminal idea in the 
following manner:  
I can do no other than honestly say (assuming that I am not already confused 
through superficially acquired theories): I now see things, these things here, they  
 themselves; I do not see images of them, nor mere signs.  Obviously, I can also be  
 deceived.  But on what basis does it prove to be deception?  On the basis of a  
 reliable seeing, tested time and again, that is a seeing of real things themselves.   
 To say that all seeing is a deception negates the sense of talking about  
deception.31 
                                                 
31 Edmund Husserl, Manuscript, “Einleitung in die Philosophie,” F I 29 (1922/23), 3a; 
transcription, 33.  Translated by Donn Welton in The Other Husserl, 13.  This quote is 
also important for the claim that what one sees is not mitigated by an image, which 
Husserl did claim in his early period.  While wedded to the intermediary of an image, 
Husserl was caught in a dualistic dilemma wherein the realm of conscious reflection was 
always of images and the world of objects was never present without mediation.  
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So Husserl went and looked again, reflected upon his looking again, and guarded 
carefully against being confused by “superficially acquired theories” while looking and 
reflecting.  The complexity that grew from this has ignited much of what continental 
philosophy is today.  Let us turn for a few pages to a general introduction of 
phenomenology in order to see how so much has begun from simply returning to the 
things themselves. 
 Phenomenology is inspired first by the presence of things which present 
themselves in various ways.  The initial task of phenomenological analysis is to disclose 
every manner of an object’s presentation - what makes that object appear the way it does.  
Phenomenology, in other words, attempts to be true to phenomena - to the way something 
looks.32  Capturing the how and why a thing looks the way it does, however, begins an 
unexpected, complex methodology.  First, an object does not have one look but many 
profiles as the same object is viewed from many different vantage points.  A book, any 
book, (Tolstoy’s War and Peace, Drew Carey’s Dirty Jokes and Beer, the books I 
shamelessly plagiarize to write this dissertation) cannot be judged by their cover, for not 
                                                                                                                                                 
Truthfully, Husserl’s early work often sounds quite Kantian with a dualism analogous to 
the phenomenal and neumenal realms. 
 
32 It is important to note that Husserl’s phenomenology is not simply a philosophy of 
vision or sense in general.  Husserl’s fountainhead, the Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. 
Findlay, 2 vols. ( New York: Humanities Press, 1970), did not discuss visible objects but 
speech, instead.  Husserl also avoids discussion of the visual in his 1908 lectures on 
meaning (Vorlesungen über Bedeutungslehre: Sommersemester 1908, ed. Ursula Panzer, 
Husserliana, Vol. 26 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), see chapters 1 and 
2) and in Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1969).  Nevertheless, the vast majority of Husserl’s work emphasizes vision and 
sensation, and while we may not find this emphasis worthy of direct criticism, it certainly 
leaves open the possibility of a broader understanding of phenomenology.  That 
phenomenology may be more than what Husserl envisioned, however, is something 
Husserl himself would hardly contest. 
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only can an observer notice a cover, but also the spine; the unadorned back; the 
smoothness, roughness, or shiny gold lined pages when the book is shut; the large, small, 
smudged print on open page 1, 2, 3, etc.; all of which make up the book’s appearing but 
which never appear all at once.  Not only would we describe these various profiles which 
one would term objective, but the full manifestness of an object also entails the 
judgements that the hard cover is beautiful, the unadorned pages are austere, the writing 
is insightful.  Consequently, the phenomenological analysis not only describes how an 
object appears, but it also reveals that manifestness is the result of a relationship between 
perceiver and perceived - for both appearings of judgement and objectiveness are the 
result of this relationship.  Any report a perceiver makes originates from a vantage point 
taken by the observer, whether one walks around the object or handles it, turning it this 
way and that. 
 Surely the claim that the description of an object’s appearing must originate from 
a situated perceiver does not raise philosophical eyebrows, but if phenomenology is to 
truly return to the things themselves, to be true to their appearing, then phenomenological 
description must not “forget” the role of the perceiver in the analysis of the manner of an 
object’s manifestness.  The sum of our lived experience with objects, the intricate 
interplay of attending to what is present and our subsequent recognition of its “sense,” 
comprises a subject’s “natural attitude.”33  One does not take up this attitude; one simply 
                                                 
33 Husserl defines the “sense” (Sinn) of an object as that consistent, reidentifiable pattern 
that gives what is present a certain determinateness.  Sinn, for Husserl, is broader in 
implication than Bedeutung (translated as “meaning” or “signification”) since it is used to 
refer to the whole of the experiential field.  Ideas I, 294. 
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exists precisely as situated in this manner by virtue of having experience.34  Husserl 
describes our embeddedness in the natural world in this way: “The natural world . . . is 
there for me continuously as long as I go on living naturally.  As long as this is the case I 
am ‘in the natural attitude.’”35   
 By renewed attention to the experience of one’s natural position, phenomenology 
includes in its analysis an often undervalued aspect of experiencing the presence of an 
object, the important role that absence and expectation play in appearing.  While I look at 
the profile of a closed book lying flat on a table from a position directly above the front 
cover facing up, most of the book is absent from my view.  The parts not present at this 
initial viewing today are co-given, anticipated from prior viewings of this very book or 
even from memory of repeatable qualities found in books in general in order to fill out 
the manifestness of the new viewing today.  Husserl describes the bringing into present 
awareness of anticipated profiles as a pre-grasping.  However, with the necessity of 
including the idea of a pre-grasping, has Husserl’s ground in experience already been 
compromised?  How can it be as Husserl would have it that perception is a direct 
grasping of the object itself when so much of the object is absent at each look?  Husserl, 
in fact, concedes that “in the content of the directly grasped in a given moment of 
                                                 
34 The realization that one exists as situated in the natural attitude is not self-evident to the 
natural attitude.  The natural attitude is a realization from a transcendental perspective 
that can render the structure of the natural attitude evident.  Nevertheless, that structure is 
not realized all at once, as though the transcendental perspective absolutely escapes the 
natural attitude to view the natural attitude from a position devoid of naïve notions.  The 
rendering evident of the natural attitude from the transcendental perspective takes place 
in a continual process wherein naïve notions are ferreted out and bracketed off for a 
clearer description of the structure.   
 
35 Husserl, Ideas I, §28. 
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perception there lie moments of the pre-grasp.  Basically, nothing in the perceived is 
purely and adequately perceived.”36 
 The inclusion of pre-grasp, objective profiles, and subject-object relationship in 
phenomenological description of lived experience were the start of a methodology that 
Husserl hoped would eventually result in a philosophy of description that should 
undergird and restart the thinking of the sciences.  The difference between 
phenomenology and the sciences, which are themselves methods of classification, 
description, and interpretation, has already been anticipated in our discussion of the 
importance of the tie between perceiver and perceived.  By emphasizing this relationship, 
the phenomenologist must avoid employing a language of objectification focused upon 
the item present but, rather, must employ a language of “reflection” wherein the 
experience of the object receives the emphasis.  Reflecting upon experience as moments 
of grasp and pre-grasp together, profile upon profile, requires that the description 
recognize the perception of an object as the recuperating of the perceiving as a lived 
experience, i.e. as a perceiving through time.  The process of describing the experience of 
an act of perceiving the world as it is present in a meaningful way discloses a field that 
conditions the object’s appearing and provides the act of perceiving with its 
meaningfulness.  Husserl often calls the process of disclosing this otherwise 
unrecognized field that meaningfully conditions active perceiving the “phenomenological 
reduction.”37  The reduction is the first step into a deeper methodology that will take 
                                                 
36 Edmund Husserl, Erste Philosophie II (1923/24), Part 2: Theorie der 
phänomenologischen Reduktion, ed. Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana, vol. 8 (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 45. 
 
37 While it may be more correct to discuss the reduction within the framework of 
Husserl’s transcendental turn, Donn Welton records that Husserl considered that the 
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phenomenology past a simple description done within the still naively accepted natural 
attitude.         
 The phenomenological reduction takes on a more specific meaning when Husserl 
begins his transcendental phenomenology.  In a passage from First Philosophy, Husserl 
explains the beginning of the transcendental move with respect to cognizing 
consciousness: 
 One must study cognizing life itself in its own essential achievements . . . and  
observe how consciousness in itself and according to its essential type constitutes   
and bears in itself objective sense and how it constitutes in itself “true” sense, in   
order then to find in itself the thus constituted sense as existing “in itself,” as true   
being and truth “in itself.”38    
 
In order to disclose the fields that meaningfully condition consciousness and present the 
phenomena of objects in the manner of their presentation, Husserl’s transcendental 
philosophy begins its methodology within cognizing consciousness itself.  The division 
between the immanent field of the self’s own conscious awareness and the field of 
objects of which one is conscious yet which remains transcendent to the self by virtue of 
the real existence of objects in themselves undergoes the phenomenological reduction as 
it is transcendentally understood to the effect that the relationship between the perceiver 
and perceived under the reduction allows for the study of the immanent field of 
                                                                                                                                                 
phenomenological reduction applied even to the Logical Investigations, a pre-
transcendental text.  Welton, The Other Husserl, 412, n.32.  Husserl’s lectures of 1925 
even discuss the reduction in conjunction with phenomenological psychology, which 
takes place within the “natural attitude.”  Edmund Husserl, Phenomenological 
Psychology: Lectures, Summer Semester 1925, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana, vol. 9 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 34, 144. 
 
38 Edmund Husserl, “Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy,” Southwestern 
Journal of Philosophy 5 (Fall 1974), 24.  This essay first appeared as part of Husserl’s 
Erste Philosophie I (1923/24), ed. Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana, vol. 7 (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 248.  A small modification in translation has been made.  
“Essential achievements” replaces “achievements of essence.” 
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consciousness to provide for objective sense.  In other words, by perceiving the things 
themselves within the life of consciousness, one may reflect upon the manner in which 
objects are meaningfully constituted within cognitive awareness in order to reveal how 
the “‘true’ sense” within consciousness discloses the sense of an object “in itself.”  What 
the reduction actually implies, then, is not a simple reducing of transcendent life to an 
immanent and ultimately solipsistic field of consciousness but a reduction that demands 
its findings to be reintroduced back into the realm of transcendence in an action of world 
affirmation. 
 The phenomenological reduction’s turning to immanent consciousness is not so 
simply done as turning to one’s experiences and memories of experience.  Certain 
presuppositions, especially the expectation of existence, under gird every aspect of the 
natural attitude, from the experience of objects to the very world itself.  The ontological 
expectation of the world as there has resulted in the many disciplines that describe the 
world as an objective totality.  In order to grasp the world phenomenologically, the world 
must be understood as a field or horizon that encompasses both subject and object, as a 
field outside of which the subject cannot take up a vantage point.  Consequently, the 
ontological expectation of the world as existing in an autonomous manner, a state in 
which the qualities of the world that are only meaningful in conscious experience are 
assumed to be independent of consciousness, must be put “out of play.”  Immanent 
reflection of cognizing consciousness alone, in a kind of supposed introspection, cannot 
effect such a “bracketing off”: “however carefully it (immanent reflection) may observe 
and analyze, however truly it may be directed toward my pure psychical life, toward the 
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pure inwardness of my soul, bare reflection remains natural, psychological reflection.”39  
The phenomenological reduction, the process which uses immanent reflection for the 
disclosing of the inclusive world horizon, must first begin with a suspension of naïve, 
especially naturalistic, belief in existence, which puts the natural attitude “out of play.”  
Husserl dubs this movement of exclusion the epochè.40                
 The exclusion enacted by the epoché is matched by a movement of inclusion in 
immanent reflection, which has gained the ability to surpass the natural viewing of the 
world as a totality of objects and that the subject is a self-enclosed region of self-
cognition.  The phenomenologist now understands that cognition, consciousness of 
experience, and intuited objects are not divided as a realm of immanence versus a realm 
of transcendence, but, rather, immanent reflection now provides the action that discloses 
immanence and transcendence as cohering within the unity of the integrative sense of 
something.  Husserl makes the claim as follows: “The world itself has its entire being as a 
certain ‘sense.’”41  Donn Welton clarifies that one’s “putting out of play that condition 
necessary for both the subject and the world to appear as ‘objects,’ as beings, gives us 
access to them in their being.”42  In other words, for an admittedly difficult concept, 
                                                 
39 Husserl, Erste Philosophie II, 79. 
 
40 Husserl, Ideas I, §32. 
 
41 Husserl, Ideas I, §55. 
 
42 Welton, The Other Husserl, 89. 
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instead of looking at the objects that are there, the phenomenological reduction reveals 
that field that makes the “there” there.43 
  Husserl describes the disclosed field that provides the conditions for the 
possibility of cognition in terms of certain structures.  Our daily lived experience must be 
described in terms that capture the quality of experience, which is clarified and stripped 
of its mundane, naive attitude in phenomenology by uncovering the structure of 
phenomena, each differentiation of which has been hinted at in our discussion thus far.  
The first structure of experience is that which Husserl and Heidegger call the sense of an 
object.  Sense is the characteristic of phenomena grounded in an object, all objects being 
determinate in the sense that they appear as something.  The as structure of appearing, 
however, does not give a meaningful object; it is that structure that allows for that 
                                                 
43 At this time, I must make some necessary remarks concerning the method of using 
immanent reflection, especially concerning Husserl’s reduction to the transcendental ego.  
This issue is difficult to place in “Phenomenology 101” for Husserl never abandons an 
“I” centered entry into the phenomenological disclosure of the field that makes the 
“there” there, but at the same time, certain issues appear to problematize the usage of this 
entry into phenomenology, and Husserl spends some time working out alternate entry 
levels.  The Idea of Phenomenology and Ideas I seem to place existence out of play in 
order to place the realm of transcendence within the immanent life of the subject.  Donn 
Welton argues in The Other Husserl, that “Husserl’s Cartesian treatment of subjectivity 
as a ‘remainder’ . . . requires this interpretation,” 92.  The lurking difficulty with this is 
that the subject appears as presumably existing even after existence was “bracketed” off.  
Consequently, immanent reflection within an existing subject would fall prey to the very 
objectifications Husserl wishes to avoid.  While this is certainly problematic, and will 
appear again as one of Levinas’s own criticisms of Husserl, Husserl arguably intended for 
the subject to also fall under the epochè.  Demonstrating Husserl’s own insight into the 
development of his phenomenological program, he makes similar criticisms of his 
Cartesianism in the Crisis texts.  Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. 
David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), § 43. 
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object’s appearing - what Husserl terms the “what” of an object.44  The object’s 
appearing as something to a perceiver is prior to any and all interpretation.  In order to 
discuss the significance of an object, Husserl unfolds the next structure of appearing 
which is the for structure wherein an object appears for a perceiver.  As we have seen, 
phenomenology takes the tie between subject and object to be necessary for appearing; 
thus the as and for structure of phenomena exhibit the same necessary bond.  In order for 
the sense of an object to be as something, it must appear for someone.  It is not the case, 
however, that we have two separate structures but, rather, two distinguishable aspects to 
the structure of appearing. 
  The intricacies to the structure of appearing are not exhausted in the relation of 
the as and for structure.  Not only does appearing take place as a result of the interrelation 
between the subject and the object, but the subject and object relationship occurs within a 
contextual field - what Husserl calls a horizon.  The horizon that accompanies an 
appearing object is not itself a phenomenon, but that which makes possible the object’s 
appearing in the manner that it does.  A common mistake is to speak of an object’s 
properties, hoping to get at “what” it is, as though one could divorce the object from its 
surroundings, as though the experience of the object had occurred, metaphorically 
speaking, in a vacuum.  What appears comes to light in a context, embedded in its 
surroundings in such a way that the horizon of the object is, on the one hand, the ground 
of that object, meaning that from its context that which appears acquires its specificity 
and possibly its generation.  The horizon, on the other hand, also serves as the dimension 
                                                 
44 Husserl, Ideas I, §130.  Heidegger retains this same distinction, but his refers to the 
“what” as a property drawn from the object as present at hand.  Martin Heidegger, Being 
and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 
1962), 192f, 200. 
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of possible appearing that becomes clear as the multiple perspectives of an object are 
unified in an observer’s lived experience.  We can term this horizonal structure as the in 
structure of appearing for it is necessary that all experience occur within the framework 
of the horizon.     
 The horizon as represented by the in structure of appearing, even though it is not 
itself representable as a phenomenon, is still disclosable insofar as one’s focus object can 
shift to other objects that make up the surroundings.  Husserl does, however, refer to a 
horizonal structure that is at once not representable as phenomenon but also remains 
hidden from disclosure in the manner in which an object can be disclosed.  To this point, 
the possibility of appearing occurs with the fulfillment of a “what” that manifests itself as 
something for a perceiver in a contextual field.  Each of these three elements to appearing 
is disclosable by the phenomenological attitude that reflects upon our consciousness of 
the world after one has enacted the phenomenological reduction, but the hidden structure 
from which the in structure receives its possibility of being is not disclosable by direct 
reflection.  The problem is that as the eminent horizon of an object is possible from its 
transcendental conditions we are always already under these conditions and cannot gain a 
vantage point outside them in order to render them in an objective fashion. 
 The issue of the from structure of appearing is the issue of ultimates, of those 
structures that provide the possibility of the totality of appearing.  At this point we enter 
the stage where Husserl and Fink were in a close working relationship.45  Husserl 
abandoned the revising of the Meditations, leaving the process solely in the hands of 
                                                 
45 For the extended story that depicts the interweaving of thoughts between teacher and 
student, see Ronald Bruzina’s first chapter, “Contextual Narrative: The Freiburg 
Phenomenology Workshop, 1925-1938,” in Edmund Husserl & Eugen Fink. 
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Fink.  Fink’s subsequent work lead him to question some of those aspects of 
phenomenology that had been intricately and almost inextricably involved in Husserl’s 
corpus - namely the Cartesian, egoic nature of the phenomenological reduction.  It is 
important to note that Fink’s work was done under close supervision by Husserl and that 
Fink’s notes record Husserl’s answers to questions that Fink raised.  Consequently, we do 
not have a reworking of phenomenology peculiar to Fink, but one that expresses much of 
Husserl’s thinking without Husserl having written those thoughts himself.  The ego 
centered reduction is just such a case.  Husserl’s work continually reaffirms this method 
of entry into phenomenology, but by the time of the Cartesian Meditations and the Crisis-
texts, he offers other possible points of entry as well as making the claim at one point in 
the Crisis that the transcendental egoic subject has “nothing human” about it.46 Because 
the topos from which the reduction performs its reflective descriptions is characterized by 
Husserl as egoic, as though it were a privileged position of the subject pole in the subject 
object relationship, a question arises when considering those structures which seem to 
also include the subject within their respective frameworks.  Fink asks Husserl about this 
problem with respect to transcendentally constituting time-consciousness: “Does the pure 
stream of lived experience have a beginning, an end?  Does ‘worldly’ talk of death and 
birth coincide with the problem of the beginning and end of transcendental time-
consciousness?”47  If Husserl holds to the topos of the egoic reduction as equivalent to a 
special function of the subject, then he would have to answer Fink in the affirmative, 
consequently revealing an affinity with Kant.  Husserl, however, begins his answer with: 
                                                 
46 Bruzina, The End of Phenomenology, 14 n. 16. 
 
47 Ibid., 15. 
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“Self-constituting temporality cannot begin and cannot end,” which immediately 
distances the subject’s lived life from birth to death from having any transcendental 
power over temporality.  He goes on to strengthen the implication of such a rift by 
redirecting the question: “What you have to ask is, Is the stream of egological lived 
experience as such to be considered wholly independently from transcendental 
intersubjectivity, must not the basic ‘genetic’ aporias be investigated in connection with 
the all encompassing structures of totality.”48  Husserl’s redirection affirms for Fink that 
the from structure of appearing, those structures of totality, the ultimates, the absolute 
must be considered together with, but distinct from, the ego of the transcendental mode of 
the phenomenological reduction. 
Levinas and Heideggerian Phenomenology 
 Levinas has always considered his philosophy to be allied with phenomenology as 
its most basic methodology, and in particular, Levinas places himself squarely in the 
tradition left by Edmund Husserl.  Of his time spent in Freiburg, Levinas claims, “it was 
little by little that the essential truth of Husserl, which I still believe today, emerged into 
my mind.”49  Nevertheless, what a philosopher cares to claim about his philosophy does 
not, necessarily, make it so.  In the case of Levinas and his phenomenological 
allegiances, the case against his Husserlianism begins with the remainder of our quote 
just above, for even though Levinas still believes in the central truths of Husserl, he also 
asserts that “I do not at all obey his school’s precepts.”50  Could it be that Levinas never 
                                                 
48 Bruzina, The End of Phenomenology, 15. 
 
49 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 30. 
 
50 Ibid., 30. 
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clearly assimilated what Husserl had to say?  Let us turn to Husserl’s own reading of 
Levinas’s doctoral thesis, The Theory of Intuition in the Phenomenology of Husserl.51  In 
a letter to Welch, after lamenting those who have misunderstood his phenomenology, a 
list including Scheler, Heidegger, and Hering-Strassburg, Husserl mentions Levinas’s 
recent publication and complains that it “brings my phenomenology [down] to the same 
level as the Heideggerian and, thereby, robs it of its authentic sense.”52 
 Heidegger’s influence upon Levinas is undeniable.  Levinas’s dissertation, while 
written strictly on Husserl, makes several references to Heidegger, but in order to validate 
Husserl’s claim that Levinas’s work presents an inauthentic phenomenology, we must 
first briefly investigate what Husserl finds so unpalatable in his chosen successor.  After 
the publication of Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic in June of 1927, Husserl 
dedicated the next two months to reading Being and Time.  The conclusions he draws 
concerning Heidegger’s philosophy are clearly written in the margins of his own copy of 
Being and Time.  Husserl remarks, “In my sense, that is the way to an intentional 
psychology of personality in the broadest sense, moving out from personal life in the 
world . . .”  This follows more critical commentary three pages prior, “Heidegger 
transposes or transvests the constitutive, phenomenological clarification of all regions of 
beings and universals, of the total region, world, into the anthropological.  The entire 
                                                 
51 While we will make The Theory of Intuition one of our primary texts for review in this 
section, there is some concern as to whether Levinas’s dissertation is relevant for his 
philosophy.  When Sean Hand, the editor of The Levinas Reader (Oxford: Blackwell 
Press, 1989), asked Levinas if he could include a selection from the dissertation, Levinas 
assented with the caveat that Hand also include Levinas’s declaration that this work was 
“ancient history” p. 11.  Levinas, certainly, does evolve in his understanding of 
phenomenology, but I have remarked throughout this section that the chief criticism of 
Husserl which appears in The Theory of Intuition holds for all of Levinas’s philosophy.   
 
52 Edmund Husserl, Letter to Welch, June 17 and 21, 1933, Briefwechsel, 3/6, 458. 
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problematic is a transference; Dasein corresponds to the ego, etc.  Thereby everything 
becomes profoundly unclear and philosophically it loses its value.”53  Husserl, without 
specifically mentioning Heidegger but with Heidegger as his clear target, concludes in 
the “Epilogue” to Ideas II (reprinted 1931) that Heideggerian phenomenology is neither 
radical nor scientific, completely misunderstanding the nature of the phenomenological 
reduction and falling prey to the very aporias of psychologism with which Husserl 
intended his method to do away. 
 The phenomenological reduction, the move from the natural attitude of empirical 
consciousness to transcendental consciousness, was Husserl’s answer to the problems of 
psychologism.  Husserl criticizes empirical psychology for not recognizing the following: 
1. Consciousness is always intentional, meaning that it is always “conscious of” an object 
in the object’s transcendence and ideality, and 2. Intentional consciousness, in itself, 
would be purified of any empirical apperception as a psychophysical fact.54  
Transcendental phenomenology, then, makes the relationship between intending acts of 
consciousness and the object at which it aims the focus of investigation simultaneously 
dispossessing objects of their independence from consciousness while ensuring their 
                                                 
53 Edmund Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the 
Confrontation with Heidegger (1927 – 1931), trans. and ed. Thomas Sheehan and 
Richard Palmer, Husserliana, vol. 6 (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997). 
 
54 Here I am following Rudolf Bernet’s discussion of Husserlian consciousness, which he 
wants to distinguish from the popular late nineteenth century understanding that follows 
either empirical psychology or the transcendental in a Neo-Kantian sense.  Rudolf Bernet, 
“Levinas’s Critique of Husserl,” in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, eds. Simon 
Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 82 – 
84. 
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transcendence.55  If Husserl understands Heideggerian phenomenology as a psychologism 
that places the world as both collection of beings and horizon of all being within the 
grasp of an un-reduced ego, then his criticism is, explicitly, that Heidegger cannot 
disclose anything beyond a human way of analysis, a way that imports unsubstantiated 
presuppositions.  For Husserl to claim that Levinas reduces phenomenology to the 
Heideggerian means that Levinas also fails to properly understand the method of the 
reduction and the manner in which the reduction safeguards the transcendence of 
intentional objects.    
 Heidegger, however, would not characterize Dasein simply as the ego or his way 
into phenomenology as anthropology.  The complaint held by Husserl concerning the 
impropriety of Heidegger’s starting point seems to be a mutual complaint held by 
Heidegger against Husserl, and Levinas will have paid particular attention to these in his 
reading of Being and Time and his attending of Heidegger’s lectures.  For Heidegger, 
Husserl’s transcendental ego represents a position that one takes up in order to do 
phenomenology, but it is a position which phenomenology cannot allow in the first place.  
Heidegger claims in his 1920 – 21 lectures, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, that 
“the point of departure of the path of philosophy is the factical life experience.”56  
                                                 
55 Transcendence, in this section, will primarily mean the transcendence of an object as 
apart from a subject.  The nature of intentional consciousness, as we shall see will allow 
us to argue that we can consider the transcendent object to be accessible within immanent 
reflection, what we mean when we say that the object is dispossessed of its independence 
from consciousness.  Within immanent reflection, the perceived object as it is perceived 
(noema) is perceived in a multiplicity of views, but this multiplicity is found to have a 
constant, singular identity.  This singular “X” of identity is also considered as 
“transcendent” by Husserl, but this will not be the main use of “transcendent” here. 
 
56 Martin Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. Matthias Fritsch and 
Jennifer Anna Gossetti-Ferencci (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 8.  
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Factical life is the entirety of experience, both the active and passive attitude of the 
human being.  What is experienced, Heidegger explains, is designated as “world,” the 
milieu in which one lives.  The relation, the manner, or the “how” one experiences the 
“world” is not, however, a part of the factical life experience.  Phenomenology is that 
process of disclosing the manner of living in the “world,” and that manner with which all 
factical life addresses the world is, according to Heidegger, through significance: “All of 
my factical life situations are experienced in the manner of significance which determines 
the content of experience itself.  This becomes clear if I ask myself how I experience 
myself in factical life experience.”57  Onto this last sentence, Heidegger parenthetically 
adds, “no theories!” as if to suggest that any phenomenology that does not begin by 
simply addressing where one is must be relying upon a theory at its beginning, a 
postulated starting point.  Without naming Husserl, Heidegger makes his critique of 
theory more explicitly contra Husserl’s phenomenological reflection: “This self-
experience is no theoretical ‘reflection,’ no ‘inner perception,’ or the like, but is self-
worldly experience.”58   
 At this point, let us not become too embroiled in the discussion concerning who 
has the purest reading of phenomenology’s philosophical foundations, whether we 
consider Husserl, Heidegger or Levinas.  For now, it is sufficient to uncover Levinas’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
While Levinas would not have attended this early lecture, I cite this portion here because 
it would be exemplary of the kinds of things Levinas would have heard in his lectures or 
talks with Heidegger.  This particular quote and those following come from the 
“Methodological Introduction: Philosophy, Factical Life Experience, and the 
Phenomenology of Religion.”  Here, Heidegger shows the fullness of his conceptions that 
will serve as his critique of Husserl at a very early stage.  
 
57 Ibid., 9. 
 
58 Ibid., 10. 
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understanding of phenomenology.  Along the way, I shall make some comments to 
ensure that a proper reading of Husserlian phenomenology is not lost.  The implication is 
that while Levinas is a careful reader of Husserl, he is not a perfect reader.  Nevertheless, 
we shall conclude with a look at Levinas’s mature understanding, which, I argue, does 
indeed hold on to the “spirit” of phenomenology. 
 One can imagine Husserl’s dismay at his first reading of Levinas’s Theory of 
Intuition, which was copywrited in 1930, a time well after Husserl’s awakening to 
Heidegger’s critique.  Levinas boldly states in his introduction concerning his thesis that 
“we shall not fear to take into account problems raised by other philosophers, by students 
of Husserl, and, in particular, by Martin Heidegger, whose influence on this book will 
often be felt.”59  Levinas, however, goes beyond a simple rehashing of the 
phenomenological debate to make the stunning suggestion that Husserl’s 
phenomenology, once understood aright, moves beyond its epistemological premises to 
the properly ontological: “We may discover that in the guise of epistemology Husserl 
pursues interests that are essentially ontological.”60  Indeed, given Levinas’s tutelage 
under Heidegger, when Levinas makes the link between Husserl and ontology, he seems 
to mean ontology in a Heideggerian sense.61 
                                                 
59 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition, lx. 
 
60 Ibid., 124. 
 
61 Levinas even makes the claim, “such a powerful and original philosophy as 
Heidegger’s . . . is to some extent only the continuation of Husserlian phenomenology.”  
Theory of Intuition, 15.  Several writers have taken this statement to mean that Levinas 
sees Husserl as a proto-Heideggerian and that the primary value of Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology was to prepare the way for Heidegger’s ontological 
phenomenology, e.g. Robert Manning, Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1993).  The question we shall have to answer in 
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 Levinas’s two main criticisms of Husserl as they appear in his dissertation are as 
follows: 1. While Husserl describes consciousness as intentional, as open to all modes of 
phenomena, he begins with theoretical consciousness as primary and necessary and 
without being argued for before any other mode of experience can be properly 
understood, and 2. Because Husserl relies upon theoretical starting points, the 
phenomenological reduction never escapes the naïve attitude.  Both of Levinas’s points 
were first broached by Heidegger whose answer to the problem was an ontological 
analysis of Dasein from the starting point of factical life, which Husserl deemed 
anthropology.  Levinas approaches the first criticism starting with his description of “The 
Phenomenological Theory of Being,” the primary title to chapters two and three of his 
dissertation, where phenomenology’s ontological program is revealed, finally arriving at 
chapter four and a discussion of the theory presumed in Husserl’s phenomenology.  The 
second criticism, which asks how the phenomenological reduction is to be accomplished, 
appears throughout the last half of the dissertation but never in a lengthy discussion.  In 
fact, Levinas’s only suggestion for a solution to this dilemma comes with some brief 
references to Heidegger’s philosophy.  Let us examine how Levinas develops these 
Heideggerian criticisms in his Theory of Intuition. 
 Levinas’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology views the reduction as the 
moment of opening into an ontological philosophy.  I have argued that Husserl’s 
reduction recognized that the being of the world is experienced by consciousness as a 
certain “sense,” and the goal of the reduction was to uncover the epistemological 
framework that provided the conditions of the manifest “sense.”  Levinas’s early 
                                                                                                                                                 
part 3 of chapter one is “does Levinas’s statement claim Heidegger’s superior position to 
Husserl or does it mean that what is admirable in Heidegger is his Husserlianism.” 
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understanding, however, claims that the reduction allows one to move from experience 
and sense to the properly ontological, a move which can only be possible given 
consciousness as absolute.   
The analysis of immanent perception,” he argues, “leads us to the absolute 
position of consciousness, to the impossibility of denying its existence.   
 ‘When reflective perception is directed toward my Erlebnis, what is perceived is   
an absolute self (absolutes Selbst), the existence of which cannot in principle be   
denied; that is, it is in principle impossible to suppose that it does not exist.  To   
say of an Erlebnis given in such a way that it does not exist would be nonsense.’ 
We seem to be in the presence of the Cartesian cogito; there is no doubt about the 
relationship between the two ideas, and Husserl realizes it.62   
 
Levinas explains that Husserl does not delve deeply into what it means for consciousness 
to be absolute, only that Husserl asserts that it is; however, Levinas attempts to make the 
argument given what little Husserl does discuss.  What makes Husserl’s absolute 
consciousness different from and a step beyond Descartes’ is his sensitivity to multiple 
possible meanings of the term existence.  One of Descartes’ mistakes was defining the 
existence of consciousness in the same manner as the existence of objects, but 
consciousness, while it can become an object of itself, does not always exist in the 
manner of objects.  Levinas explains, “The specific mode of existence of consciousness – 
its absoluteness and its independence from reflection – consists in its existing for itself, 
prior to being taken in any way as an object by reflection.  Consciousness exists in such a 
way that it is constantly present to itself.”63  As always present to itself, what appears in 
immanent reflection is always adequate to immanent perception, meaning there is no 
                                                 
62 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition, 28.  Here Levinas discusses what it means for 
consciousness to be absolute, quoting Husserl’s Ideas, § 46.  It is also helpful to read 
André Orianne’s “Translator’s Foreword,” in The Theory of Intuition, xxxv ff. 
 
63 Ibid., 30. 
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distinction between what is and what appears in the realm of consciousness, meaning one 
can properly determine the essence of an object as it appears in conscious reflection.  By 
taking into account both the absolute existence of consciousness along with the adequate 
perception of essence within consciousness, Levinas sums up Husserl’s ontological leap 
forward as follows: 
 Husserl’s step forward beyond Descartes consists in not separating the knowledge 
 of an object – or, more generally, the mode of appearing of an object in our life –   
from its being; it consists of seeing the mode of its being known as the expression  
and the characteristic of its mode of being.  This is why, in Husserl’s philosophy,   
there is for the first time a possibility of passing from and through the theory of   
knowledge to the theory of being.64      
 
 The discovery of the absoluteness of consciousness via the constant possibility of 
consciousness being able to reflect upon itself relies entirely upon a theoretical argument, 
which relates to Levinas’s first criticism.  Having argued that the absoluteness of 
consciousness is only discoverable in immanent reflection, Levinas criticizes this 
argument for its theoretical dependency, for reflection is a theoretical act.  Once again, 
we hear Heidegger’s admonition against beginning with any kind of “inner reflection.”    
The failed result for phenomenology is that consciousness’s absolute existence is 
theoretically presumed when its absolute nature demands that it be argued for and 
explicated as itself foundational and ground.65  Levinas’s critique of Husserl’s preference 
                                                 
64 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition, 32. 
 
65 In reply to Levinas’s criticism, allow me to say that because one begins with a 
theoretical act aimed at explaining the absolute nature of consciousness does not mean 
that Husserl has theoretically presupposed theory as primary or consciousness as 
absolute.  For Husserl, this is a beginning, and all beginnings must be re-evaluated time 
after time as the nature of consciousness becomes evident until even the presupposed 
theory in the beginning finds its ground in the absolute nature of consciousness.  Such a 
move would not be unlike Descartes claiming to build an epistemological structure from 
the truth of the cogito which provides the foundation for knowing the truth of God and 
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for theory – “no theories!” – will deepen with his discussion of intentionality as the 
subjective mode of consciousness. 
 Having argued for and critiqued Husserl’s absolute ground of consciousness, 
Levinas turns his explication of phenomenology to the mode in which consciousness 
operates: intentionality.  “Intentionality is, for Husserl, a genuine act of transcendence 
and the very prototype of any transcendence.”66  Levinas uses this as a working definition 
and means that intentionality is that which allows consciousness to reach an actual object 
that is not reliant upon consciousness for its existence, consequently distinguishing 
Husserl from Berkeleian idealism.  Whereas Berkeley does not distinguish between 
sense-data and the qualities of objects, Husserl draws a sharp line.  We are not, however, 
left with a dualism between what is sensed in consciousness and what exists as the 
inherent properties of an object.67  Intentionality is the very openness of consciousness, a 
revisiting and deepening of the scholastic idea that consciousness is always 
consciousness of something.  The pertinent question surrounding intentionality’s 
openness is: How does intentionality relate the subject to a transcendent object? 
                                                                                                                                                 
later affirming that God must be the foundation for even the cogito.  If it were the case 
that Husserl never revisited his starting points, then Levinas’s criticism would hold fast, 
but Husserl is a born beginner, starting over and evaluating his starting points throughout 
his philosophical career. 
 
66 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition, 40. 
 
67 Without careful explication it would be easy to argue that Husserl’s phenomenology 
from Ideas I does draw a sharp ontological line between consciousness and objects; 
however, Husserl’s concept of intentionality clearly creates a field that includes the 
transcendent within the immanence of consciousness.  Husserl’s Cartesian methodology 
for investigating this field, on the other hand, reconstitutes this division. 
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 Reaffirming that consciousness always has an object is hardly a philosophical 
innovation; nevertheless, once Husserl takes this concept and classifies it as 
intentionality, he wrests intentionality and, subsequently, consciousness from empirical, 
substantialist, or naturalistic interpretations.68  The issue is whether or not intentional 
relation should be viewed as a property of consciousness, one activity among others, or as 
the very manner of existence for consciousness.  Levinas understands the importance of 
the question and explicates Husserl as follows: 
Intentionality is not the way in which a subject tries to make contact with an 
object that exists beside it.  Intentionality is what makes up the very subjectivity of 
subjects.  The very reality of subjects consists in their transcending themselves.  
The problem of the relation between subject and object was justified by a 
substantialist ontology which conceived existence on the model of things resting 
in themselves.  Then, any relation to something alien was extremely mysterious.69 
 
Levinas concludes, and rightly so, that Husserl wants to establish intentionality as the 
mode of conscious existence such that the conscious subject is always, already in relation 
to transcendent objects.  This means, however, that the appellation of subject is already 
derivative, for it expects a separated object as its counterpart, but intentionality’s 
relational modality means that both “subject” and “object” are derived from a singular 
                                                 
68 We shall note several times that Husserl rewords, reworks, or completely reconstructs 
pieces of his philosophy time and again.  The importance of intentionality is central, as 
has already been discussed, but Husserl did not easily free intentionality from the classic 
empirical tradition.  Levinas recounts the maturation of Husserl’s philosophy between the 
writing of the Logical Investigations and  Ideas I as a movement away from classic 
empirical oppositions.  Husserl’s Investigations describes the analysis of intentional 
consciousness in terms of “hyletic data” (Empfindungen – sensations), acts, and 
intentions.  The correlates of the data, acts, and intentions are objects of the world that sit 
in opposition to consciousness.  Ideas, as we shall see, brings more consistency to 
Husserl’s account of intentionality by eliminating the opposition, if not the distinction, 
between consciousness and its objects. 
 
69 Levinas, Theory of Intuition, 41. 
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unified field, the field of consciousness.70  Those intentional relations that characterize 
the field of consciousness include theoretical acts, which are the correlation between a 
world of things and sense acts, and practical acts, which are the correlation between 
objects and their usefulness or value.  These intentional acts encompass the whole of 
lived experience, and phenomenology proposes the necessity that all must be investigated 
to determine the constitution of the world as experienced.   
 Levinas’s criticism of Husserl specifically turns on his understanding of the 
theoretical acts of intentionality, a criticism with which we are already familiar because it 
follows Levinas’s critique of the absoluteness of consciousness and the theoretical 
dependency beneath that argument, for in Levinas’s view, Husserl’s phenomenological 
program, from its inception, grounds all intentional acts in the theoretical.  If Husserl’s 
notion of intentionality does rely upon the theoretical to ground all other intentions, then 
phenomenology, in Husserl’s formulation, begins with a presupposition, the very kind of 
prejudice phenomenology attempts to avoid.  The root of this criticism arises from 
Levinas’s reading of the Logical Investigations and Husserl’s coming to grips with 
Brentano’s assertion that “acts are either representations or founded upon 
representations.”71  Here, representation does not mean the re-presentation of an object to 
                                                 
70 Within intentional consciousness, Husserl distinguishes between the subjective 
apprehensions, noeses, and the correlates of those, noemata, which relate to the object of 
consciousness as correlate: Husserl, Ideas I, § 85, 88.  This relation within consciousness 
allows for the possibility of expressing the as and for structure.  Levinas’s criticism of 
Husserl will undermine the claim that subject and object are derivative, for Levinas will 
accuse Husserl of prefering the noetic over the noema and the role of the subject over the 
role of the object. 
 
71 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, 556.  Levinas discusses this quote in Theory 
of Intuition, 57.  While Levinas would contend that his understanding of phenomenology 
grew after his dissertation, he retained his critique, even grounding his critique in 
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consciousness but representation as an act of consciousness, which, for Husserl, would 
focus upon the constitution of the “matter,” “sense,” or “noema” of consciousness insofar 
as each of these refers to the “what” consciousness grasps or the as structure of 
consciousness.  However, the as structure which stands as the characterization of the 
constitution of the object of consciousness must be teased out from the distinguishable 
as/for structures of appearing, arriving at a description of the object in its pre-theoretical 
presentation as a “what” as opposed to the “how” of its appearing for someone after the 
interpretive process occurs.  Admittedly, such laying out of the pre-theoretical without 
interpretation is a theoretical modification of the original experience that presents itself in 
the as/for manner.  The as structure realizes what Levinas finds to be the realist 
underpinnings of Husserl’s Logical Investigations where the “objectifying acts reach a 
being which exists independently of consciousness, and that the function of non-
objectifying acts is to relate to these objects without contributing anything to their real 
constitution.”72  Consequently, Levinas finds, in Husserl, objectifying/theoretical acts to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Brentanto’s statement, throughout.  In 1983, explicating his own work, Levinas remarks 
about Husserl’s phenomenology, “the intentional structure of consciousness is . . . 
characterized by representation.  It would be at the base of all theoretical and non-
theoretical consciousness.  This thesis of Brentano keeps its validity for Husserl in spite 
of all the precautions the latter brought and all the precautions with which he surrounded 
it in the notion of objectivizing acts.”  Emmanuel Levinas, “La Conscience Non-
Intentionelle,” in Philosophes Critiues d’eux-memes, vol. 10 (New York: Peter Lang, 
1983), 15.  My translation. 
 
72 Levinas, Theory of Intuition, 62.  Levinas seems to be arguing that the objectification 
being done by theoretical intentionality is the positing of its object as a “non-immanent” 
existent.  Consciousness, then, is always thinking the real existence of objects.  If this is 
the case, then it is easy to see how Levinas sees Husserl’s work as ontological, for what 
are first presented as epistemological conditions are reconceived as ontological ones in 
light of an existing object of consciousness.  But Levinas understands that the 
phenomenological reduction calls for a release from ontological considerations.  He 
complains that Husserl’s philosophy “demonstrates that the notion of existence remains 
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be foundational and all other intentions to be grafted onto the theoretical.  In other words, 
before there can be a primary field of relation where subject and object are derivative 
terms, there must be something like an intentional assertion that objects are there to be 
desired or valued or found useful. 
 At this point, we do need to make a corrective note concerning Levinas’s 
interpretation that Husserl depends upon representation.  When Levinas wrote the Theory 
of Intuition there were no other translations of Husserl’s works; consequently, the French 
terminology set in his dissertation were the result of his understanding of Husserl’s 
vocabulary alone.  In the case of representation, Levinas chose a term that most 
translators and interpreters of Husserl deem incongruent with Husserl’s phenomenology, 
and I agree.73  The very idea of re-presentation assumes that something that was present 
is being made present again.  For Levinas and his careful discussion of Husserl’s acts of 
consciousness, re-presentation is more than simply presenting an object again, but the 
effect is similar.  Based upon his view that Husserl’s phenomenology is at root an 
ontology, the re-presenting act presents again the ontological status of what is 
phenomenologically intended, that an object is there for the possibility of other 
intentional relations.  This claim, however, seems fundamentally opposed to the very idea 
                                                                                                                                                 
for [Husserl] tightly bound to the notion of theory, to the notion of knowledge, despite all 
the elements in his system which seem to lead us to a richer notion of existence than mere 
presence of an object to a contemplative consciousness,” 134 (My italics). 
 
73 André Orianne, the translator for the English version of Levinas’s dissertation makes 
this comment at the very beginning.  Instead of translating Levinas’s French translation 
of Husserl into English, Orianne felt it would be better to use the established English 
translations.  Whenever Levinas’s explication calls for “representation,” Orianne renders 
it as such, but in those quotes to which Levinas refers, “representation” does not appear 
but, rather, “presentation.”  The difference suggests a different way of understanding 
what Husserl is saying. 
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of intentionality, which is always in relation to an object being “presented.”  After many 
translators and students of Husserl have worked upon Husserl’s texts, the consensus is 
that the proper translation for Vorstellung is not “representation” but simply 
“presentation.”  The difference in these translations could mean the difference in whether 
or not Levinas has a correct understanding of Husserl or not.  In fact, as it pertains to 
Levinas’s understanding of “representation,” he does not read Husserl well, but we do not 
need to correct that here.  As we shall see in the third section of this chapter, Levinas 
clearly understands the “spirit” of Husserl’s phenomenology when he finds within 
Husserl arguments to reject “representation.”     
 Having interpreted Husserl as presupposing theory, Levinas broaches two 
questions already asked by Heidegger: 1. How is the phenomenological reduction 
possible in Husserl’s phenomenology if the transcendental subject to which Husserl 
reduces the conscious self is already theoretically presumed?  2. What is the main attitude 
toward reality if not that of theoretical contemplation, i.e., where does the 
phenomenologist start? 
 In regard to our first question, Levinas summarizes the nature of his critique of 
Husserl’s dependence upon the theoretical with these remarks in the conclusion of his 
dissertation: “The freedom and impulse which lead us to reduction and philosophical 
intuition present by themselves nothing new with respect to the freedom and stimulation 
of theory.  The latter is taken as primary, so that Husserl gives himself the freedom of 
theory just as he gives himself theory.”74  If it is the case, as Levinas argues, that Husserl 
relies upon objectification at the basis of all intentional acts, then the theoretical 
                                                 
74 Levinas, Theory of Intuition, 157. 
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dimension is presupposed rather than supported.  Self-given theory undermines the 
possibility of a phenomenological reduction in two ways.  On the one hand, the ability for 
a situated phenomenological observer to realize the naïve attitude and escape it appears in 
jeopardy.  Theoretically, a phenomenologist reflects upon conscious acts with the 
realization that consciousness is absolutely given, according to theoretical 
argumentation.75  The difficulty lies in the nature of theoretical consciousness being 
present within the naïve attitude, and if it is so present, then it cannot be used as a way 
out of that naïveté.  On the other hand, with regard to the second difficulty, if the 
transcendental subject of Husserl’s phenomenology must rely upon a theoretical ground, 
then acts of consciousness are always, already under theoretical scrutiny.  As such, the 
lived experiences of surprise, the unsuspected, and horror seem logicaly impossible since 
these experiences presuppose a lack of observation wherein the theoretical is thwarted, in 
some way, from making full sense of the act.    
 Levinas’s criticism of Husserl reveals the Heideggerian influence, and Levinas 
does little in the way of offering a correction for the theoretical dependency he uncovers; 
however, what correction is present owes its entirety to Heidegger.  In the place of 
Husserl’s transcendental consciousness, Levinas offers Heidegger’s existential field of 
“care”:  “Is not the world presented in its very being as a center of action, as a field of 
                                                 
75 We can emphasize the Heideggerian origin of Levinas’s criticism by reference to Being 
and Time, just one of several materials with which Levinas was familiar which could 
give rise to his critique.  In § 25, Heidegger discusses the “who” of Dasein and asks “Is it 
then a priori self-evident that the access to Da-sein must be simple perceiving reflection 
of the I of acts?”  If phenomenology is to uncover the ontological conditions of Being, it 
cannot do so under ontic reflection, an obvious jab at Husserl’s transcendental, yet 
theoretically bound, subject. 
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activity or of care – to speak the language of Martin Heidegger.”76  That which is 
investigated is that which matters to the conscious subject, a field of value and history.77  
If we are in a search for the origins of reality, then we must search for those origns within 
life.  In these few remarks and the critique of theory, Levinas aligns himself with the very 
ideas which Husserl considered anthropology when reading Being and Time. 
Derrida, Levinas, and Heideggerian Ontology 
 For a time after the dissertation, Levinas pursued his study of Heidegger, 
enamored with ontological phenomenology.  In 1932, he published the article, “Martin 
Heidegger and Ontology.”78  He explained in a footnote that the article was the workings 
of the early chapters of a book on the subject.  Levinas, therein, esteemed Heidegger as 
“one of the apogees of the phenomenological movement” and that “fame has not been 
mistaken and did not come too late.”79  Levinas never completed the book he had 
promised, and the praise for Heidegger that appeared in the 1932 essay had been muted 
when the article was reprinted in 1949 as a part of a collection of essays by Levinas 
entitled, Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger.  What happened in the 
                                                 
76 Levinas, Theory of Intution, 119. 
 
77 Heidegger was not the only one to be working on Husserl’s lack of historicity.  Husserl 
was also familiar with this criticism from Georg Misch, Lebensphilosophie und 
Phänomenologie: eine Auseinandersetzung d. Dilthey’schen richtung m. Heidegger u. 
Husserl (Bonn: Cohen, 1930). 
 
78 Emmanuel Levinas, “Martin Heidegger and Ontology,” in Revue Philosophique de la 
France et de l’Etranger 57 (1932), 395 – 431.  A slightly revised edition appears in En 
découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris: Vrin, 1949), 53 – 76. 
 
79 Ibid., 395. 
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intervening years on the world stage with National Socialism and World War II had 
changed Levinas’s outlook concerning Heidegger’s philosophy.     
 Levinas’s move away from Heideggerrian ontology and his reason for never 
completing the book which “Martin Heidegger and Ontology” was meant to begin was as 
much a result of political history as it was a difference in philosophy.  In fact, 
Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism undermined for Levinas the positive 
possibilities he had envisioned after reading Being and Time.80  The starting point of a 
Dasein centered account of being, as it appeared in Heidegger’s enduring work, was 
reconceived in the early thirties by Heidegger in the form of an account of the history of 
being.  Heidegger’s account of history was apocalyptic – inauthentic lives caught up in a 
“technological frenzy” were at the point of bringing “annihilation.”81  The Weimar 
Republic’s economic debacle had left Germany poor, defenseless, and unstable.  National 
Socialism seemed to offer recourse out of History’s spiral with promises to re-establish 
the values and simplicity of the past.  Heidegger’s “Rectoral Address” (May 27, 1933) 
encapsulates his optimism for the conservative movement underway: “[The beginning of 
our spiritual historical being] does not lie behind us, as something that was long ago, but 
stands before us . . . There it awaits us, as a distant command bidding us catch up with its 
                                                 
80 Levinas’s positive reading of Being and Time are evident throughout his writings.  In 
1981, on a radio interview in France now in print as Ethics and Infinity, Levinas 
recognizes that the homage he pays to Heidegger, “seems pale to the enthusiastic 
disciples of the great philosopher,” 41.  Nevertheless, he asserts that Being and Time is a 
“sovereign exercise of phenomenology” and “this exercise is extremely brilliant and 
convincing,” 39 – 40. 
 
81 Heidegger makes this historical turn transparent in his 1935 lecture course: An 
Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1959) 31 – 32. 
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greatness.”82  This mission of retrieving one’s spiritual beginning from the future was one 
for the “German Volk.”  Being, formerly approached through an individual Dasein, was 
now grasped as the historical inheritance of the Volk, mimicking the völkische ideology 
of Nazism.  
 Victor Faria’s 1987 book, Heidegger and Nazism, marks the beginning of serious 
debate over how to understand Heidegger’s grave mistake.83  Pierre Bourdieu, Charles 
Guignon, Hubert Dreyfus and others have written, not to excuse Heidegger, but to place 
him within a wider context of historical events such that his Nazi involvement seems 
more a misunderstanding of the political movement motivated by Heidegger’s own 
philosophical reasoning than a desire for totalitarianism.84  Guignon goes so far as to say 
that Heidegger was a “fairly minor, almost laughable actor in a much wider wave of 
support for Hitler.”85  These readings of Heidegger’s involvement seem lost on Levinas, 
who suffered the waves of anti-Semitism in Europe, fought German occupation in 
France, and was held a prisoner of war.  While Levinas admires the philosopher of Being 
                                                 
82 Martin Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University and the Rectorate 
1933/34: Facts and Thoughts,” trans. K. Harries, Review of Metaphysics, 38 (March 
1985), 473.  This address by Heidegger comes shortly after his entry into the Nazi party 
on May 1, 1933. 
 
83 Victor Faria, Heidegger and Nazism, ed. Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). 
 
84 Pierre Bourdieu The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger, trans. P. Collier 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).  Charles B. Guignon, “Introduction,” 
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 26 
– 36.  Hubert L. Dreyfus, “Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, 
Technology, and Politics,” Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, 311 – 315.  
 
85 Charles Guignon, “Introduction,” 27. 
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and Time, he remarked, in his 1981 interview that, “Heidegger has never been exculpated 
in my eyes from his participation in National Socialism.”86 
 After World War II, Levinas makes a point in his 1947 book Existence and 
Existents that he felt “the profound need to leave the climate of [Heidegger’s] 
philosophy.”87  Most interpreters of Levinas have seen this break as a philosophical 
difference of opinion centered on the way in which Levinas and Heidegger see the work 
of ontology.  However, Robert Bernasconi has argued that the “climate” Levinas desires 
most to leave is that of National Socialism, tying together both the philosophical and 
political.88  Consequently, Levinas’s critique of ontology is not simply to introduce an 
ethical foundation into philosophy but to criticize ontology for its un-ethicality, of which 
Heidegger’s political bent was one applied example.  The problem Levinas sees in 
Heidegger’s ontology is an outgrowth of his critique of Husserl’s intellectualism.  
Fundamental ontology, the study of world horizons, “presupposes the factual situation of 
the mind that knows,” which means the philosopher attempting to describe ultimate 
horizons is already within and open to those horizons: “The whole human being is 
ontology.”89  For Levinas, the mind that knows and attempts to comprehend and write a 
                                                 
86 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 41. 
 
87 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), 19. 
 
88 Robert Bernasconi, “Levinas and the Struggle for Existence,” presented at Emory 
University Conference, “Addressing Levinas,” 1999.  Now published in Addressing 
Levinas, ed. Eric Sean Nelson, Antje Kapust, and Kent Still (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2005), 170ff. 
 
89 Emmanuel Levinas, “Is Ontology Fundamental,” in Levinas: Basic Philosophical 
Writings, ed. Adriaan Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1996), 2 – 3. 
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description of world horizons is attempting to comprehend more than is available to our 
theoretical intentions.  “Our consciousness,” Levinas states, “and our mastery of reality 
through consciousness do not exhaust our relation with reality, to which we are always 
present through all the density of our being.”90  Ontology, however, reduces, by way of 
its analysis and description, all human relation with reality to the theoretical 
comprehension of the particular relation within the formal structure.  What Levinas finds 
so unethical in this reduction is that the particular relation becomes subordinated to the 
theory of being, and if the relation between persons, for instance, is also subordinated, 
then the treatment of persons becomes dependent upon the way in which being is 
perceived.  Heidegger’s involvement in National Socialism was, for Levinas, a direct 
consequence of his ‘mis’- application of ontology. 
 The culmination of Levinas’s critique of Heidegger and attempt to offer a better 
philosophy arrived in the form of Totality and Infinity, the main ideas of which can be 
traced in many of his essays written prior.  While the content of Levinas’s first major 
philosophical work was expected, Jacques Derrida responded in an unexpected way in his 
essay, “Violence and Metaphysics,” on behalf of “two Greeks named Husserl and 
Heidegger,” asserting that Levinas’s work was fundamentally grounded in ontology.91  In 
                                                 
90 Levinas, “Is Ontology Fundamental,” 4. 
 
91 Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan 
Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 83.  Derrida’s title references 
Levinas’s two main points as we have been discussing.  “Violence” refers to the 
unethicality within ontology that reduces otherness, the more than comprehensible, to the 
level of analysis and theoretical description.  “Metaphysics” is Levinas’s reappropriation 
of the traditional philosophical term that mirrors Heidegger’s discussion of ontology.  
Just as Heidegger desires to resurrect the ancient philosophy of ontology, Levinas seeks a 
philosophy that preserves ethicality and dubs such “metaphysics.” 
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essence, Derrida makes the claim that Levinas, at his most anti-Heideggerian, is still a 
Heideggerian.  
 Levinas’s Heideggerian mistake begins, according to Derrida, with the attempt to 
write a philosophy that takes as its object the otherness of the other (person) and 
considering it as the tout autre.  If something is indeed “wholly other,” then it would be 
as Derrida describes it, an “unthinkable-impossible-unutterable beyond.”92  Speaking, or 
writing, about what is “wholly other” cannot be done.  If Levinas desires to affirm 
language, which is as he seems, since he claims that the simple greeting “bonjour” holds 
the moment of encounter with the “wholly other,” then he cannot affirm otherness as 
something absolute, for language can only describe, or communicate with, that with 
which we are connected in some form.93 
 Derrida agrees with Levinas that the otherness of the other person is inaccessible, 
meaning the Erlebnisse, the lived experiences as lived by the other, cannot be my lived 
experiences.  Without doubt, others can communicate with me about what was 
experienced, but the need for the medium of language to share what has been sensed 
actually preserves the barrier of transcendence.  However, the fact that language is shared 
and that language can share experiences suggests that the other person, in glorious 
transcendence, is actually like me, an alter ego.  Derrida suggests, in fact, that the other 
                                                 
92 Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” p.114. 
 
93 Derrida offers another possible way of dealing with the “wholly other.”  “Violence and 
Metaphysics” is not only a discussion of Levinas’s philosophy but also a response to 
those who have claimed Derrida’s philosophy is linked with that of Negative Theology.  
Derrida offers that one can claim to have an intuitive contact with the wholly other that is 
positive, as negative theology does, as long as one keeps a “disdain for discourse.”  
However, just like negative theology, Levinas cannot help but speak/write.  
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person can only be “wholly other” within well defined limits.  Levinas can only be 
correct, Derrida claims, if the ethical horizon of the “wholly other” is contained within an 
even wider horizon which ensures a certain symmetry between myself and an alter ego.94  
The reason that the other can be recognized to be so absolutely other than myself is 
because the other appears within an ontological structure that ensures our virtual 
sameness.95  Consequently, Levinas needs Heidegger’s ontology to conform the ontic 
existence of human beings before one can recognize and be ethically bound by the 
otherness of the other person.  Otherness, then, depends upon the ontological horizon.    
 Derrida’s accusation that Levinas is dependent upon Heidegger goes beyond the 
need for ontology.  As we have seen, Levinas makes claims for the need to honour and 
respect the impossible advent of the otherness of the other person, an advent which he, at 
times, links to a Jewish wisdom unrealized by philosophy, which he dubs “Greek.”96  As 
Derrida has argued, however, the ontological dependence and reliance upon language 
makes it such that “nothing can so profoundly solicit the Greek logos – philosophy – than 
this irruption of the tout autre.”97  The criticism, then, is that Levinas not only fails to 
properly signal the wholly other (because the wholly other cannot be signaled), but 
                                                 
94 Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 126. 
 
95 Ibid., 127. 
 
96 We shall investigate Levinas’s opposition between Jew and Greek in the second chapter 
of this dissertation.  While this may seem strange, constructed, or even inflammatory, the 
distinction has become an important one in some continental philosophy being done 
today.  Derrida also takes up the distinction in agreement with the “spirit” of Levinas’s 
work if not the way it works out philosophically in Levinas’s texts.  John Caputo and 
others, following both of these French philosophers, similarly rely upon the distinction, 
but with added religious import. 
 
97 Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 152. 
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Levinas, in fact, emphasizes Greek philosophy rather than pointing to something more 
than philosophy can offer. 
 John Caputo, in elaborating Derrida’s essay, complements (however, compliments 
works just as well, methinks) Derrida’s critique by reflecting upon Levinas’s apparent 
contradiction wherein Levinas wants a distinction between a Jewish wisdom and a Greek 
philosophy but also seems to avow that Greek philosophy is sufficient to understanding.  
Caputo quotes from Difficult Liberty where Levinas states that the Greek logos is “the 
medium of all comprehension and of all understanding in which all truth is reflected.”98  
Philosophy, it seems, while distinct from Jewish wisdom, can encompass Jewish wisdom 
if the Judaic has said something true.  Levinas often calls his philosophy a translation of 
the Hebraic into the Greek.  Philosophy, then, cannot be surprised by the wholly other; it 
is ready for any truth, even one as yet unearthed.  Caputo addresses this faith in 
philosophy directly saying, “About that, I think, Levinas is fundamentally mistaken, 
surprisingly far too philosophical, far too Greek, and – he will hate this – far too 
Heideggerian.”99  Essentially, then, by trusting in philosophy for the possibility of 
understanding, even of simply stating the otherness of the other, Levinas has fallen into 
the same trap he springs on Heidegger.  The otherness of the other, so cherished by 
Levinas, appears enclosed within a totality constructed by Levinas’s Greek philosophy.           
 
 
                                                 
98 John Caputo discusses and supplements Derrida’s arguments in The Prayers and Tears 
of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1997), 20 – 26.  He addresses Levinas’s quote specifically on page 24. 
 
99 Ibid., 25. 
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Levinas and the “Spirit” of Phenomenology 
 In order for Levinas to finally “escape the climate of Heidegger,” he would have 
to find a key that would allow him to unlock the egological totalities instituted by 
ontology.  Levinas discovers this key in the unlikely phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, 
unlikely because it was Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s theory and representation, a 
prison of its own, that lead him to Heidegger, whom Levinas also came to reject.  Within 
the seminal work of Husserl and Levinas’s return to Husserl’s texts, Levinas finds seeds 
that do not lead to theory or representation but to the possibility of phenomenology 
conceived in a broader and deeper manner where theory has its place but a place among a 
multiplicity of intentional possibilities rather than the necessary and primary starting 
point of phenomenological description.  Levinas’s new focus places more emphasis upon 
intentionality’s “sense-bestowal,” the discovery of meaning transcendent to and more 
than the appearing of the object yet rooted in the multi-faceted ways the object appears, 
and the concept of horizon, the recognition of consciousness as situated or as “in the 
world.”  Levinas’s turn leaves behind his interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology as 
ontology in favor of disclosing the ways in which the world appears as meaningful.  In 
this scheme, ontology would be just one way in which existence meaningfully appears, 
offering the possibility of seeing other meaningful horizons, ethical horizons, as 
fundamental in their own right.  Using phenomenology in this way would not only allow 
Levinas to escape Heidegger’s climate but also to circumvent Derrida’s critique which 
claims ontology to be logically prior in any philosophical endeavor.   
 What germinates in Levinas’s reorientation is the possibility of giving a 
phenomenological description of “otherness,” an encounter with an absence that is not an 
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experience but is a meaningful horizon within which intentionality is situated.  Levinas’s 
desire for a phenomenology of the other is evident as early as his dissertation.  “The 
reduction to an ego, the egological reduction, can be only a first step toward 
phenomenology.  We must also discover ‘others’ and the intersubjective world.”100  
Already familiar with Husserl’s fifth Cartesian Meditation and its emphasis on 
intersubjectivity by the time of his dissertation, Levinas was even then glimpsing the 
phenomenological journey he would undertake.  However, realizing that he was 
beginning to envision his own role in the developing history of phenomenology, we must 
beware that Levinas would also attempt to distance himself from his predecessors.  While 
I will argue that Levinas fits nicely within the “spirit” of phenomenology, we must not 
forget that he never retracts his critique concerning Husserl as fundamentally dependent 
upon theory and representation.  What arises in Levinas’s later re-evaluation of Husserl’s 
phenomenology is a two-sided presentation: 1. Husserl as a philosopher of egological 
totality and 2. Husserl as the visionary that provides the seminal work that allows for the 
very ruin of totality and representation.  Levinas never believes that what he finds 
concerning the latter should be taken as Husserl’s real intentions; however, I believe we 
can say that they are well within the possibilities of Husserl’s phenomenology.  Whether 
the disagreement is the bravado of a young philosopher ready to strike out on his own or 
an honest case of misunderstanding we can only speculate.101  In this section, we will see 
                                                 
100 Levinas, Theory of Intuition, 150. 
 
101 In defense of Levinas, let me just comment that Husserl and Heidegger are brilliant, 
seminal, and excruciatingly hard to grasp at times.  If Levinas’s familiarity with Husserl’s 
and Heidegger’s published works and a brief but intense time of studying with these 
philosophers left him with some misconceptions that became rooted in his philosophy, I 
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how Levinas re-reads Husserl to arrive at the “spirit” of phenomenology, following his 
understanding of intentionality as “sense-bestowal” and of horizons of meaning.   
 Before we begin to explicate Levinas’s resonance with the spirit of 
phenomenology, let us briefly discuss the manner in which Husserl becomes perceived as 
a philosopher of totality.  Keeping in mind that theory and representation are already part 
of Levinas’s critique, Levinas refines his criticism – even to the point of reinterpreting 
representation – to reflect the ways in which Husserl creates egological totalities.  
Representation (Levinas’s translation of Vorstellung), remaining the primary work of 
consciousness for Levinas, is the act of consciousness identifying or bestowing meaning; 
however, identification can be an infinite process without some core against which to 
measure repeated manifestations.  For Levinas, “The process of identification can be 
infinite, but it is concluded in self-evidence, in the presence of the object in person before 
consciousness.”102  The multiple appearings of an object are attended by a transcendent 
meaning that makes sense because intentional consciousness intuits; consciousness 
grounded in self evidence is “the very penetration to the true.”  In some sense, Levinas’s 
re-evaluation of Husserl paints Husserl in a more positive light than before, once Levinas 
focuses upon the epistemological aspect of intentionality, an interpretation much more 
Husserlian than Levinas’s ontological one which he offered in his dissertation.  Husserl’s 
philosophy, however, is still limited in the sense that “the theory of intentionality in 
Husserl identifies mind with intellection and intellection with light.”   
                                                                                                                                                 
can only empathize, not ignoring my own weakness with these thinkers.  Let us celebrate 
what he was able to accomplish. 
 
102 Emmanuel Levinas, “The Work of Edmund Husserl,” in Discovering Existence with 
Husserl, trans. Richard A. Cohen and Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1998), 61. 
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 Once again, we see the danger of understanding Vorstellung as representation, for 
even though Levinas is more correctly assessing intentional consciousness as a process of 
sense-bestowal, Levinas emphasizes the act as an intellectual grasping initiated, 
conditioned, and consummated by and within consciousness even though he will see 
another possible way of understanding Husserl.  This interpretation comes strictly from 
Levinas’s reading of Ideas I.  On the one hand, Levinas is concerned to state that 
perception has a perceptual sense, a noema, a perceived as perceived, which is grounded 
in the concrete, but because the conscious field is that from which the subject and object 
are derived, the noema is only a distinction in the singular field that must always exist 
with a correlate noesis.  The multiplicity of views, each view a self contained unity, is 
parallel to a noetic field wherein the views are held together in a functional manifold.103   
Levinas will claim, however, that Husserl founds the correlation between noesis and 
noema in a spontaneous ego, in the very presence of a subject to the world, a subject the 
very idea of which was supposed to be derived from the conscious field.  Husserl states:  
Every positing begins with a point of initiation, with a positional point of origin. . 
. This initiation belongs precisely to the positing as positing qua distinctive mode 
of original actionality. . . Every act of no matter what species can begin in the 
mode of spontaneity pertaining, so to speak, to its creative beginning in which the 
pure Ego makes its appearance as the subject of the spontaneity.104  
 
Husserl’s quote appears to Levinas as a privileging of the active and spontaneous ego 
ready to take hold and constitute sense, making the world into a totality for the ego, as 
Husserl’s very next lines might suggest: “This mode of initiating is immediately, and 
according to an eidetic necessity, converted into another mode.  For example, perceptual 
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104 Ibid., §122. 
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seizing upon, taking hold of, are immediately and without a break changed into the 
‘having in one’s grip.’”  As Levinas’s philosophy comes to maturity, Husserl’s 
description here will become the very language Levinas cites as indicating the violence 
done by an ego encountering and capturing its world, representing the world in 
consciousness.  There is no doubt that Husserl’s choice of language, making reference to 
the “pure Ego,” proves a stumbling block for many readers, but if we want to find 
consistency in Husserl’s philosophy, then we must rethink the meaning of the Ego.  If the 
Ego is simply the subject consciously or even unconsciously orienting intentionality, then 
Levinas’s critique should hold, but such a reading would suggest that intentionality is a 
controllable quality of the ego after Levinas has already argued that the subject is 
intentionality.  However, taking the Ego as conformable with the conscious intentional 
field improves the consistency of the claim that every act begins in a pure spontaneous 
Ego even when the possibility of a subject is derived from the very field generated by the 
Ego’s actions.  While Levinas does not see this as Husserl’s intent, let us investigate how 
Levinas understands intentional consciousness as more than presumed intellection and 
representation, interpretations which he derives from Husserl’s work. 
 In 1940, Levinas published a second expository work on Husserl’s 
phenomenology entitled, “The Work of Edmund Husserl.”  This essay comes after 
Heidegger’s involvement in the Nazi party and before Levinas’s interment as a prisoner 
of war by Germany in World War II.  This means that Levinas had shaken off his 
infatuation with Heidegger’s philosophy if not his respect and had turned back for 
another look at Husserl.  While it is recognized that Levinas ventures his own ethical 
  
  64
philosophy only after his imprisonment, we can see, nevertheless, the nascent return to 
Husserl that will mark his later work. 
 Much of Levinas’s 1940 essay reiterates the points made earlier in The Theory of 
Intuition; however, “The Work of Edmund Husserl” makes a major turn away from his 
dissertation when he seeks to unhook representation from theory.  While he still asserts 
that Husserl “maintains that every intention is either an objectifying act or supported by 
one” and that “in Husserl, theoretical consciousness is at once universal and primary,” 
Levinas claims “perhaps it would be unjust to qualify [Husserl’s philosophy] as 
intellectualism.”105  These assertions, which seem inconsistent on the surface, are a result 
of Levinas taking more seriously the multiplicity of intentions that are a part of the lived 
experience, specifically the non-theoretical intentions of feeling, desiring, and willing.  
By 1940, Levinas clearly asserts that “the felt, the willed, the desired are not things.”106  
This stands in stark contrast to his dissertation where he maintains that regardless of the 
multiplicity of intentions in complex acts, the desired, the willed, and the felt are present 
in the “mode of existence of theoretical objects.”107  While it is true that one can 
contemplate a desired object – a car, a diploma, etc. – and that it is often asserted the 
object has the quality of being desirable, it is not necessarily the case that these feelings 
are reducible to subjective opinions about the object.  The felt, the willed and the desired 
are meanings in their own right. 
 As we saw in our discussion of The Theory of Intuition, Levinas was concerned 
with showing the ways in which Husserl’s phenomenology operated as an ontology 
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106 Ibid. 
 
107 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 62. 
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rooting phenomenological analysis in the intuiting and representing of the transcendent 
object.  While Levinas never changes his reading that consciousness of an object means 
an intuiting of the world that is there and is grasped in an intentional manner (nor should 
he undo such a reading), his return to explicating Husserl uncovers the purpose of 
phenomenological analysis to be a description of the meaningfulness of the manifest 
world, which is the heart of the epistemological undertaking of phenomenology.  Levinas 
shifts from the representation of the transcendent object to the transcendent meaning 
bestowed by intentional consciousness: “The relation of intentionality is nothing like the 
relations between real objects.  It is essentially the act of bestowing a meaning 
(Sinngebung).”108  Levinas understands the bestowing of meaning as a process of 
identification wherein the multiple aspects of what is experienced is synthesized into a 
meaningful unity.  Each momentary presentation is a moment of one’s lived experience, 
which includes every aspect of mental life, even those aspects that are not primarily 
theoretical.  The resulting transcendent unity “represents” the world of experience, but 
this new understanding of representation can now be divorced from the theoretical 
critique offered in his dissertation, for while the transcendent meaning bestowed in 
intentionality can be disclosed in reflection, this notion of representation must operate 
prior to contemplation. 
 Because “representation,” “objectification,” and “identification” as the meaning 
giving work of intentionality are now distinguished from theory, we can understand 
Levinas’s claim that “it would be unjust to qualify [phenomenology] as intellectualism, 
since the primacy accorded to the notion of meaning over the notion of object to 
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characterize thought prevents this.”109  It would seem as though Levinas has explicated 
Husserl in a way that would put to rest the theoretical critique, but a very short paragraph 
in “The Work of Edmund Husserl” reminds us that Levinas never relinquishes his earliest 
criticism.  Instead of a new understanding of Husserl emerging, we see “The Work of 
Edmund Husserl” as not only explication but also as Levinas using Husserl against 
Husserl, a tactic that he will employ time and time again.  Consequently, Levinas is not 
undoing phenomenology when he attacks Husserl so much as investigating a broader 
phenomenological perspective.  If we turn our inquiry to why Levinas retains his 
criticism, we will see another step Levinas must take for his broader perspective. 
 In addition to the major themes of intuition and representation that have marked 
Levinas’s analysis of Husserl thus far, Levinas begins after his dissertation a study of 
Husserl’s concept of time.  He interjects into his discussion of representation, which now 
takes shape as intentionality as meaning bestower, the assertion: “In the theory of the 
experience of immanent time, and in [Husserl’s] investigations of prejudicative 
experience – the primary experience – this primordial role of representation is likewise 
affirmed. . . Thus, in Husserl, theoretical consciousness is at once universal and 
primary.”110  Even if representation (Vorstellung) is not a theoretical operation in primary 
lived experience, phenomenology’s connection with immanent time, specifically the need 
to consult memory in reflection, reveals another form of representation, namely 
“presentification” (Vergegenwärtigung), that operates over time to provide consciousness 
with a reliable link to the past.  For Husserl, the present always sits within the context of 
what has gone before (retention) with what is anticipated or expected (protention).  The 
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intentional lived experiences which passed in time were determined by the same 
meaning-bestowing process operative at the “now” moment.  Memory assures fluid 
continuity between what was meaningful in the past and what is meaningful in the 
present because consciousness in the present can always make present again (re-present) 
what is in the memory.111  To this effect, Husserl states: “It is natural to say at first (as 
Brentano did) that the actually present perception becomes constituted as presentation on 
the basis of sensations and that primary memory becomes constituted as representation, 
as re-presentation (Vergegenwärtigung), on the basis of phantasies.”112  What lies held 
within these phantasies and what is directly accessible to consciousness as a result of re-
presentation is what allows Levinas to retain his critique of phenomenology based upon 
theory.  The ego relies upon re-presentations constituted by the ego in memory for insight 
into the meaningfulness of lived experience.  Although transcendent meaning as a 
product of intentionality is no longer theoretical, the necessity of relying upon memory 
and its representational underpinning fuels Levinas’s theoretical critique.   
 Just as Levinas broadened his perspective of phenomenology when he reappraised 
Vorstellung as the non-theoretical meaning-bestowing task of intentionality, Levinas will 
                                                 
111 See Rudolph Bernet, “Levinas’s Critique of Husserl,” 88-89. 
 
112 Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, trans. James 
Churchill. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964) §14.  Our quote, which points 
to the roots of Levinas’s critique, is followed by objections by Husserl against such a 
simplistic understanding.  Even within our quote itself is the phrase “it is natural to say at 
first,” as though the first look at the issue of memory will need adjusting.  What Husserl 
goes on to argue is that the continuity of past and present makes it such that a “continuity 
of apprehension is still there” even when what was present has faded away.  
Consequently, “everything is like perception and primary memory and yet is not itself 
perception and primary memory.”   What Husserl means here is that the nature of 
intentional consciousness does not, in fact, re-present what has passed, but is 
intentionally conscious of a memory as a “presentation.” 
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again broaden his perspective by addressing Husserl’s supposed reliance upon theory 
with respect to immanent time.  This second re-evaluation can be seamlessly integrated 
with Levinas’s focus upon alterity and his later, more mature philosophy as Rudolph 
Bernet explains in his essay, “Levinas’s Critique of Husserl.”  Nevertheless, the change 
can be traced, once again, to Levinas’s early discussions of Husserl, since it was his 
investigation into Vorstellung and his new understanding of intentionality that stimulated 
his broader understanding.  Levinas recognizes that intentionality, as especially 
evidenced by the affective states of will, desire, and feeling, does not posit an object but, 
rather, is the field from which subject and object are derived.  Levinas refers to this 
understanding of intentionality as “the most fecund idea contributed by 
phenomenology.”113  We are aware, however, that Levinas does not consider his non-
theoretical reading of Husserl to be what Husserl intended.  Therefore, as Levinas 
continues to discuss Husserl’s intellection, he is now at the point of readiness to go 
beyond theory in other aspects of phenomenology as well.   
The theory of intentionality in Husserl, linked so closely to his theory of self-
evidence, in the final analysis, identifies mind with intellection, and intellection 
with light.  If we wanted to distance ourselves from Husserl’s terminology and 
characteristic mode of expression (my italics), we would say that self-evidence is 
a unique situation: in the case of self-evidence the mind, while receiving 
something foreign, is also the origin of what it receives.  It is always active.  The 
fact that in self-evidence the world is a given, that there is always a given for the 
mind, is not only found to be in agreement with the idea of activity, but is 
presupposed by that activity.  A given world is a world where we can be free 
without this freedom being purely negative.  The self-evidence of a given world, 
more than the non-engagement of the mind in things, is the positive 
accomplishment of freedom.114 
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Much of Levinas’s essay, “The Work of Edmund Husserl,” focuses upon the intellection 
and theory he still finds in Husserl’s philosophy; however, it is at points like the above 
quote where something new begins to take form.  At the end of his dissertation, Levinas 
found the freedom of the ego to be assumed on the part of Husserl’s phenomenology, but 
just a few years later, freedom is the possibility of the ego’s having meaning.  It is no 
longer something Levinas considers assumed; it is the basic orientation of the ego as 
constitutive of the world as meaningful.  Put another way, “intentionality is nothing but 
the very accomplishment of freedom.”115  Consequently, the thrust of much of “The 
Work of Edmund Husserl” is the explication of the subject as transcendentally 
constituting and, as a result, not in-the-world.  This plays into Levinas’s critique of 
phenomenology as promulgating the ego as a totalizing entity.  What Levinas claims in 
our quote in which he “distances” himself from Husserl’s terminology suggests 
something more, a subject in reciprocity with the world, an ego actively constituting that 
which is already given: a chiasmus of auto-affection and hetero-affection.   
 Levinas’s answer then to the problem of intellection and theory at the basis of 
immanent time involves freeing time and conditions of meaning from the sole possession 
of the ego.  While representation remains a difficulty for Levinas as it is used in Husserl’s 
phenomenology of time, he relieves the critique of intellection by freeing freedom from 
its separation from the world.  If the ego, in its mode of transcendental constitution, is 
not-in-the-world and needs to resort to the mediary of representation to make the past 
present again, then the ego seems truly bound to theory to make any claim concerning the 
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intuited object.116  The free ego that sits in the chiasm of auto/hetero-affection, rather than 
being dependent upon theory, sits in the juncture where “the antinomy of spontaneity and 
passivity is eliminated in the mind grasped at the level of the Urimpression.”117  For 
Husserl as well as Levinas, the Urimpression is that conceptual moment in the “now” 
when consciousness originally accepts the givenness of the world but also spontaneously 
initiates its constituting intentionality.  Consciousness, in this spontaneous moment, 
engages in the constitution of meaning such that thought is never without concepts, but 
the fact that consciousness receives the given world at the moment of the Urimpression 
also places the affected consciousness within a world of given horizons.  The subject 
appears as a nexus of meaningful structures which are integrated in manifold to produce 
the possibility of human experience.  Levinas’s task, now, is to disclose these layers.     
 
 
Copyright © Ronald Lynn Mercer, Jr., 2007 
                                                 
116Levinas’s leap forward in his understanding of phenomenology is rooted in an early 
problem which Husserl himself also recognized and dealt with in his phenomenology of 
“internal time analysis.”  The main difficulty centered on the mediating representation 
since this “phantasm” of memory separates the conscious act from the object of 
consciousness.  Such a dualism invokes the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.  The 
separation between consciousness and object originates with a description of the subject’s 
sense of the object.  As we have already stated, subject and object are already derivative 
from the analysis of the conscious field.  In essence, Husserl begins his time-analysis 
within the very natural attitude from which he desires to escape.  The change that Husserl 
makes and which Levinas does not discuss is a change away from description within the 
natural attitude to a description of the formal structure of time within the 
phenomenological field.  At this point, the manner of presentation of sensory content is 
not as important as the temporal structure that conditions the manner in which that 
content is presented.  Consequently, what is in memory can now be called a presentation, 
i.e. as a “presentification,”  rather than a representation because the sensory content held 
in memory is presented in the now moment as a memory and not as a representation of 
what was present in the past.  
 
117 Levinas, “The Work of Edmund Husserl,” 78. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Levinas and Judaism: The Possibility of a Religious Phenomenology 
 
Introduction 
 
In chapter one, we endeavored to place Levinas within the phenomenological 
tradition by arguing for a certain understanding of the “spirit of phenomenology,” 
foregoing any argument showing Levinas’s strict adherence to Husserlian methodology.  
We justified such a tack by arguing that Husserl himself was never comfortable with any 
one formulation of his phenomenological methodology but grew consistently concerning 
his understanding of the structures in need of disclosure through one’s description of 
lived experience, wherein lived experience is taken as that unity of meaningful 
experience.  While Husserl’s earliest writings utilized straightforward descriptive analysis 
exclusively on the as/for relationship, his exploration into the horizonal structures, the 
in/from relationship, made the shortcomings of such analysis apparent and stipulated 
Husserl’s subsequent new beginnings.  Levinas claims to be uncovering horizonal 
structures that govern ethical relationships and which are at the very heart of the structure 
of the human ego, from which arises the sense-bestowal of human experience.  The 
argument put forward in chapter one would deal sufficiently with some detractors who 
balk at Levinas’s claim to follow phenomenology by placing him within the evolving 
methodology of horizonal structures, but one challenge remains before we can say with 
authority that Levinas should, without reservation, be considered within the realm of 
phenomenological philosophy.  Given that phenomenology begins with a return to the 
“things themselves” and that anything that counts as a presupposition informing upon our 
experience that would colour our viewing of the “things themselves” should be bracketed 
off, it becomes mandatory that any defense of Levinas’s phenomenological philosophy 
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address Levinas’s copious references to God and allusions to Levinas’s own Judaic 
background.118  God, in traditional usage of the term, seems impossible to address as one 
of the “things themselves,” or as even a structure implicated in the appearing of the 
“things themselves,” and Judaism, in its everyday connotation, is full of presupposed 
traditions, revelations, and theology.  The task of exonerating Levinas will involve 
proposing an understanding of the terms “God” and “Judaism” that avoid 
phenomenology’s demand to place them out of bounds.119 
 Students of phenomenology have questioned from its inception the connection 
between phenomenology and religion.  Jean Hering, a student of Husserl, writes about 
many of the positives phenomenology can contribute to religious philosophy as early as 
1925.120  He argues that from the “angle of natural or positive religion” phenomenology 
could provide a method that is productive for religious philosophy and for the description 
                                                 
118 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy -- First Book: General Introduction to a Pure 
Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982 [1913]), §58, (hereafter 
Ideas I) includes the transcendence of God under the reduction, seemingly halting our 
investigation at the beginning. 
 
119 As this last sentence suggests, defending Levinas against accusations of allowing his 
ethnic background to pre-write his phenomenological description will involve coming to 
a new understanding of the terms “God” and “Judaism,” meaning that we will constantly 
be playing with common sense definitions, which will be different from the technical 
understandings of theologians and Jewish scholars, which will be, in turn, different from 
the redefined concepts we will present as Emmanuel Levinas’s understanding of them.  
Consequently, there will be a need for numerous scare quotes, and, in some sense, we 
could put quotes around every instance of “God” and “Judaism” in this chapter.  I have 
elected, however, to use scare quotes only at those times when the chapter is about to 
make a thematic switch between meanings, alerting the reader to gather his or her wits 
and prepare for some manner of gestalt shift.  
   
120 Bernard G. Prusak,“Translator’s Introduction,” in Phenomenology and the 
“Theological Turn” (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000) proves very helpful in 
outlining this historical concern and contemporary debates over the connection between 
phenomenology and religion. 
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of religious phenomena.121  However, Hering also warns about the future: “It is not 
difficult to foresee that the hour when [phenomenology] will become à la mode . . . will 
see the springing forth of a whole pseudophenomenological literature.”122  Hering’s fear 
revolves around religious groups using phenomenology to justify various actions or 
instantiations of the Christian church, what amounts to a confusing of the eidetic and the 
empirical.  In the case of Levinas’s philosophy, which Hering, of course, could not be 
directly addressing, we will still have to wonder whether or not Levinas is trying to use 
phenomenology to describe an essential truth of Judaism or a truth about humanity 
brought to relief in the Judaic context.  Time and again, Levinas will describe the ethical 
relation as expressing the Judaic in us all, even when the ethical relation is shared 
between Gentiles. 
 Dominique Janicaud picks up the banner of warning against phenomenologists 
investigating the religious, in particular the wave of French phenomenologists who 
“suppose a non-phenomenological, metaphysical desire.”  This desire “comes from ‘a 
land not of our birth.’”123  This foreign land specifically refers to the influence of the 
other, the Absolutely Other, the Infinite, God and any other way to mention an origin of 
phenomena that cannot be grounded in the cogitatio, which must “play a central role” in 
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connaissance religiuse (Strasbourg: Imprimerie Alsacienne, 1925), 7.  
 
122 Ibid., 73. 
 
123 Dominique Janicaud, “Contours of the Turn,” in Phenomenology and the “Theological 
Turn”, 27.  Within this quote from Janicaud, he cites Levinas’s Totality and Infinity, 
trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 33-34.  Among the 
French phenomenologists whom Janicaud challenges are Paul Ricoeur, Jean Louis 
Chrétien, and Jean-Luc Marion.  Janicaud views Emmanuel Levinas as a pioneer in this 
field, often the catalyst for these “new phenomenologists.”  Interestingly,  this book also 
prints responses from some of the embattled “new phenomenologists.” 
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any phenomenology grounded in Husserl.  Janicaud, unlike Hering, grounds much of his 
critique in what he sees as a betrayal of the reduction, which always leaves the 
phenomenologist with the transcendental ego in its “nudity.”  The fashionable movement 
of French phenomenology, however, according to Janicaud, addresses the transcendent, 
and, indeed, many of the philosophers in question describe the other et al as transcendent, 
which makes the object of their phenomenology unavailable as phenomenon.  Chapter 
one will be a sufficient answer for this critique if we can show that the manner in which 
transcendent applies to their descriptions is as a horizon that conditions experience.  Such 
a horizon would be a non-object, a structural factor in the origination of human 
intentionality.  In Levinas’s case, we should be prepared to see this intentionality as 
pathic rather than perceptual without any predisposition to rank the perceptual as more 
fundamental than the pathic.  
As Prusak’s introduction to Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn” points 
out, Janicaud’s critique does not take into account Husserl’s development.  The entire 
critique revolves around Husserl’s essay “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” (1911) and  
Ideas I.124  While Ideas I is a cornerstone of Husserl’s philosophy, we have already 
shown that he ventures past the conceptions of phenomenology treated therein.  
Consequently, our response to Janicaud on this matter will be that he has turned 
phenomenology into a rigid discipline rather than an evolving methodology. 
 Chapter one, as a defense of investigating the transcendent, would be undermined 
if the transcendent were to also be directed by an established theology.  Janicaud 
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compounds the affront to phenomenology with the accusation that these philosophers are 
not only failing to add the transcendent God to the reduction but also the presuppositions 
of faith: “All is acquired and imposed from the outset, and this all is no little thing: 
nothing less than the God of the biblical tradition.  Strict treason of the reduction that 
handed over the transcendental I to its nudity, here theology is restored with its parade of 
capital letters.”125  The effect of the presupposed theology is not the adding of minute 
theological details to Levinas’s argument but the raising of various concepts to hubristic 
levels.  Janicaud focuses on Levinas’s description of the desire the ego is said to have for 
the other, or for God.  Desire quickly gets a capital “D,” what Janicaud would certainly 
consider a theological imposition wherein the Desire for the other gets attracted to the 
other’s transcendence and sanctions (or sanctifies) Desire as having special, untouchable 
and unquestionable qualities.126  Desire, as well as other specially capitalized words, 
become objects of faith, according to Janicaud, since their origins are without any 
particular phenomena and Levinas’s biblical and Judaic background give away the faith 
at the basis of the elevations given to his disclosed concepts.  
 I shall argue, hereafter, that even though Levinas exercises religious vocabulary 
throughout, these words should not be taken with traditionally, religiously understood 
meanings.  Religious language, in fact, offers a cache of “improper” language that more 
properly describes the phenomenon of the ethical encounter and the horizon of the ethical 
than does the expected and prescribed language of Greek philosophy.  The description of 
the ethical relation as particularly Jewish, just as with religious language, should not be 
                                                 
125 Janicaud, “Contours of the Turn,” 27. 
 
126 Ibid., 27 ff. 
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taken as elitism or even as specifically Jewish, but his description of the ethical relation 
does arise from his experience, which can be properly described as the experience of a 
Jewish European struggling with the pervasive anti-Semitism of the 20th century.  Let us 
first deal with the possibility that Levinas has, contrary to the demands of the reduction, 
allowed his Judaic tradition to inform his phenomenology.  Then we will respond to 
Hering’s warning about whether or not Levinas has confused an eidetic description of the 
ethical relation with the particular Jewish experience.  Finally, we will address whether or 
not religious language in general is a proper “improper” language to employ for 
phenomenological descriptions, specifically whether “God” operates as a divine 
imposition or a proper metaphor for that which can only be described metaphorically.  
Levinas in Cultural, Religious Context 
  Emmanuel Levinas begins “Signature,” a short article meant to encapsulate the 
themes of his work, with a highly shortened version of his autobiography.  Places, events, 
and figures that one might expect from a twentieth century phenomenologist are readily 
apparent, but at the beginning of the autobiography and at the end, Levinas makes 
reference to his Judaic background beginning with, “The Hebraic bible from the earliest 
years in Lithuania . . .” and ending with “dominated by the presentiment and the memory 
of the Nazi horror.”127  Those familiar with his philosophical works will readily recognize 
Biblical allusions and references to God; however, this does not mean that Levinas’s 
Judaism is informing upon his philosophy any more than allusions to Captain Ahab or a 
white whale would indicate a surreptitious attempt to impose a whaling background on an 
investigation.  Suspicions about any real crossover between the Judaic and the 
                                                 
127 Emmanuel Levinas, “Signature,” trans. Mary Ellen Petrisko, ed. Adriaan Peperzak, 
Research in Phenomenology, vol. 8, 1978, 175. 
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philosophical are further heightened by Levinas’s own assertions that when he is doing 
something philosophical, it is not to be taken as anything religious.  Then why should I 
make any certain claims about Levinas’s Judaism in his philosophy?  Perhaps the history 
of philosophy has taught that what a philosopher claims to be doing and what he is 
actually doing are not always the same.  Not until much later did Levinas actually admit 
that his religion was involved: 
 I have never explicitly intended to “accord” or to “reconcile” the two [viz. the  
 biblical and the philosophical] traditions.  If they are in fact in agreement, this is 
 probably due to the fact that all philosophical thought rests on pre-philosophical 
 experiences and that the readings of the Bible belonged in my case to these 
 fundamental experiences.  The Bible has therefore played an essential role in my 
 philosophical way of thought - for the most part, however, without my being 
 conscious of it.128   
 
 Let us take a moment to uncover Levinas’s “fundamental experiences” which 
concern the Bible and Jewish tradition.  Emmanuel Levinas’s Jewish development went 
through three distinct stages.129  In 1906, Levinas was born in Lithuania into a Jewish 
family and community where “to be Jewish was as natural as having eyes and ears.”130  
While the family spoke Russian, the first language he learned to read was Hebrew, and 
when his family returned to Kovno in 1920, Levinas enrolled in the Hebrew Gymnasium 
as part of his formal education.  Once he left for the University of Strasbourg in 1923, 
                                                 
128 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, trans. Richard Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1985), 24. 
 
129 Annette Aronowicz marks Levinas’s religious journey in her introduction to the Nine 
Talmudic Readings.  I have taken her introduction and distilled out what I consider to be 
the three most important influences on Levinas.  For a much richer development see her 
introduction in: Nine Talmudic Readings, trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1990), ix - xxxix. 
 
130 Emmanuel Levinas, “Interview with Myriam Anissimov,” in Is it Righteous to Be? 
Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, ed. Jill Robbins (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2001), 84. 
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Levinas’s connection to his Jewish roots often gets overlooked in biographies in favor of 
the philosophical traditions that begin to take hold, and it is not unfair to note that there is 
little evidence to suggest that Levinas spent time in contact with Jewish texts during the 
late 1920’s and 1930’s.   
Nevertheless, after only a short while in France in the early 30’s, Levinas joined 
the Alliance Israélite Universelle established in France by prominent Jews in French 
culture.  While Levinas did not necessarily agree wholeheartedly with the Alliance’s 
desire to integrate, he did find the values at the root of integration to be worthwhile.  
Integration assumes a unity of humankind that nationalist Jews would deny.  The obvious 
conflict awaiting the Alliance was, of course, the fascism of the 1930’s, which placed an 
onus upon Jews to admit their difference and be noticed as a group apart from 
mainstream European culture.  Levinas responded to this cultural imposition by turning 
his attention to giving an essential definition for Judaism and describing the implications 
making such a definition would have for the Alliance and European Jews.  The position 
at which he arrives simultaneously takes into account his own seminal thinking on the 
situation of ethics and the essence and efficacy of Jewish wisdom.  Jewish wisdom, 
Levinas claims, as opposed to the Western tradition, is different in that while it focuses 
upon the “formation and expression of the universal” it is an expression of the universal 
“insofar as it unites persons without reducing them to an abstraction in which the oneness 
of their uniqueness is sacrificed to the genus; of the universal in which oneness has 
already been approached in love.”131  
                                                 
131 Emmanuel Levinas, “From Ethics to Exegesis,” in In the Time of the Nations, trans. 
Michael B. Smith (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994),109. 
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The third important development in Levinas’s Judaism dates from 1947 to 1951 
with his study under the enigmatic Chouchani, who taught within a small, select circle, 
often without introducing one student to another.  Both Eli Wiesel and Levinas studied 
with Chouchani, but neither had any idea of the other’s tutelage.  Chouchani impressed 
upon Levinas that any rediscovery of what Judaism was must go through the traditional 
texts of the religion, specifically the Talmud.  Such an influence inspired Levinas to place 
greater emphasis upon the Hebrew language, doing his own translations rather than 
relying on others, as well as taking up teaching the Talmud at the École Normale Israélite 
Orientale, a school established by the Alliance of which Levinas was the director. 
Levinas personally admits that his life has never been without participation in the 
Jewish community, and having seen evidence of his level of commitment, we are forced 
to admit that Janicaud has a right to his suspicions concerning Levinas’s attachment to 
Judaism and the possibility of, if not a conscious inclusion in his philosophy, a 
subconscious seeping through of the Judaic tradition.132  It will be helpful, now, in the 
face of Levinas’s early denial and later admission of religious influence that we look 
directly at those concepts which most seem to attach him to problematic religious 
involvement. 
The Greek and the Hebrew 
 First and foremost, Levinas appears to rely upon Judaism as the proper counter-
balance or remedy for the Western Philosophical tradition.  It is important to note, 
                                                 
132 Annette Aronowicz makes the point that Levinas denies having any “return” to 
Judaism in his life, since he feels as though he was never absent from the community and 
traditions of his religion.  This is in direct contrast to some writers who make more of the 
fact that Levinas does not deal specifically with Jewish texts during his formative, 
phenomenological years. 
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however, that Levinas chooses to contrast the Hebrew to the Greek rather than Judaism to 
philosophy.  Therefore, in order to have a foundation against which to understand the 
Hebrew, let us first define, in brief, the easier term: Greek.  Greek is the easier of the two 
because Greek is the language of philosophy.  It is the language of what is; therefore, it is 
not a problem for reason to ask the question: What is Greek?  Greek is that defining 
characteristic that guides Western Philosophy in the traditional understanding of its own 
history.  Adriaan Peperzak’s gloss on this is most important.  When Levinas considers 
Western Philosophy, he considers it as it is defined by the average French academic.  
Levinas is certainly aware of philosophers within the tradition that do not fit into his 
definition.  This is not a problem, for, in Levinas’s critique, Western Philosophy acts 
more as a foil for his consideration of the “other” and the “ethical” than it does as a 
rigorous attempt to define the tradition.133  With a more scrupulous inspection, an intent 
student of philosophy would probably see the limitations of the traditional understanding; 
nevertheless, it remains traditional because philosophers try to keep the overall picture 
simple, interpreting its heritage with a well worn template. 
 Levinas defines this Greek template as “economy.”  Following the etymology 
explicitly, the Greek economy represents the rule of the home where the home in 
philosophical terms represents the Ego.  The Ego, here, denotes the privileging of the 
theoretical aspect of existence which ultimately engenders objectification, technology, 
totality and exploitation.  The Greek, then, signifies the subject’s going out and return, 
the inquiry that begins from where one is, investigates, and returns from the quest only to 
integrate what was found into the structure of the home.  Metaphorically, Levinas refers 
                                                 
133 For elaboration, see Adriaan Peperzak, “Emmanuel Levinas: Jewish Experience and 
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to this return of philosophy to itself, to home, as the journey of Odysseus who fought to 
regain his house, his wife, and his rule.  In these terms, it is not hard to see why Levinas 
also aligns the Greek tradition with the unethical, for constant assimilation never allows 
the other, the goal of the quest, to remain as other.  The return always subsumes the 
other’s identity into the home of the Ego.134 
 In contrast to the Greek, Levinas poses Hebrew.  Gibbs describes Hebrew as a 
“way of thought” or a “kind of reasoning prior to Greek” that opposes the Greek 
economy;135 however, this cannot be the case.  “Thought” and “reasoning” are 
themselves elements of the realm of the Greek.  Hebrew must be something else, 
something other, a non-theoretical experience of the self in the world that cannot be 
reduced to any theoretical explanation.  Just as Odysseus metaphorically describes the 
way of thought for the philosophical, Levinas compares his new “first philosophy” of 
ethics to the story of Abraham: “To the myth of Odysseus returning to Ithaca, we wish to 
oppose the story of Abraham, leaving his fatherland forever for a land yet unknown and 
                                                 
134 Given this understanding of the Greek, it is little wonder that Heidegger becomes one 
of Levinas’s favorite targets for critique.  Levinas dedicates an entire section of Totality 
and Infinity to the partial refutation and correction of Heidegger’s analysis of “being-in-
the-world,” which amounts to little more than being at home for Levinas.  “Interiority and 
Economy” finds that love of life, not Sorge, constitutes the nature of egoic existence; 
however, Levinas goes on to claim that this is not the fundamental mode of the self.   
 
135 Gibbs’ analysis of the Greek and Hebrew in Levinas is both in depth and insightful; 
nevertheless, he falls victim to the very problem Levinas is trying so desperately to avoid, 
allowing the Hebrew to not only be translated into but to be overtaken by the Greek.  The 
fact that some sort of translation can occur suggests a connection between the two terms, 
but Levinas does not want to suggest that one is in fact a greater genus of the other such 
that a reduction from one to the other is possible.  Gibbs’ declaration that the Hebrew is a 
kind of “reasoning” places Hebrew within the categorical metaphysics of the Greek, 
effectively asserting just such a reduction.  For his analyses see: Robert Gibbs, 
Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
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forbidding his servant to bring even his son to the point of departure.”136  The journey of 
Abraham involves a departure without return, a promise that his clan would never return.  
Should we be worried, now, that having spoken of this story, i.e., put it into Greek, that 
the essential Hebrew has been lost?  Later in the same article in which Levinas makes this 
comparison between Abraham and Odysseus, Levinas explains that “the work thought to 
the limit demands a radical generosity of the Same, which in the Work goes toward the 
Other.  It therefore demands an ingratitude of the Other.  Gratitude would be precisely 
the return of the movement to its origin.”137  The Hebrew experience is one of giving 
without return, with the expectation of ingratitude, the dissolution of a balanced 
economy.  The story of Abraham, “thought to the limit,” holds meanings upon meanings 
and, in some sense, never stops teaching or giving.  Consequently, Levinas’s relating of 
the story does not contradict or undermine the essential nature of its going out.  The 
reader can never add to the story; the story always adds to the reader.  The giving in the 
text cannot be returned.138  Having assigned this reading to the Hebrew, let us not beg the 
question, if this is the Hebrew according to Levinas, is it truly Jewish? 
 To label a certain thought as essentially Jewish may be problematic.  Are there no 
other religions that offer the same kind of ethics to be “for the other” with no expectation 
of return?  Levinas periodically quotes from the New Testament of the Christian Bible 
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138 Jill Robbins has an excellent treatment of these two stories and also keeps in mind the 
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Judaic: Reading Levinas,” in Prodigal Son, Elder Brother (Chicago: University of 
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verses from the Gospel of Matthew: “Lord, when did we see you hungry or thirsty or a 
stranger or naked or sick or in prison? . . . Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one of the 
least of these, you did it to me.”  Perhaps we might quote from the Epistle of James 
which echoes its Jewish roots in the nascence of Christianity: “Religion that is pure and 
undefiled before God, the Father, is this: to visit orphans and widows in their affliction, 
and to keep oneself unstained from the world.”  Surely there are other traditions which 
Levinas might have suggested.   
Levinas still critiques the Christian tradition, however, as having succumbed to 
the influence of the Greek: “Christianity too is tempted by temptation, and in this it is 
profoundly Western.”139  What Levinas means here is that Christianity sees itself caught 
in struggle with the tempter; Christians see themselves caught in struggle with 
temptations, and as Nietzsche and Hegel correctly surmised, this corporate and individual 
conflict acts as a high motivator for Christians to evolve in the world, constantly 
overcoming new challenges, conquering and assimilating.  It is not necessarily the case 
that Christianity is unethical or without a sense of the other in its tradition, but since 
Levinas sees the history of Christianity expressed in Europe culminating in a tacit 
compliance with Fascism, the tradition fails to offer, for Levinas, a proper model or 
language for ethics.140    
                                                 
139 Emmanuel Levinas, “The Temptation of Temptation,” in Nine Talmudic Readings, 
trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 33. 
 
140 Let us note here that Levinas is not attempting to offer a definition of Christianity in 
order to dismiss it as unethical.  The Christian mission historically proselytizes, bringing 
others into conformity with Christian views, endeavoring to create a totality which 
Levinas opposes.  This does not mean that Levinas is against Christianity nor does it 
mean that he does not see instances where Christianity and Judaism can be in a mutually 
positive relationship.  E.g. Levinas writes in Difficult Freedom, “Judaeo-Christian 
Friendship,” of an experience at the fourth Colloquium of French-speaking Jewish 
  
 84
Rosenzweig, a heavy influence on Levinas, predates Levinas’s understanding of 
Christianity and gives credence to the idea that even as some Jews were trying to offer 
apologetics that would stem the anti-Semite sentiment and would allow them to pass 
unrestricted in European culture, there was a blooming awareness of essential differences 
between Judaism and the entrenched European Christianity.  In the third and final section 
of the Star of Redemption, Rosenzweig offers a sociological view of Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam.  For him, Protestantism proudly takes its place as the highest 
realization of Hegel’s culture growing in perfection turning its desire for brotherhood into 
a desire for winning converts via evangelism or conquest.  Christianity, then, for Levinas 
and Rosenzweig is a religion tied to history and progress, reaching its logical end through 
secularization and loss of the divine, meaning that the end will be when the world 
becomes Christian, erasing the division between the heavenly and the earthly.141  
Would Levinas go so far as to say that the only true ethics is one grounded in the 
Jewish, which seems the only belief that is founded upon the Hebrew?  It seems as 
though he would, but the issue at heart is one of language rather than ontology. In fact, 
what Levinas is claiming about the essential “Jewishness” of all humankind as one relates 
to another on the foundation of the ethical is that all human beings originate under similar 
situational structurings such that the ethical is always already there, and Judaism, for 
Levinas, provides a tradition which can rightly describe this origination.  Other religions 
                                                                                                                                                 
Intellectuals where Jacques Madaule “shows Christians that we (Jews) are significant to 
the future and to life.  This significance can transform the very meaning of Judaeo-
Christian relations.”  Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Sean Hand (London: 
The Athalone Press, 1990). 
 
141 For a review of Rosenzweig’s understanding of Christianity, see Mark Lilla, “A Battle 
for Religion,” in The New York Review of Books Vol. 49, No. 19, December 5, 2002.  
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or disciplines which have also embraced ethics still fall short as a proper model for 
Levinas’s philosophy because they are “tempted by temptation,” wrapped up in the 
philosophy of assimilation, of the expectation of a return for their work.  Here we see the 
outcome of the dilemma Levinas faced as a member of the Jewish Alliance, who believed 
in a humanity common to all, and as a marginalized Jew in Europe was forced to define 
what makes Judaism essentially different from the actions and ethics of a society ready to 
marginalize and control.  The proper ethical nature found in Judaism is not, then, 
specifically Jewish but is the properly human, the properly ethical, acting in Judaism.  
“Judaism” and “Hebrew” become concrete names that disclose a universal, ethical nature.      
 The philosophical arrogance of the modern period is dying, and philosophy is 
coming to accept that it can no longer justify its own history.142  Western philosophy, as a 
historically situated endeavor in itself, cannot claim mastery over all experience, and in 
the sense of western philosophy with which Levinas is concerned, the context is even 
more constricted.  When he claims to “speak in Greek,” he means the “customary mode 
of presentation and interpretation in the universitites,” a mode which “owes much to the 
Greeks.”143  Levinas’s implicit Judaism, that which he himself claimed to be replete in his 
work “subconsciously,” allows a move away from the totalizing forces of the “Greek.”  
                                                 
142 The idea here is that Western philosophy is historically contextualized by politics, 
philosophical discoveries, religious movements, and scientific advancements.  
Consequently, philosophy in the West must be seen as delimited by this context and not 
free to define itself as though it were not contextually restricted.  While the concept of the 
West as a concept is coming under scrutiny, Philippe Nemo offers an excellent work that 
acknowledges the role of the Greeks, Romans, Christians, and democratic revolutions as 
contributors of recognizable Western culture.  Philippe Nemo, What is the West, trans. 
Kenneth Casler (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2005). 
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In one sense, then, we have already answered part of Janicaud’s critique.  Levinas’s 
understanding of the ethics implicit in Judaism is not, as we have it so far, an insidious 
infecting of the phenomenological epochè, but is a way of defining the lived experience 
of the intersubjective in a manner not constricted by the habitual practices of the 
universities, the very experience phenomenology is intended to investigate, an experience 
Levinas defines as “Hebraic.” 
            While we have yet to completely satisfy Janicaud’s objections, we are at a point 
to bring up Hering’s warnings about a pseudo-phenomenological literature that confuses 
the eidetic with the empirical.  Levinas’s use of “Hebrew” and “Judaic” as linguistic 
intrusions meant to unseat the expected “Greek” descriptive language do not refer to 
something specifically religious, but to an eidetic that is universally descriptive of 
humanity.  We have not, as yet, investigated the appropriateness of Levinas’s description 
of the ethical, but we can, with assurance, argue that his description is not an attempt to 
apply a singular Jewish eidetic to extra-Jewish instances of the intersubjective.  Judaism 
offers, in its history, stories and experiences, an indication of the ethical eidos Levinas 
argues is constitutive of all human interaction.  Janicaud, however, still holds sway with 
his critique that nothing has been done to show that Levinas does not reach an 
understanding of this eidos without reliance upon the tenants and tradition of Judaism. 
   Having settled Hering’s warning, we must now uncover the Jewish resources that 
shaped Levinas’s Hebrew in another concession to Janicaud’s attack.  If Levinas is to 
keep the Judaic tradition properly bracketed, then he cannot allow his phenomenology to 
be overrun with the expectations and presuppositions presented in the classic Jewish 
texts, which he freely addresses in his work. 
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Levinas and Hebrew Texts 
 The first evidence of a truly Jewish tradition in Levinas’s background has already 
been noted in his initial education centered on the Hebrew Bible, but under the influence 
of Chouchani, Levinas would also make the interpretive texts of the Talmud foundational 
to his understanding of the role of the Jewish in history.  For Levinas, the Bible is the 
“Book of books.”144  What makes it so “is that extraordinary presence of its characters, 
that ethical plenitude and its mysterious possibilities of exegesis which originally 
signified transcendence for me.”145  Levinas’s confession concerning the Bible 
illuminates a central concern of his that will be important for the rest of this chapter.  The 
Bible’s overabundance of possibilities represented transcendence for him.  As Levinas 
attempts to show God (a.k.a. the infinite in philosophical parlance) as the constitutive 
element of the ethical encounter, his later descriptions of the way in which the infinite 
can be found in the finite will all be modeled after this original sense of the transcendent 
infinite, which is the limit of the mysterious possibilities in the Bible.   
 While the Bible represents the irruption of the infinite in the finite text, the 
Talmudic texts helped Levinas to rediscover the specific theme and place of Judaism in 
the world.  Chouchani’s contribution to Levinas’s work was a renewed interest in the 
Talmud, which, for Levinas, brings to light Israel as the model of ethical behavior.  As 
we will see argued, human beings originate in the ethical condition of the infinite, but it is 
the interpretation of the Rabbis that bring this condition to light in its truly Jewish frame.  
I will, for the most part, avoid the Talmudic readings simply because Levinas’s 
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hermeneutic approach involves “translating” the Hebrew of the Talmud into Greek, and 
our interest here is Levinas’s roots in the Hebrew.   
 Levinas’s other sources for his formulation of the Hebrew come from other 
Jewish thinkers, most specifically Franz Rosenzweig and through Rosenzweig, Hermann 
Cohen.  One may object that Cohen is much more notable as a neo-Kantian and should 
not be considered as a “Jewish” thinker.  While Rosenzweig writes obscurely for a 
strictly Jewish audience, he was also a student of Cohen’s and can easily be related to 
other philosophers.146  Consequently, to consider these figures as part of Levinas’s Jewish 
background would seem paradoxical if we were attempting to draw a hard and fast 
distinction between the Judaic and the philosophical.  However, because our distinction is 
between Hebrew and Greek, we can consider these thinkers as Jewish insofar as they 
have some religious affiliation in their work and contribute to the theme of the Hebrew.  
Having made the distinction between the Hebrew and the Greek, I will investigate how 
the Bible, Cohen and Rosenzweig contribute to the irruption of the infinite, as one would 
say in Greek, or as one would say in the Hebrew, the possibility of revelation. 
  From Levinas’s early philosophy in Totality and Infinity, he has relied upon 
Exodus chapter 33 wherein Moses is said to meet God face to face to illustrate the 
manner in which God reveals Himself without His presence.147  The central verse (11) in 
                                                 
146As adamantly as Levinas desires to be known as a philosopher for the world, 
Rosenzweig desires to be known as a thinker for the Jews.  Nevertheless, Robert Gibbs 
argues convincingly that we should also understand Rosenzweig as a very capable 
philosopher.  Aligning Rosenzweig with philosophy, however, places him squarely in the 
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the Jewish influence.  Again, see Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas. 
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the passage reads, “And God spoke to Moses face to face like a man speaks to his 
friend.”  Face to face often represents a presence of one face in front of another; however, 
the simile in the verse that compares this relationship to the way one might speak to a 
friend places the actual presence in doubt.  This should strike even the occasional reader 
of scripture as expected, since Biblical authors continually avoid picturing God in a 
position of inferiority or even equality.148  The text reveals that the face to face is not a 
true presence of God before Moses when we read Moses’ question at verse 13 for God to 
“let me know thy ways.”  The nature of God, then, is not revealed to Moses, but remains 
hidden.  However, Moses’ second and final request, that God show His Glory (v.18), is 
granted, but Moses does not get the front row seats he might have desired.  As God 
passes, Moses is pushed into a cleft in the rock so that he cannot see the Lord pass. 
 God’s face, then, never truly appears, but is always deferred in God’s passing.  
The importance for Levinas from this passage is the nature of God’s absence even in 
what should be the most intimate of forums - the face to face conversation.  What follows 
the conversation, after Moses comes down from the mountain and confronts the nation of 
Israel, symbolizes the nature of the infinite in the human.  Even while pressed into the 
rock face, Moses was still privy to the revealed glory of God, and this glory radiates from 
him (Ex. 34:29-35).  This glory radiates God’s demand for His people to repent of their 
                                                                                                                                                 
Conceptions of Ethics in Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Deridda (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 2000), 90 - 129.   
 
148 Friendship may sound like a relationship of equality, but it need not be.  The avoidance 
of showing God in an equal or inferior manner led the Masoretes to edit the meeting 
between Abraham and God during the bargaining session over the number of righteous 
men in Sodom needed for God to spare the city.  Some ancient traditions read at Genesis 
18:22 that “the Lord remained standing before Abraham,” as though God were to wait 
upon Abraham.  The Masoretes edited in favor of “Abraham remained standing before 
the Lord.”  God’s superiority is constantly affirmed. 
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unfaithfulness, return to their God and do what is right in His sight.  After Moses’s 
meetings, though, his practice was to place a veil over his face to obscure the beaming 
light of the infinite.  While interpreting the nature of this veil is open, whether literal or 
metaphorical, Levinas may indeed want to read the veil as Moses’s actual face.  The 
infinite, the light of God’s glory, shines from behind the face of every human being as the 
demand to do what is right, but just as the glory of God passed while Moses’s back was 
turned, the infinite does not show even in the face of those who confront us.149  
 If the face of God does not show, then how do we recognize God in the finite 
world in which we live?  How does the revelation of God happen?  For the Biblical 
answer to this, we must turn to the figure of the prophet Ezekiel.  Ezekiel becomes for 
Levinas a figure of influence in his later works, “God and Philosophy” and Otherwise 
than Being or Beyond Essence.  While he never treats it as explicitly as he does the 
passage from Exodus, a careful reading of the prophet’s confrontation with God in the 
opening chapters of Ezekiel’s book lays bare the resonance within Levinas’s work.  Even 
though Ezekiel’s reluctance to be God’s prophet demonstrates the possibility of a 
subjectivity that resists the demand, we will concentrate on Ezekiel 3: 1-3 wherein God’s 
chosen eats the text of God’s word and becomes the divine mouthpiece.  Despite 
resistance, God at least puts His word into Ezekiel by making the chosen prophet eat a 
                                                 
149 The place of a passage like the one we have just finished exegeting in Levinasian 
fashion does not necessarily reflect the way that Biblical scholars might approach the 
text.  The face as a philosophical principle in Levinas is not presented as such in the 
Bible; nevertheless Levinas would respond: “In my opinion that is the spirit of the Bible, 
with all its concern for weakness, all the obligation towards the weak.  But I didn’t find 
that in a verse.  You see my terminology does not come from the Bible.  Otherwise it 
would be the Bible to the very end.”  See, Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes, Alison Ainley, 
“The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas,” in The Provocation of 
Levinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (London: Routledge, 1988), 173. 
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scroll.  The text, here, represents the medium by which God must enter the finite world, 
but simply reading what God has written is obviously insufficient.  Ezekiel becomes, 
then, for Levinas, the portraiture of the infinite as part of the human origination, for the 
eaten text sustains in a way that the read word cannot.150   
The depiction of a medium at which God’s passing may be hinted demonstrates 
the need for subjectivity to be radically reconceived.  The origin of the human can no 
longer be defined in terms of one’s self but must now, by being de-centered, thrust into 
and out from this medium of God’s passing, find the sustenance of self in the infinite that 
is our true origin.  The medium for mankind, however, is not the text, but the face, and 
once again, Levinas finds Ezekiel to be a model figure.  After Ezekiel consumed the word 
of God, making God’s demands part of him, Ezekiel prophesies to the people, but this 
seems strange after Ezekiel’s reluctance in the face of God’s awesome persuasion in 
chapters one and two.  In 3:12-27, though, God ends Ezekiel’s isolation and places His 
prophet among the people.  Ezekiel only adheres to God’s demand once his attention 
moves from God to the nation.  For Levinas, this epitomizes the way the subject has a 
vertical relationship with the creator for it is only through our ethical interaction with 
others following our divine origin that we achieve a relation with God. 
No one can defend Levinas from the claim that he makes explicit reference to 
religious texts.  Reading any of his works, philosophical or otherwise, reveals numerous 
quotations, but Levinas himself is aware of the criticism these citations will bring and 
                                                 
150 The text, here, has important ramifications for Levinas’s understanding of Judaism, for 
it is through the rituals that have defined Jewish life that the presence of God is indicated.  
God is always pointed to via the medium of scripture, and just as scripture defines the 
medium that makes the Jewish nation a nation so does the infinite as mediated by the face 
act as origin of what it is to be human. 
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seriously asks, “Am I citing the Bible, or am I doing phenomenology.”151  If he means for 
the Bible to lend credence to his argument by adding the weight of an uncontestable 
authority, then one of the basic tenets of phenomenology has been violated.  
Phenomenology is a method of description that begins with observing where one is and 
the experiences had by simply being there.  The phenomenologist describing his 
experience, however, must not make reference to any presuppositions.  Uncovering the 
conditions of the experience without reference to preconceived notions is the goal and 
major difficulty of phenomenology.  The Bible, or theological tradition, cited as an 
authority would constitute such presuppositions and would, therefore, be out of play.152  
Levinas, though, does not reference the Bible as indisputable; rather, the Bible represents 
revealing stories of humanity, descriptions of ethical encounters.  As a result, Levinas 
responds to his own question that the real concern is “to know if this reference to the 
Bible falsifies phenomenology.”153  Considering the Bible without grounding it in 
supernatural origins opens it up as a descriptive text like any other, as examples for 
phenomenology. 
In addition to the many examples of Biblical texts in Levinas’s philosophy, we 
may also locate him within the Jewish mystical tradition.  Claiming such a correlation is 
doubly dubious considering Levinas’s own admonition that his philosophy should be 
distinguished from seeking the unio mystica.  Levinas asserts that the transcendent 
infinite that he discloses in his phenomenology should not be confused with the manner 
                                                 
151 Emmanuel Levinas, Autrement que savoir (Paris: Editions Osiris, 1988), 74.  
  
152 When Janicaud makes his critique, he refers to Husserl’s Ideas I §58, as did we at 
footnote 1, where Husserl places the transcendence of God outside the reduced subject. 
 
153 Levinas, Autrement que savoir, 80. 
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in which mysticism employs transcendence and subsequent contact with it: “[The 
Infinite] is not the numinous: the I who approaches him is neither annihilated on contact 
nor transported outside of itself, but remains separated and keeps its as-for-me.”154  This 
characterization of mysticism assumes that the unio mystica results in a totality, and 
totality is the very thing that negates the possibility of transcendence.  Mysticism either 
joins the seeker and God together such that the seeker loses all identity in a totality made 
by God or the seeker creates a totality that is capable of encompassing God. 
 The problem with Levinas’s criticism is that its target is only one form of Jewish 
mysticism, specifically Hasidic, whereas he makes it appear as though all mysticism is at 
fault.  In pre-Hasidic texts, the term devekut (cleaving) most often describes man’s 
intimate relationship with God, which connotes a relationship between two identifiable 
participants; however, Hasidic Judaism typically employs the term yichud (union) which 
certainly implies the very annihilation of which Levinas is critical.  Gershom Scholem 
agrees that very few kabbalists actually intended a communion with God to destroy 
individuality.155  The desired outcome was an apprehension of God and creation which 
could not be achieved via the intellect.  If non-theoretical apprehension of God does 
rightly describe the earlier segment of Jewish mysticism, then Levinas will appear to 
have a strong affinity with it.156  In fact, Richard Cohen, while questioning congruence 
                                                 
154 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 77. 
 
155 Gershom Scholem, Kabbalah (New York: New American Library, 1974), 3. 
 
156 I find it impossible not to interject with at least an allusion to a story.  Hagigah 14b 
details one of the oldest Jewish mystical stories of four men who entered the pardes.  Ben 
Azzai, Ben Zoma, Aher, and Rabbi Avika entered the pardes but only Rabbi Avika 
endured unscathed.  What allows our hero to survive is his refusal to give up his separate 
identity. 
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between Levinas and mysticism on the grounds put forward by Levinas, unequivocably 
admits “that both Rosenzweig and Levinas are not merely aware in some vague way of a 
Jewish mystical tradition, but diversely refer and allude to Jewish mystical sources,” and 
that while “both thinkers explicitly deny the label ‘mystic’ . . . affirmative or negative 
avowals are of little account.”157 
 With Cohen’s admission in mind, we can briefly show how Levinas does in fact 
resemble a strand of Jewish mysticism represented here by Abraham Abulafia and Isaac 
Luria.158  What Levinas shares with the former is the idea of rupture, the only action that 
would allow a truly transcendent being to be encountered by finite humanity.  Rupture, 
the breaking in of the transcendent upon the world of the human being, involves two 
other concepts central to Levinas.  On the one hand, God remains infinitely separated, a 
being without being - “neither a body nor will He ever be corporealized”159 - and on the 
other hand, the union between God and human occurs within and through the world itself.   
If, however, man must go through the entire world to draw close to God, then man and 
God are at the greatest possible distance, but “the abundance of mitsvot” exists for the 
one who knows the reality of the Torah, and this brings God near.160  At this moment, we 
must shift our brief tryst with mysticism to Isaac Luria, for while Abulafia occasionally 
                                                 
157 Richard Cohen, “The Face of Truth and Jewish Mysticism,” in Elevations: The Height 
of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 
251-252. 
 
158 For my discussion of these two mystics, I am relying upon the work done by Oona 
Ajzenstat in her work, Driven Back to the Text (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
2001), 150-200. 
 
159 Moshe Idel, The Mystical Experience of Abraham Abulafia, trans. Jonathon Chipman 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 90. 
 
160 Ibid.,135. 
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suggests the bridge of ethics, Luria proclaims it boldly.  What Levinas found in Abulafia 
was deepened and expounded in Luria.161  The most important advance, of course, is the 
importance Luria placed upon ethics.  Luria describes a desire for union with God in 
much the same way that Levinas describes desire in Totality and Infinity.  This desire 
instructs or demands responsible actions.   
The Influence of Jewish Philosophers 
 The features of God’s constitutiveness in humans and the moral relation that 
makes an approach to God possible also appears in the philosophical works of Hermann 
Cohen.  Levinas rarely addresses Cohen, and the relationship between them is usually 
mediated by way of Rosenzweig, Cohen’s student.162  However, Rosenzweig is not 
always a faithful student, so Levinas’s affinities with Cohen, while sometimes simple 
correlations, suggest ties beyond fortunate parallels.  Cohen’s approach to the infinite 
God and His relation to the finite find an unmistakable resonance in Levinas.  Consider 
the following quote from Cohen’s Religion: 
This looking toward God can mean nothing other than looking towards the 
solution of the infinite task, a solution which, though it is infinite, nonetheless 
actualizes itself.  The solution is infinite, for it is only a moment in the infinite 
task; but the solution at this moment signifies infinite success, the infinite result.  
                                                 
161 An overly brief synopsis of some of the congruent themes would entail the separation 
of the infinite from the finite by way of contraction, a contraction which makes the finite 
possible.  This contraction is the necessary condition for the transcendence of the infinite.  
Finite beings relate to the infinite, and this relationship constitutes a redemption of 
creation and the diminution of contraction.  See Ajzenstat, Driven, 178-179. 
 
162 One of the earliest dealings with the relation between Levinas and Cohen comes from 
Edith Wyschogrod, “The Moral Self: Emmanuel Levinas and Hermann Cohen,” Daat: A 
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 4, 1980, 35 - 58.  While she recognizes the differences 
between the two thinkers, she argues that what binds them together is their understanding 
of the role of the infinite, which is our focus here.  For both Cohen and Levinas, she 
states, the infinite is that which provides “the open-endedness of the moral realm which 
gives the self its meaning” (58). 
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God can assign no task that would be a labor of Sisyphus.  Self-sanctification 
must arrive at its infinite conclusion in the forgiveness of sin by God.163 
 
The relationship between humans and God takes the form of an “infinite task,” for 
Cohen, a task that can never be completed, much like a line approaching an asymptote on 
a graph.  One might suspect that the promise of an unending work would paralyze those 
looking at the daunting task.  Cohen, on the other hand, believes that the infinite nature of 
the approach guarantees the continual striving for an ethical community, which already 
hints at a connection between the infinite God and moral praxis.  Striving in relation to 
the infinite is, for Cohen, the move of one becoming holy, which is the developing of the 
spirit of knowledge into the spirit of action.   
 For Levinas, Cohen’s infinite task would accurately describe the relation one has 
with the other, a demand that is never met, but for Levinas, the imposition of the other 
does not cause the self to whither under an impossible load.  Rather, the imposition 
signals the infinite in the ethical task ahead, and the relation one has with the infinite is 
Desire.164  Cohen, then, provides another figure for Levinas who finds the relation with 
God both to be infinite and to require the seeking after God in moral terms.  However, 
there does seem to be incongruence in the fact that Cohen believes that we move from 
knowledge to praxis.  While this will remain a stumbling block for complete 
                                                 
163 Hermann Cohen, Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism, trans. Simon 
Kaplan (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1971), 207. 
 
164 Here we get our first reference to the one example harped on by Janicaud.  Desire is 
the feeling, motivator, and catalyst for a relation with the infinite that overcomes any 
personal doubts as to the impossibility of accomplishing the task.  The question to be 
asked is, is this desire so tied with the notion of God in Judaism that it is not free to be 
properly descriptive of the ethical experience? 
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correspondence, Cohen’s further explanation of what happens in this move reduces the 
friction between the two thinkers. 
 Cohen claims that the mediation between God and humans can be conceptually 
maintained in a pure abstraction.  However, whenever one allows for any material 
connection between the two, the conceptual can no longer maintain the abstraction and 
must give way to ethical activity. 
The mediation [between God and humans], however, can be thought of as 
correlation only conceptually.  As soon as it is not confined to a strict conceptual 
abstraction, as soon as it is imagined as a material connection of powers, which 
afterwards become persons, the connection assumes the form of a community.165 
 
Again, we have the move of holiness from the conceptual to the moral.  The Shekinah, 
the dwelling presence of God with his people, would not be the condition for relationship 
between God and humans but would be the condition within which God and humans act.  
If Cohen has rightly interpreted the activity of humans in their relation to God as moral 
activity, then one cannot distinguish between a moral act and an act that brings one closer 
to God. 
 For Levinas as well, once the encounter with an “other” has occurred, the 
conceptual can no longer encompass God.  Of course, for Levinas as well, the conceptual 
could never think the infinite in a way in which all its possibilities are grasped.  The self 
is always, already for the other; we are always involved in community first.  Therefore, 
the self is always limited in the scope of its relationship, unable to grasp the whole of the 
encounter from a vantage point outside.  Once Cohen makes the move to community, 
however, he and Levinas would find much agreement.  Levinas constantly asserts that 
                                                 
165 H. Cohen, Religion, 100. 
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any move toward God must be made, necessarily, through ethical moves toward the other 
that holds us hostage. 
 As we conclude just some of the influences on Levinas’s philosophy that might be 
considered Jewish, our last figure stands as the largest, at least according to Levinas 
himself: “We were struck by the opposition to the idea of totality in the Star of 
Redemption by Franz Rosenzweig, which is too often present in this book to be cited.”166  
What makes Rosenzweig such an important figure is the role that he plays in freeing 
Levinas from the totalizing grip that phenomenology, in the hands of Husserl and 
Heidegger, had held.  The adequation between conscious thought and experience that 
phenomenology analyzed in intentionality totalized the world into a knowable quantity, at 
least according to the manner in which Husserl and Heidegger were being predominantly 
read during Levinas’s most formative years with phenomenology.  Only by his 
familiarity with Rosenzweig and the deepened appreciation for justice he received by 
reading the Star did he discover the means to break from totality.167  In keeping with our 
theme concerning the irruption of the infinite, we will see Rosenzweig’s influence in the 
nature of the command that issues from the other, the command as a call for redemption, 
and redemption as a response to the infinite in the finite world.  
 Rosenzweig composes the Star of Redemption in three sections, each of which are 
further subdivided into three sections.  The second section of the Star, “The Course or 
The Always-Renewed Cosmos,” details the interrelation of God, human, and world, and 
                                                 
166 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 28. 
 
167 See Richard Cohen’s analysis of Levinas and Rosenzweig for the significance of the 
Star in correcting the shortcomings that Levinas found in the phenomenologies of Husserl 
and Heidegger.  Richard Cohen, “Levinas, Rosenzweig and the Phenomenologies of 
Husserl and Heidegger,” in Philosophy Today, vol. 32, no. 2, Summer 1988, 165 - 178.  
Of course, chapter I questions the idea that phenomenology is of such a totalizing nature. 
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comprises the necessary correlation we wish to draw between Rosenzweig and Levinas, 
especially the relation between God and humans and humans and world.  Rosenzweig 
establishes in his first section that God is separate from world, a rarely disputed orthodox 
claim, but this leaves the question of how humans who live in the world are supposed to 
know the God that is separate.168  Knowing God only becomes possible if God reveals 
Himself.   
 Speech, for Rosenzweig, acts as the fundamental mode of revelation, for it is in 
speech that one reveals oneself beyond the trappings of actions and behavior.  In speech, 
the element of surprise always waits to overtake us as something unexpected about the 
other comes to light.  The specific mode of speech that accomplishes this revelation is the 
imperative, “Love me,” or Biblically speaking, “You shall love the Lord your God” 
(Deut. 6:5).  What makes the imperative revelatory, though?  In contrast to the 
imperative, the indicative states a state of affairs; the temporal frame within which it 
works always slips into the past.  Commands, on the other hand, state what must be now, 
molding each future moment to the present state.  The special status of the command to 
love lies in its being foundational to all others.  The reason for this is that all imperatives 
can be turned into law without changing the nature of the order, but if this were to occur 
to the command to love, it would no longer have the nature of the utterance coming from 
a person.  “Love me” does not simply implore; it places the recipient of the command 
into a realization of one’s failure.  This failure arises from the realization that while in 
egoic solitude, there was an element of love upon the receiver which went unreturned.  
To admit of this failure is to acknowledge oneself as loved: “It confesses not the 
                                                 
168 Here, I am strictly using Gibbs, Correlations, chapter three as the guiding interpretation 
of Rosenzweig’s second section. 
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lovelessness of the past, rather the soul speaks: I also now love, but still in this most 
present moment not as much as I - know myself loved.”169  
 As of now, God remains hidden, but the nature of the revelatory command leads 
us into the redemption of the world where God is finally realized.  The command to love 
will make possible God’s revelation, but it is carried out through the redemption of others 
as the condition of love forms people into a community.  “Love me” must be answered as 
Abraham and Isaiah answered the Lord, “Here am I.”  As each subject stands in relation 
to his neighbors, the two poles are bound together in recognition of love, a love that can 
only now be recognized as the love of God.  The binding of people together in a 
community under God’s love brings about true redemption wherein people offer praise 
back to God for His goodness.  The linguistic move here is the cohortative, “Let us 
praise,” but the key to this statement is in the acknowledgment that must take place of the 
Third person in all dialogue, God.  Community is based on love that is God’s condition 
for humans, and acknowledging this is to bring about the world’s redemption.   
 Redemption always points to the future.  The cohortative “Let us praise” 
anticipates what all gathered under God will do, not as an indicative state of affairs or as 
an immediate imperative, but as a portrait of what is ours to make.  Nevertheless, 
Rosenzweig thinks that this future can be fulfilled in the present, and that the community 
of God can come about.  When I come into contact with my neighbor, I recognize 
someone who is also loved, is under the command to love, and, thus, someone who 
shares my condition.  Now the “I” has become a “we,” and through this other, I am 
connected to neighbors upon neighbors.  The community can be completed. 
                                                 
169Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. William W. Hallo (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1971), 181.  
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 When Levinas finished reading the Star, he was ready to make an assault on the 
totalizing nature of philosophy.  He resonated well with God as that condition upon us 
that commands us to love as well as the acknowledgment of the infinite in dealing with 
the other, which is Rosenzweig’s encounter with the neighbor.  However, where 
Rosenzweig believed in a realized eschatology, a completed time where the future of 
redemption had taken place in the present, Levinas sides with Cohen’s infinite task.  Here 
at the end, we can begin to see how the Biblical and Jewish philosophical influences swirl 
together in Levinas’s thought.  The Bible provided the foundational experience of God as 
absent but present, the infinite that could never be part of the world but was yet in-finite.  
Cohen allowed for a way to express God’s revelation in daily existence as an asymptotic 
goal that could always be striven for but never reached.  Rosenzweig, perhaps the greatest 
influence of all, helped put together the nature of the command that holds us to others, a 
condition that we as human beings are always, already in.  We must “love our neighbor” 
because God has already commanded our love be to God. 
“God” and Phenomenological Religion 
 As we have seen, Dominique Janicaud laments over the “new phenomenologists” 
who, he claims, are not in fact practicing phenomenology because they refer to a God that 
needs a theology already intact before He can be spoken of meaningfully.  Answering 
Janicaud’s challenge as it may concern Levinas’s philosophy will involve knowing 
exactly what Levinas means when he uses the term “God” in his philosophy.  Is this the 
God of the Hebrew Bible masquerading as a self-evident manifestation?  Let us allow 
Levinas’s work to speak for itself without any assumptions about the meanings of God or 
religion.  What this will reveal at the very foundation of Levinas’s work is his belief that 
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the human is grounded in the religious and in God, but God and religion will be 
understood in a manner far removed from their normal conception and far removed from 
Janicaud’s criticism. 
 One way to answer Janicaud is to argue that he is unwilling to understand the 
term “God” in anything but a religious context.  Levinas, who is well aware of the 
problems of using phenomenology to point to God declares that God is an “inadmissible 
abstraction . . .  it is in terms of the relation with the other that I speak of God.”  Even 
more emphatically is the claim in the last sentence of the paragraph just cited: “The idea 
of God is an idea that cannot clarify a human situation.  It is the inverse that is true.”170  
Certainly, throughout all of his philosophy, Levinas has not been afraid to use the term 
“God” in his texts, but up through 1962, his use of “God” had more of a Cartesian cast 
rather than religious source and had the purpose of describing the relation with the other 
rather than anything strictly theological.171  The self’s relation with the other, from whom 
the ethical demand ensues, discloses the infinite, the ab-solute, the irreducible other. 
 The promise of an encounter with infinity appears strange in the context of a face 
to face relationship.  What is infinite about the other person?  What is “divine” about the 
other?  Here we have Levinas’s basic use of the idea of God, which, in the beginning, has 
Cartesian parallels.  For Descartes, the cogito is a realization that demands an idea of the 
                                                 
170 Emmanuel Levinas, “Transcendence and Height,” in Levinas: Basic Philosophical 
Writings, ed. Adriaan Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1996), 29. 
 
171 Along with the desire to emphasize the Cartesian connections, it is important not to 
overplay a relationship between Levinas and Descartes.  Descartes’ concept of God finds 
its closest and most important parallel with Levinas in terms of the idea of infinity; 
however, this relationship with the infinite is disclosed in the human interaction of those 
situated in the world. 
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infinite, which amounts to an idea of God.  The problem with infinity is that the I is 
limited in such a way that it cannot grasp the concept of the infinite.  Infinity, then, is 
radically and absolutely other, and, as a result, it remains completely separated from the I.  
Consequently, the relationship between the concept of infinity and infinity as an object to 
be rendered as idea has no similarity with a mental representation and its object. In fact, 
the intentionality that attempts to grasp the infinite reaches for what cannot be embraced, 
and in this way, Levinas considers it infinite.  The I tries to “think more than it thinks.”  If 
such a direct attempt at grasping the infinite results in being overrun by the that which is 
to be thought, how does the idea of the infinite, the idea of God, get into the thoughts of 
the I.  Levinas answers, “It has been put into us . . . It is experience in the sole radical 
sense of the term: a relationship with the exterior, with the other, without this exteriority 
being able to be integrated into the same.”172  That which cannot be integrated into the 
realm of the same, which is ruled by the ontological, must, necessarily, be from a realm 
outside the same or beyond being. 
 In Levinas’s philosophy, the other functions as that which is beyond being and is 
before any sense of being.  God, in the aforementioned Cartesian sense, acts as a model 
for that which overflows the I and does not bend to integration into the same.  What 
makes God even more of a model figure is the parallel model of the Good which appears 
in Plato.  Levinas makes constant reference to Plato’s Republic which posits a Good 
beyond being.  In the desire to reach for the other and respond to the ethical demand there 
is a hollowness that accompanies the reaching.  According to Levinas, “The true desire is 
                                                 
172 Emmanuel Levinas, “Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,” in Collected Philosophical 
Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 54. 
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that which the desired does not satisfy, but hollows out.  It is goodness.”173  The Good 
beyond being operates in the same manner as the infinite God.  As the intentionality of 
the I directs the self towards the other, the self becomes overrun by the ideatum of 
infinity, hollowed out by the Good.  Both God and the Good operate rhetorically to 
describe the encounter between the other and the I and not to operate as objects to be 
understood in an ethical or ontological sense. 
 God, distinguished as the supreme being or creator, does not play a role in 
Levinas’s early philosophy – only the idea of God as illuminated by Descartes.  Levinas’s 
first major work, Totality and Infinity, published in 1961, continues the model of God 
and the idea of infinity as the other.  In a section titled “Transcendence and the Idea of 
Infinity,” Levinas reiterates the major points of “Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity”: 
“Infinity is not the ‘object’ of a cognition . . . but is the desirable, that which arouses 
Desire, that is, that which is approachable by a thought that at each instant thinks more 
than it thinks.”174  Conceivably, in an extreme state of doubt, we can account for all of 
our ideas except for infinity, which must be put into us.  Levinas clearly calls this infinity 
“God.”  Taking infinity in this work as equal to the idea of infinity as represented by the 
Cartesian concept of God, Levinas explicitly makes the connection between the idea of 
God and the other: “Infinity is the characteristic of a transcendent being as transcendent; 
the infinite is the absolutely other.”175  Here the absolutely other is that which contests the 
self’s totalizing possession, in other words, the other and its ethical demand.     
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 With a promise of innocence already made, at least for the early works up until 
1962, let us not make our assertion lightly, for it has indeed been argued that Levinas is 
grounded in his Jewish background with respect to his concept of God, and not just by 
critics of his philosophy but also by proponents of it as well.176  Richard Cohen makes 
this claim specifically with reference to Levinas’s conception of God, asserting that 
“Levinas’s thought is committed to the Jewish tradition, to a properly Jewish conception 
of God” (my italics).177   Cohen focuses upon the latter, the “properly Jewish 
conception,” but his argument immediately puts his claim into question.  Cohen claims 
that Levinas is attempting to overcome the traditional dichotomy between philosophy and 
religion, between the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and the God of the 
philosophers.  This is certainly true, but how is such a move proper to Judaism.  Why 
should Levinas not affirm one over the other as Martin Buber and Leo Strauss do, both 
affirming the God of the Bible?178  In contrast, what Levinas then goes on to do is to seek 
                                                 
176 Janicaud’s critique is not so easily answered with reference to Descartes, even in 
Levinas’s Totality and Infinity, for in the later section, “The Metaphysical and the 
Human,” the use of “God” once again becomes somewhat ambiguous: “The Other is not 
the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the 
manifestation of the height in which God is revealed.  It is our relations with men, which 
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sole signification they admit of” (p. 79).  It seems as though we can read this passage as 
saying that our theological concepts are conceived through the infinite disclosed in our 
relations with others, but it might also be saying nothing more than our theological 
concepts are built upon a humanism that need not posit the actual existence of God.  
Either way, Levinas seems to be re-introducing a measure of theology, where he had been 
careful to avoid it before. 
 
177 Richard Cohen, “God in Levinas: The Justification of Justice and Philosophy,” in 
Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), 173. 
 
178 Strauss suggests that the dualism between philosophy and religion is in fact 
unavoidable and cautiously sides with the God of the Bible.  See Leo Strauss, “Progress 
or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization,” in An Introduction to 
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a third, an alternative that is philosophical, but not in the philosophical tradition, “to hear 
a God not contaminated by Being is a human possibility no less important and no less 
precarious than to bring Being out of the oblivion in which it is said to have fallen in 
metaphysics and in onto-theology.”179  What this statement suggests is that Levinas 
places himself in line with philosophers of the phenomenological tradition who are, in 
essence, overhauling philosophy from a self-imposed oblivion.  Levinas’s own 
contribution is to hear God without Being, or to hear God from a height of absolute 
transcendence.  Cohen is right to point to transcendence as a notion of God that fits well 
within Jewish tradition, but, at the same time, transcendence seems to get in the way of a 
God intimately involved in the history of His people, carrying on conversations with His 
chosen leaders, involving Himself in nature.  Cohen suggests that Levinas’s description is 
able to preserve both transcendence and a personal God.180  If this is true, then perhaps 
Janicaud is right, and if this “properly Jewish conception” invades Levinas’s philosophy, 
then it is truly not phenomenology anymore. 
 Levinas does, undoubtedly, stand in the Jewish tradition, even if his philosophy 
does not stand for the Jewish tradition as he sometimes seems to claim.  Nevertheless, 
what I hope to show is that Levinas’s phenomenological approach and resulting 
                                                                                                                                                 
Political Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo Strauss, ed. Hilail Gildin (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1989), 248-310.  Buber, however, strongly affirms the God of the Bible 
by invoking a simple line from Pascal, “God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob - 
not of the philosophers and scholars.”  Martin Buber, “The Love of God and the Idea of 
Deity” (1943), trans. I. M. Lask, in The Eclipse of God: Studies in the Relation Between 
Religion and Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 49.  
 
179 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981), xlii. 
 
180 Levinas rarely suggests God as personal but does describe Him as such in “Loving the 
Torah more than God,” in Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism: Essays on Judaism, 
trans. Sean Hand (London: The Athalone Press, 1990), 145. 
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“phenomenological religion” grounds his claims in experience without needing or relying 
upon the support of an existing theological tradition.  In addition, I will also argue that 
Levinas’s philosophy cannot be considered, in any way, theological.    
 Where is “there” for Levinas’s phenomenological analysis?  What experience is 
central to his description?  While some might argue that Levinas is a philosopher of 
alterity, his true focus has always been the experience of the subject.  He defines the 
living self as “the being whose existing consists in identifying itself, in recovering its 
identity throughout all that happens to it . . . the primordial work of identification.  The I 
is identical in its very alterations.”181  What this means is that the subject is always about 
the task of constructing itself from what it finds in the world, narcissistically recovering 
the self in the face of difference.  Objects and beings which might be considered as other 
than the self are comprehended by the self and used in self-identification, effectively 
negating the otherness of those objects.  Levinas consistently characterizes this negation, 
the grasping of objects in knowledge, as an act of violence.  The self “carries out an act of 
violence and negation . . . without disappearing, beings are in my power.  The partial 
negation which is violence denies the independence of beings: they are mine.”182  
Consciousness, in its theoretical grasping and negating of otherness, creates a totality for 
itself.  After this description, however, Levinas puts the self-identity of the subject in 
question and asks if it is not possible for there to be a relation between self and otherness 
that does not come under the power of the narcissistic I (eye). 
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 Evidence for this pre-conscious relation arises in the advent of the other person.  
As the self appropriates things, categorizing and comprehending them, there is no sense 
that these things in the world are not there for one’s use - as Heidegger would claim - or 
there for consumption - as Levinas claims, going a step beyond Heidegger.  However, 
when another person approaches and meets face to face with that consuming self, there is 
a sense in which no amount of conscious theorizing can encompass the other person.  The 
other reveals the limits of consciousness and puts into question the right of the self to its 
self-identity.  Levinas asserts: “To approach the other is to put into question my freedom, 
my spontaneity as a living being, my emprise over the things, this impetuosity of the 
current to which everything is permitted, even murder . . . the face in which the other is 
produced submits my freedom to judgment.”183  This otherness of the person signified by 
the face that confronts the subject represents something which exists otherwise than what 
can be expressed in a totality; therefore, Levinas claims that this otherness is transcendent 
to the conscious self.  For the transcendent to avoid conscious grasp, it must be otherwise 
than ontological, for if it fit within the ontological scheme of the world, then experience 
could embrace it and reflect upon it.  Nevertheless, the self is not unaffected.  The 
transcendent affects by a moral exigency that puts the self into question, judges the 
freedom the self assumes in its consumption.  It is this relationship between the self that 
has been judged and the other as transcendent and otherwise than ontological that will 
comprise for Levinas the heart of his phenomenological religion, for, he claims, “the 
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distinction between transcendence toward the other man and transcendence toward God 
should not be made too quickly.”184         
  If transcendence encounters the subject prior to conscious grasping, then the 
relationship between the two must occur in a moment of the self’s absolute passivity.  
The subject in this instance cannot be identified with the powerful, world-making “I” of 
consciousness, but, in fact, embodies its etymological meaning.  The subject is sub-
jected, thrown under, put into question and called to account without asking, “What then 
is it to me?  Where does he get his right to command?  What have I done to be from the 
start in debt?”185  The summons to the subject in its passivity can be summarized in the 
Biblical accounts which Levinas employs, the archetype of which being the response of 
Isaiah to God’s call, “Whom shall I send?”  The English translation of Isaiah’s answer, 
“Here I am,” is insufficient for Levinas’s point.  However, both the Hebrew and the 
French translation announce the subject in the accusative, where a more proper English 
rendering would be, “Behold me.”  The accusative, linguistically speaking, signifies the 
direct object, that which receives the action just as the subject passively receives the more 
of the other prior to conscious reflection.  Now, however, our investigation is at its crisis 
point.  How does one go from describing an encounter with an-other person to citing 
Isaiah’s encounter with God?  How did God sneak in? 
 The horizon that is more than consciousness lies in the transcendent as condition 
for the self to emerge as ethical.  Levinas has been read to suggest that the transcendent 
behind the face of the other person is initiated at the advent of the other.  While this 
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reading is alluring and easily made due to the confusion between the face as seemingly 
both concrete and transcendental, it must be resisted.  The approach of the other opens 
the conscious subject to the realization of the excess that was already there as condition 
for the “I,” confirming the subject’s relation to transcendence.  The other is evidence of 
the binding between the self and the ethical call that transcends consciousness.  The face, 
then, signifies as ethical because it orients the self to an excess of consciousness, which 
has already been shown to sub-ject the subject in responsibility.”186    
 What is suggested in an excess of consciousness is not something rational, for 
ideas are held within conscious thought.  The idea of transcendence opened up at the 
coming of the other ruptures consciousness, signals a breakup of the self’s integrity, 
thinks more than can be thought.  Such transcendence, unrecoverable in reflection, 
conserves the possibility of God.  In this view, “transcendence is no longer a failed 
immanence.  It has the sort of excellence proper to Spirit: perfection, or the Good.”187  
Transcendence gains its significance as the Good in the phenomenology of responsibility 
which discloses the subject as implicated in the excess of consciousness, implicated in 
“an obedience to the absolute order - to the perfect authority - an originating obedience to 
the perfect authority, to the word of God, on condition of naming God only in terms of 
this obedience.”188 
                                                 
186 Levinas is very emphatic about the sub-jection of the self, claiming that the “I” is a 
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 What we have just described is the essence of phenomenological religion - 
religion in its etymological sense of to tie or bind again.  The self and the transcendent 
God are bound again in the relation of the self to the other, implicating every human 
being in this religion.  The self is not religious because it is ethical, but ethical because it 
is religious.  Religion here, though, obviously takes on a different connotation than what 
Janicaud assumed in his criticism.  Far from being a philosophy based upon scriptural 
proof-texts, Levinas has constructed his arguments based upon phenomenological 
analysis.  The fact that his phenomenology falls in line with some Biblical stories only 
indicates that the Bible is a reliable record of the structural relationship between human 
and transcendent.  Rather, Levinas finds scripture to be insightful concerning the manner 
in which the subject exists in the face of the truly other, which Levinas names God. 
Phenomenological Religion Reapplied to a Jewish Context 
Having constructed this phenomenological religion, Levinas can now apply it to 
his Jewish experience as a survivor of National Socialism.  If there is anything Jewish to 
which one can easily point that influences Levinas’s work, it is that Levinas wants to 
address God and ethics in a world after the Holocaust.  In his philosophy, he is not only 
attempting to define the ethical nature of the human, but also to disclose the significance - 
or rather lack of significance - of suffering caused by those who ignore their ethical 
grounding.  What I hope to show here is that Levinas does not rely upon established 
tradition or theology in order to answer this question.  In fact, he attempts to show that 
the problem of suffering can only be answered if God is taken in the non-ontological 
sense that Levinas describes.   
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 Elie Wiesel’s account of his experiences at Auschwitz sets forth the problem of 
believing in an ontological God, a God within being that must, if He is good at all, play a 
part in relieving the horrors of the camps.189  What should devout Jews do?  If God is 
good, then the events of history should be just.190  Those who were most reflective about 
their faith wondered what sin had been committed to bring down the Nazi’s on the Jews, 
so they prayed for forgiveness, deliverance, and a miracle.  For those enduring in 
suffering, there seemed only two options, either maintain faith in God and His presence 
in history, or side with atheism and accept despair.  Weisel’s own turn away from God is 
poignantly spoken, “Never shall I forget those moments which murdered my God and my 
soul and turned my dreams to dust.”191 
 Simply because Levinas will speak to this situation does not embroil his 
philosophy again in the trappings of presupposition or religion.  Undoubtedly, his 
experiences prompted him to rethink how one can express God and the reality of the 
Holocaust at the same time.  Experience began his questioning; it did not provide the 
answer or even direction.  Secondly, being involved with theodicy does not necessarily 
tie Levinas to religion.  In “Useless Suffering,” Levinas sketches the tradition of theodicy 
in Western thought and argues that reconciling God with the problem of evil has 
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dominated the thinking of the West.192  The primary form which theodicy has taken is to 
make pain meaningful by placing suffering within the context of God’s plan for the 
whole.  Therefore, theodicy, like all violence for Levinas, places God within the structure 
of a totality within ontology.  For Levinas, it is time for Jews of faith to become adults 
and give up the child-like belief in a God who “dished out prizes, inflicted punishments 
or pardoned sins.”193 
 “Useless Suffering” stands as one of several essays which put Levinas’s 
philosophy to work, applying the principles of ethicality and what it means for God to be 
otherwise than ontological.  First, Levinas argues that all suffering is useless and devoid 
of meaning, a statement sure to perk the ears of Nietzscheans everywhere.  Even those 
discomforts endured for their positive outcome - bodily pains that warn us of danger, 
hard work that produces an effect, and mental hardship that increases our virtues - all 
“rejoin” those pains inflicted unjustly.194  Instead of following Nietzsche all the way to 
the death of God, Levinas declares that the choice between God involved in history and 
no God at all represents a false dichotomy.195  God beyond being has to operate neither 
within the historical framework nor be buried with the rest of metaphysics but can 
operate as something that matters to the encounter-situation of human beings.  To realize 
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God as absent places the responsibility for suffering upon those of us who witness others 
around us in pain.  While suffering is meaningless to the one affected, suffering in pity 
and charity for another is not.  We answer the call of the hidden God in our turn toward 
others, upholding the supreme ethical principle of the sort we have uncovered in 
phenomenological religion.     
 To this point, we have shown that Levinas discloses the tie (religion) between the 
self and transcendence without recourse to religious authority and with an intimation of 
the phenomenological description yet to be elaborated.  The events of National Socialism 
initiated questions that lead to the description of this phenomenological religion by 
eliminating presuppositions about the nature of God rather than providing them.  Levinas 
then was able to apply his findings to the questions that had arisen.  Perhaps, then, we 
have successfully turned away Janicaud’s criticism; Levinas does not depend upon an 
established theology for his work.  He describes his endeavor to describe God as follows: 
“To ask oneself, as we are attempting to do here, whether God cannot be uttered in a 
reasonable discourse that would be neither ontology nor faith, is implicitly to doubt the 
formal opposition . . . between, on the one hand, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, 
invoked without philosophy in faith, and on the other the god of the philosophers.  It is to 
doubt that this opposition constitutes an alternative.”196  Levinas believes that God 
without ontology alleviates him from both the opinions of philosophy and the dogma of 
faith. However, we will ask now if Levinas has gone too far.  Even if we grant that 
ethicality is implied in the transcendence behind the face, can we ascribe this 
transcendence to an absent God? 
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 When Levinas reaches the transcendent condition of ethical subjectivity, this 
ground receives the name “God.”  “God is not involved as an alleged interlocutor,” 
Levinas claims.  “The reciprocal relationship binds me to the other man in the trace of 
transcendence.”197  In one sense, naming this ground of subjectivity “God” is legitimate, 
for “God” is an enigmatic term that has the connotation of transcendence.  “God” 
signifies, then, what cannot show as a signified; it allows us to focus on what is beyond 
our experience.  For Levinas, this original relation to transcendence grounds the religious 
community, providing the possibility of a relationship with that which is absolutely 
otherwise than us.  In such a community, however, only the name could be worshipped 
and not that which is named, for the very essence of transcendence is to be outside of our 
awareness.  Such considerations remind us of the Jewish invocation, “Blessed be the 
name. . .”198  If “God” be of the sort that is so utterly beyond, then it is easy to see why 
Levinas will claim that his philosophy represents an “austere humanism,” but it is not 
readily apparent how this “God” can be considered “personal,” even though Levinas 
makes this very claim after realizing his humanism to be connected with a “difficult 
adoration.”199  The status of the word “God” has become difficult to nail down.  If its role 
was nothing more than the signifier of a signified that can never show, then there would 
be grounds to support such a usage, but Levinas apparently intends the word to anticipate 
something more that shows itself in religious communities.  The more that shows is a 
connectedness that encompasses more than the face to face relation but a structure that 
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encompasses the whole religious community, and in this case, the religious community is 
the entirety of humanity which is tied together in a multitude of face to face relationships.  
Uncovering this more, however, addresses a problem with the face to face relation.  It is 
incomplete or not fundamental enough.  
After 1962, beginning with the writing of “The Trace of the Other,” Levinas did 
rework his language by making a collage from the Grecian/ontological tradition as well 
as the Judeo-Christian tradition.200  By placing God and the other in juxtaposition, God 
assumes some of the personal identity of the other inasmuch as the other is face to face 
with the I, even though the I cannot conceptualize the ineffable otherness.  The 
ontological trap into which Levinas fell with the relationship between I and the face and 
the dimension of the divine opened up precisely because the relationship between the self 
and the other was too narrowly conceived and allowed for a pitting of the transcendent 
against the immanent: an unfortunate ontological fall.  In short, God is once again tied to 
ontology and what can be totalized rather than the infinite. 
  To redeem his philosophy, Levinas had to reconceive the ethical relationship in 
such a way that the transcendent quality of the relationship which defies principle or 
origin could not be located in reference to the immanent.  Levinas tweaked the notion of 
beyond being so that it is beyond the world, not in the sense of a realm opposed to being 
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but in the sense that it is “beyond every disclosure.”201  That which is beyond disclosure 
appears as an absence – which has a unique relation with the other.  “The Other proceeds 
from the absolutely Absent, but his relationship with the absolutely Absent from which 
he comes does not indicate, does not reveal, this Absent; and yet the Absent has a 
meaning in the face.”202  The order, as command and dimension that the face does not 
reveal, appears as a trace which is not a sign.  The face resides in the trace that points to 
the beyond, the utterly Absent, a past which is never a present, that which cannot be 
faced.  The ethical no longer presents itself as a demand present from the other, which 
can be confused as an other worldly world.  In Levinas’s philosophy, from the writing of 
“The Trace of the Other,” the ethical becomes that which cannot be signified but only 
found in a trace which cannot be approached personally but only as a third person.  
“Through the trace, the irreversible past takes on the profile of a ‘He’ (il).”203 
 The ethical experience can no longer be in the face to face but must come under 
the condition of illeity, the third man, which is the horizon of the ethical experience, that 
which cannot be described from the perspective of the self or even the other.  We should 
not, however, confuse the term illeity with a new other in the ethical relationship as 
though the subject, first approached by another person is now thrown into a relationship 
with a third individual.  Whenever Levinas ventures beyond the face-to-face relationship, 
he declares we have entered the realm of justice, but illeity is clearly involved in the 
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ethical encounter.  Levinas’s use of illeity, the third man, with respect to the other who 
stands face-to-face with the self originates from his familiarity with a feature of Jewish 
mysticism where “in certain very old prayers, fixed by ancient authorities, the faithful 
one begins by saying to God ‘Thou’ and finishes the proposition thus begun by saying 
‘He,’ as if, in the course of this approach of the ‘Thou’ its transcendence into a ‘He’ 
supervened.  It is what in my descriptions I have called the illeity of the infinite.”204  This 
third person condition, which cannot be faced as a you (tu), subsequently receives the 
name “God.”  Really?  Levinas, throughout his writings, remains enigmatic about such a 
radical univocity between illeity and God even though he comes close to making such a 
claim several times.  Nevertheless, we can piece together an argument for this univocal 
reading by looking chronologically at his works beginning with “The Trace of the Other,” 
written in 1963, and “Meaning and Sense,” written in 1964. 
 “Meaning and Sense” expands the ideas of its predecessor and utilizes many of 
 
the same turns of phrase, sentences and even paragraphs.  The following are the  
 
concluding words from both essays: 
 
The God who passed is not the model of which the face would be an image.  To 
be in the image of God does not mean to be an icon of God, but to find oneself in 
his trace.  The revealed God of our Judeo-Christian spirituality maintains all the 
infinity of his absence, which is in the personal order itself.  He shows himself 
only by his trace, as is said in Exodus 33.  To go toward Him is not to follow this 
trace which is not a sign; it is to go toward the Others who stand in the trace of 
illeity.205 
 
In “Meaning and Sense,” Levinas adds to this conclusion with: 
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It is through this illeity, situated beyond the calculations and reciprocities of 
economy and of the world, that being has a sense.  A sense which is not a 
finality.206 
 
Does this common passage point toward the trace of God being identical with the trace of 
illeity?  First, the conception of people being in the image of God makes a simple 
reference to Genesis 1:27, but his explication of the image of God as being in God’s trace 
states a condition for all people, a condition like the illeity he has described.  Secondly, 
the trace of God appears in the personal order, but only as a trace.  Again, illeity appears 
as an irruption of the personal order, but it cannot be characterized in a personal face to 
face manner – it is manifest only by a trace.  The addition to this passage given in 
“Meaning and Sense” describes illeity as outside the world ordering totality but without 
asserting a finality.207 
 Indications of the univocity of God and illeity also appear in Levinas’s later 
writings such as Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence: “The subject is inspired by 
the Infinite, which, as illeity, does not appear, is not present, has always already past, is 
neither theme, telos nor interlocutor.”208  Already, this description of the horizonal nature 
of illeity has become familiar, but now, illeity has been signaled as a mode of the Infinite.  
Inspiration comes by the “Infinite . . . as illeity.”  Can we, however, equate Infinity with 
God, wherein this notion of God does not refer us back to the Cartesian model which 
ruled the earlier writings?  Taking evidence from an interview which occurred after 
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Otherwise than Being, Levinas responds to his interlocutor concerning the identity of the 
Infinite by saying: “I am not afraid of the word God, which appears quite often in my 
essays.”209  Apparently, reading God and Infinity together can be justified, but are we 
justified in doing so with respect to our quote from Otherwise than Being? 
 Two arguments can be made from Otherwise than Being to support the 
connection between the Infinite and God; however, we must be prepared for an 
understanding of God that does not fit any traditional notion of God as a supreme being.  
Levinas shows this double understanding of God when he declares that “the word God is 
an overwhelming semantic event that subdues the subversion worked by illeity.  The 
glory of the Infinite shuts itself up in a word and becomes a being.  But it already undoes 
its dwelling and unsays itself without vanishing into nothingness.”210  First, notice that 
that which “subdues the subversion” is the semantic baggage that accompanies the word 
God.  The “glory of the Infinite” then becomes embossed in a being.  Nevertheless, 
semantics cannot be the house of being for the Infinite, which seems clearly identifiable 
with a notion of God not contained in the word “God,” but dismantles its house to be left 
as something like a trace, an appearing that presents evidence of what, in this case, must 
remain absent from all appearing. 
 The second argument for God’s identification with the Infinite, which allows us to 
equate God and illeity, comes from Levinas’s more intricately developed description of 
the relationship between the self and the other.  Through Totality and Infinity, the ethical 
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relation was described from the standpoint of the other as a call or a demand, but by the 
time of Otherwise than Being, the ethical relation admits of a response by the self.  “Here 
I am – in the name of God.”211  The declaration of the self’s readiness – not presence – to 
act appears “in the name of God” which claims witness to the ethical demand.  Here, the 
name of God speaks through the significations of the I declaring itself to the other.  In the 
same manner, Levinas writes of Infinity: “in my giving of signs, already the Infinite 
speaks through the saying which is said in the mouth of the very one that receives the 
witness.”212  Consequently, having asserted the equivalence between the Infinite and 
God, we can restate our original quote by saying that “the subject is inspired by the 
Infinite [which is God], which, as illeity, does not appear, is not present, has always 
already past, is neither theme, telos nor interlocutor.”213 
 How does one speak of a God that is absolutely absent?  Improperly.  The ethical 
relation that takes place under the condition of the “name of God” provides the horizon of 
justice toward the other, but nothing allows the description of God, only the description 
of the effect of the trace upon those standing in its wake (which is a trace in and of itself).  
The trace of God irrupts the economy of the self, the totality constituted by the I.  God 
does not appear as a Great Other in this totality to which we might aspire in a 
relationship.  A direct relationship with God is, strictly speaking, according to Levinas, a 
“Christian concept.”  “As Jews, we are always a threesome: I and you and the Third who 
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the self as “the religious discourse that precedes all religious discourse.”  Arriving “in the 
name of God” to take responsibility for the Other is the basis of all religious enunciations. 
 
212 Ibid., 151. 
 
213 Ibid., 148. 
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is in our midst.  And only as a Third does He reveal Himself.”214  As this third, God 
subverts our natural inclination toward totalization and demands that we pay attention to 
our obligations.  Our ontological mind-set which employs a will to power gets turned 
inside out so that our will to power becomes a will to empower, to substitute ourselves 
for the other, taking full responsibility “in the name of God.”  So, we have found God, 
but we are still searching.  The purpose of Levinas’s later philosophy is this finding and 
searching that always arrives too late for the immemorial past: 
God is drawn out of objectivity, presence, and being.  He is neither an object nor 
an interlocutor.  His absolute remoteness, his transcendence, turns into my 
responsibility – non-erotic par excellence – for the other.  And this analysis 
implies that God is not simply the “first other,” the other par excellence, or the 
“absolutely other,” but other than the other, other otherwise, other with an alterity 
prior to the alterity of the other, prior to the ethical bond with the other and 
different from every neighbor, transcendent to the point of absence, to the point of 
a possible confusion with the stirring there is.215 
 
In Levinas’s philosophy, God has unsaid His house of being and become an improper 
term.  
 Once again, has Levinas gone too far?  In this case, however, we do not ask 
whether the tie to God is too close but too stretched to be effective.  God as transcendent 
surely upholds the basic tenets of his Judaic background, but God as absent, as a trace, or 
as condition that binds humanity in ethicality does not neatly recreate the God of any 
revealed religion.  In fact, the absence risks “confusion with the stirring there is.”  God, 
in Levinas’s hands, appears at risk of becoming identical with being’s making sense.  We 
                                                 
214 Emmanuel Levinas, “Ideology and Idealism,” in The Levinas Reader, ed. Sean Hand 
(Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1989), 247.  This quote comes from a discussion held after a 
reading of this essay – a discussion which has not been appended to all translations. 
 
215 Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” 141. 
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can hear St. Anselm in the background claiming that one must not declare God to be 
outside space and time but with space and time (Monologion, Chapter 22).  In other 
words, God seems to be at the level of the transcendental conditions rather than in a 
heaven above.   
When Levinas describes the founding of the responsible self by standing in the 
trace of the Third, the self must not only find ethical significance in existence, but the 
subject also has to find himself as distinguishable within the realm of being.  Levinas 
dubs this realm the il y a, a sheer thereness that embraces every human being and eludes 
cognitive mastery: “The il y a, inasmuch as it resists a personal form, is ‘being in 
general.’. . . For il y a transcends [emphasis added] inwardness as well as exteriority, a 
distinction which it no longer even renders possible.”216  As the subject emerges from the 
il y a, interiority coalesces for the individual, an interiority which can, as we have seen, 
be interrupted by the intrusion of the face and exposed to another transcendence Levinas 
calls God.  How does one distinguish between two transcendences, two things that are 
totally otherwise, totally beyond our comprehension?  As I have suggested in this 
chapter, the transcendence revealed in the face brings the idea of God to mind, and 
Levinas would be consistent if the transcendent il y a also brought God to mind.  
Unfortunately, he claims the opposite, “rather than to a God, the notion of the il y a leads 
us to the absence of God, the absence of any being.”217  We clearly have two 
unidentifiable absences, transcendents, one of which leads to God whereas the other, 
apparently, does not.  Such an ambiguity certainly does not make Levinas’s statements 
                                                 
216 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 2001), 52.    
 
217 Ibid., 56. 
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about the place of God in his philosophy meaningless; rather, the idea of God is now 
haunted by an ambiguity that begs the question of whether one can distinguish between 
things that cannot be cognized. 
 In conclusion, we have uncovered, in Levinas, a religion prior to religion, a 
binding between the self and the transcendent that is originative of the self as responsible.  
We have dismissed Janicaud’s accusation that Levinas relies upon an established 
theological tradition in favor of a presuppositionless phenomenology incited by Levinas’s 
own personal experiences as a Jew under National Socialism.  However, the ambiguity of 
transcendence we found allows us to wonder if established religions can be grounded 
upon the relationship which Levinas claims leads us a-Dieu. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Ontic Reparations 
Introduction 
Having established that Levinas employs a broader understanding of 
phenomenological methodology than many traditional accounts and having defended 
Levinas against the accusation of religious presuppositions, we must discuss the 
phenomenological descriptions he makes in order to place his content within the sphere 
of phenomenology inasmuch as we have done for his methodology.  As stated in the 
introduction, Levinas’s guiding problematic is a proper phenomenology of the self 
wherein those conditions which define the self’s way of being in the world are disclosed.  
Totality and Infinity, however, Levinas’s first major work, often seems to deviate from 
this problematic for a phenomenology of the other.  In this chapter, we will explore the 
content of Levinas’s descriptions, explicating the departure from totality to the 
recognition of infinity and the connection this philosophy has with the self.  It is now 
well known in Levinasian studies that Jacques Derrida was inspired by Totality and 
Infinity, but Derrida’s turn towards ethics begins with a critique of this seminal work.  If 
we understand properly Levinas’s conjunction (the often overlooked and) between 
totality and infinity, we will see a partial response to Derrida within this work alone, but 
we also need to see how Derrida prepares the way for a deepening of Levinas’s 
investigation into the conditions of the self where the infinite becomes originative of the 
human self as human. 
Totality and Infinity was hardly capable of withstanding a deconstructive critique 
by Derrida, primarily because its focus was on righting phenomenology after the 
conjunction of Heidegger’s life and philosophy had shown how a link between 
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phenomenology and ontology could be co-opted by a political view.  Since 
phenomenology endeavors to become presuppositionless in its methodology, the 
politicizing that took place under Heidegger, as discussed in chapter one, suggests that 
phenomenology had not yet uncovered all the presuppositions that supported Heidegger’s 
position.  The critique offered by Levinas does not desire to undo phenomenology and 
ontology, but rather to put ontology in question as the ultimate goal and fundamental role 
of phenomenology.218  The historical cycle of critique that begins with Levinas on 
Heidegger and proceeds through Derrida on Levinas has shaped the current of ethical 
philosophy in phenomenology.  In this chapter, we will uncover the infamous “climate of 
Heidegger” from which Levinas desires an escape and outline the climax of this critique 
in Totality and Infinity, giving special attention to the phenomenological descriptions 
Levinas offers, until finally dealing with Derrida and the eventual thrust that he gives in 
furthering Levinas’s disclosure of the ethical in the self. 
Imprisoned in Totality: The Heideggerian Legacy 
 As was discussed in chapter one, Levinas’s understanding and critique of Husserl 
was often due to an early and powerful Heideggerian influence that ran its course much 
like a torrid affair.  After his dissertation on Husserl, Levinas planned to write another 
book for the French introducing the main ideas of Heidegger’s thought, the first chapter 
of which appeared as “Martin Heidegger and Ontology” in the Revue Philosophique.  
The positive force of this influence was short lived on account of Heidegger’s 
involvement with fascism.  It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Levinas’s 
                                                 
218 The directness of this critique can be seen in Levinas’s essay, “Is Ontology 
Fundamental?” originally written in 1951, reprinted in Emmanuel Levinas: Basic 
Philosophical Writings, eds. Adriaan Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 1-10.    
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critique of Heidegger is based solely on the basis of personal or political reasons, which 
we outlined in chapter one.  Levinas clearly acknowledges the extraordinary importance 
of Heidegger’s contributions to philosophy throughout his career, but the very possibility 
of a philosophical program leading to Nazi involvement was cause enough for Levinas to 
look again at the nature of Heidegger’s claims.  What he finds after careful 
reconsideration is a philosophy founded upon a model of domination, a philosophy that 
constructs totality.  Heidegger’s philosophy may be remembered for many things – 1. a 
refashioning of phenomenology 2. a seminal element in existentialism or 3. a new 
beginning for ontology – but no one viewed Heidegger’s philosophy as an exercise in 
totalitarianism until Levinas.  Whereas we stated the totalitarian critique in chapter one, 
we now need to discuss the genesis of the ontological program and the arguments 
Levinas finds in Heidegger that philosophically build the totality.   
 Heidegger’s philosophical journey to pivotal phenomenological figure begins 
with his being introduced to Franz Brentano’s On the Several Senses of Being in 
Aristotle.219  Brentano’s work describes the primacy of substance in Aristotle’s 
metaphysics such that existence depends on either being a substance or an attribute of a 
substance.  In such a system, the individually existing substances are without a unified 
meaning which could be predicated of all substances together.  In other words, the 
“being” of each individual substance does not admit of a “being” of all existing 
                                                 
219 The original German work, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach 
Aristoteles, first appeared in 1862.  The translation was done by Rolf George (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975). 
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substances.220  Discovering a unified meaning for being became a guiding problematic 
for Heidegger, but it was not until he read Duns Scotus that an answer began to formulate 
for him.  Scotus also investigated Aristotle and arrived at the realization that Aristotle’s 
irreducible substances would be only one way of looking at existence.  On account of 
Scotus’s religious belief, he reasoned that God could not be a substance of the same order 
as other substances classified by Aristotle.  Such a realization required not only a 
broadening of Aristotle’s system but a reconceiving of reality as such.  In so far as 
different disciplines, be they religious or naturalistic, conceived the world in substantial 
terms, it could not simply be the case that the conception was formed by the work of the 
object alone, as though an object’s brute existence totally informed the perceiver.  It 
appeared clear to Scotus that the differing categories proposed by different disciplines 
were on account of the object’s presentation to a subject which responded to, interpreted, 
and spoke about the object.  The task of philosophy, given this subject/object 
interdependence, is to uncover the object’s givenness in the meaningful world of the 
subject, but such a meaningful givenness suggests a unity beyond different, independent 
substances.  Heidegger was coming to the realization that a study of existence could not 
                                                 
220 Brentano’s work does discuss an “analogy of being” or what has come to be known as 
a “focal meaning” that does try to draw out the similarity of each substance but does not 
ground the similarity in “being”: ibid., 56ff.  For an in depth discussion of how this work 
and others influenced Heidegger, see Dorothea Frede, “The Question of Being,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 42-69.  Heidegger himself has two helpful introductory pieces 
that outline his early influences and general take on phenomenology without the 
obligatory references to Being and Time; they are: “On My Way to Phenomenology,” 
and what is known as the “Letter to Father Richardson,” which appears as the preface to 
William J. Richardson’s Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Press, 1963), ix-xxiii.  The major work dealing with all issues of 
origination for Heidegger can be found in Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s 
Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
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be done from a sterile beginning that did not include the “lived experience” (Erlebnis) of 
the subject.  However, even with a central focus on experience, he had not yet arrived at 
his revolutionary concept of “being” unified in manifold. 
 Heidegger’s early study already shows affinities with the phenomenology that he 
encountered while reading Husserl’s Logical Investigations: in particular, lived 
experience over an uncritical psychologism, an appreciation for language and meaning, 
and the need to understand the multiplicity of categories of being.  However, not until 
Heidegger was able to discuss phenomenology in general and the Investigations in 
particular with Husserl directly did he begin to formulate just how he might approach the 
problematic of how to reconcile the multiplicity of being with a singular sense of the 
being of beings.  Heidegger writes in “My Way to Phenomenology” that as “[I] tried out 
a transformed understanding of Aristotle, my interest leaned anew toward the Logical 
Investigations, above all the sixth investigation of the first edition.”221    Jacques 
Taminiaux has shown that this period, most specifically with its concentration on the 
“Sixth Investigation,” was instrumental in Heidegger’s thought.222  Taminiaux argues 
convincingly that even though Heidegger rarely and indifferently makes reference to 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations, Heidegger relies very heavily on this work, with the 
above passage being Heidegger’s one real admission to the importance of this influence.  
The “Sixth Investigation” brings out the difference between a sensual connectedness with 
the given object and a categorial intuition of the object, but in the categorial intuition an 
                                                 
221 Martin Heidegger, “My Way to Phenomenology,” in On Time and Being, trans. Joan 
Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 78. 
 
222 Jacques Taminiaux, “Heidegger and Husserl’s Logical Investigations: In remembrance 
of Heidegger’s last seminar (Zähringen, 1973),” Research in Phenomenology, 7 (1977), 
58-83.     
 
          
130  
 
excess appears beyond the simple givenness of the object.  As categorial intuition 
assembles the multiplicity of given entities and contexts into a manifold intuition, the 
excess created appeared to Heidegger as a disclosure of the way in which the being of 
being “let’s be” the ontic within the ontological.  As Husserl had stated, “the concept 
‘being’ can arise only if some being is placed before our eyes,” but it takes Heidegger to 
realize the being of beings in a way that is separate from object-being.223  
 In brief, we have constructed Heidegger’s guiding problematic of the being of 
beings, but what poses the greatest problem towards disclosing the meaning of being for 
Heidegger and what will eventually be the greatest source of irritation for Levinas, is the 
subject “placed before our eyes” that will disclose being apart from the object.  
“Fundamental ontology,” Heidegger writes, “from which alone all other ontologies can 
originate, must be sought in the existential analysis of Dasein.”224  While a description of 
Dasein is not the purpose of this investigation, it is important to understand Dasein in 
terms of it being the object of the existential analysis, the object before our eyes, for the 
great extent of Levinas’s critique is focused here.  The simplicity of the German word, 
Dasein, “being there” holds a wealth of philosophical meaning.  On the one hand, the 
word will eventually stand for the horizonal structure of being that discloses the very 
“there” that conditions and lets be all beings.  It would be best to see Dasein in this first 
                                                 
223 Categorial intuition, however, can only be seen as analogous to and seminal for 
Heidegger’s ontological program because Heidegger’s hermeneutic methodology 
attempts to produce a “sense” of the being of a being, whereas the unified manifold of 
categorial intuition is of an object within being.  The latter, on account of its analysis 
taking place within all the limits of being, is realizable and relatable on an experiential 
level, but the former must give way to an improper realization and communication on 
account of the fact that the ultimate telos of being in its absolute manifold cannot register 
as a being on the experiential level. 
 
224 Heidegger, Being and Time, §4. 
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instance as Da-sein, where the hyphenation eventually preferred by Heidegger 
emphasizes the “there” or structure of “sein.”  However, as has already been intimated, 
the being of beings is not itself manifest as a being such that one may simply observe and 
describe it as it appears.  Dasein, then, in the beginning, refers to a being that is there, but 
on account of its special relationship to itself can make the “there” of its being “appear,” 
not as a being but in meaningful sense because “it is ontically distinguished by the fact 
that in its being this being is concerned about its very being.”225  Certainly, it is no 
surprise that this ontic being, now so named Dasein, is a human being. 
 The human being, alone able to make the being of being’s “appear,” cannot take 
up a special position, as Heidegger believed Husserl’s transcendental ego attempted to 
do, but must begin at the very beginning of its experience, factical life.226  Analogous to 
                                                 
225 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 
1996) Intro. §4. 
 
226 We are, here, only referencing the conceptual move from a description of everyday life 
to an uncovering of the being of beings.  A proper explication must involve a concerted 
effort to investigate Heidegger’s entire methodology as he outlines in §7 C of Being and 
Time and as he performs throughout his phenomenological enterprise.  However, since 
we are primarily concerned with Levinas’s understanding of Dasein as that being that can 
uncover the “sense” of being, the hermeneutic style of Heidegger’s investigation is left 
untouched.  For articles that emphasize the interpretational aspect of Heidegger’s work, 
see David Couzens Hoy, “Heidegger and the Hermeneutic Turn,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 170-194 and Richard Shusterman “Beneath Interpretation: Against Hermeneutic 
Holism,” in Monist 73, no. 2 (1990), 181-204.  These two articles discuss from contrary 
positions the understanding of whether or not interpretation, Heidegger’s hermeneutic 
turn, is foundational for investigation or not.  However, neither article spends time with 
the major question of how does interpretation relate everyday life to the being of beings.  
For an article that deals more closely with interpretation, specifically “Auslegung,” and 
its role in the overall methodology of uncovering Dasein, see Ronald Bruzina’s 
presentation “Hermeneutics: Another Look and Other Questions,” requested for Issues in 
Interpretation Theory, ed. Pol Vandevelde (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 
2005) in press for 2006. 
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the excess of categorial intuition that signifies beyond the manifest object, the 
investigation into factical life purports to bring forth a “guiding look” at being.  What this 
presupposes is if an investigation into my factical life can make “sense out of being” by 
way of that being which is there to question being in my factical life, then the being of my 
factical life is mine:  “Dasein is my own, to be always in this way or that way.”227  
Dasein, however, is neither a solipsistic world belonging only to me or a genus derived 
from the worldly experience of myself and others.  Heidegger claims that the analysis 
that brings to light the being of the human being in a straightforward existential analysis 
is also the means of gaining a “sense” of being such that in the hermeneutics of factical 
description, the phenomenologist’s “being-in-the-world” meets the “being-of-the-world.”   
 Even though Heidegger’s argument can be parsed in greater detail, we have 
enough of the fundamental structure to focus upon Levinas’s critique which begins with 
what he claims to be an epistemological contradiction in the relation between the one 
who uncovers being and the being of the one uncovering.  We will get to the content and 
structure of Levinas’s argument shortly and with some detail since it functions as the 
necessary groundwork for what Levinas attempts in Totality and Infinity, but let us offer 
first the simple contradiction that Levinas finds: “Can being at the end still be thought as 
being at a distance from oneself?  Can there be a signification of being-there as a whole 
beyond the biography?  Is a person as a whole possible?”228  Dasein, ready to meet being 
                                                 
227 Heidegger, Being and Time, Division I §9. 
 
228 This quote comes from the printing and combining of two lecture courses Levinas gave 
in 1975-76 at the Sorbonne, a time past the publishing of his second major work 
Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence.  The first course, “Death and Time,” deals 
specifically with Levinas’s understanding of Heidegger, which changed little if at all 
from his first turn away at the beginning of his writing.  See Emanuel Levinas, God, 
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because Dasein is already aware that its being is finite and consequently concerned about 
its being (i.e., its being ends with death), cannot in fact meet its goal of uncovering being 
in total unless Dasein can perform its analysis after death.  This first critique from 
Levinas is epistemological, questioning how one can learn about, or somehow make 
manifest through existential analysis the manifold unity of being if Dasein is not able to 
perform an analysis of its own being in its own completeness, meaning Dasein’s death 
must be included.  To attempt any phenomenological investigation into one’s own death 
would be to suppose an unreachable objectivity that would place Dasein outside Dasein’s 
own absolute limits.  In other words, Levinas finds Heidegger making the same mistake 
Heidegger claims about Husserl’s transcendental ego.    
 However, Levinas is not wedded to his critique concerning the impossibility of 
escaping one’s death to view the totality of one’s existing as his final word, for 
Heidegger’s analysis of death is an existential awakening to the temporal existence of 
Dasein, which could, in phenomenological description, bring to relief the structure of 
temporality and, as a consequence, the structure of existence, without the necessity of 
completing life when the knowledge of the possibility of such a completion is sufficient 
for the analysis.229  Here, we should understand that Heidegger’s concept of being is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Death, and Time, trans. Bettina Bergo, ed. Jacques Rolland (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), 35.  This quote plays on an ambiguity in Heidegger as to 
whether or not Heidegger is attempting in his “formal indication” to grasp the “whole as 
a whole” or whether Heidegger is attempting to grasp the “structural complexity of the 
whole.”  This first critique by Levinas seems to be getting at the problem of the former.  
However, we shall soon see that Levinas will have a problem with even the idea of 
bringing to relief the latter.  For a discussion of this ambiguity in Heidegger, see Ronald 
Bruzina, “Hermeneutics: Another Look and Other Questions,” 26ff. 
 
229 For this argument in Heidegger’s own words, see: Being and Time, III, §61-66.   
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verbal in quality.  Being, as an impossible object of study since it is precisely not an 
object, should be considered in its structure as that which provides the possibility of the 
“taking place” of the “there.”  This verbal “taking place” can be structurally rendered in 
temporal analysis.  Nevertheless, even if it is a structural description that will emerge, 
Levinas will still claim in parallel with his previous critique that the primary issue is with 
the relationship between the being which exists and the totality of being within which the 
existent takes place.  
 For Levinas, the difficulty in uncovering the structure of temporality or existence 
with the realization of death occurs with Heidegger’s discussion of the mineness 
(Jemeinigkeit) of Dasein’s death.  Heidegger understands death as the “possibility of 
impossibility,” the grasping of Dasein’s limit that empowers free action upon authentic 
possibilities.230  Death, as that which is not only mine but most mine, promises an 
individuation of Dasein such that Dasein can truly be its being.  Dasein’s relationship to 
being, now properly oriented under the realization that each moment could be the last, is 
discovered to be one of care (sorge), where the world is found as meaningful, where the 
matter of the world matters to Dasein.  Heidegger, now, is ready to disclose the structure 
of the meaningful world, the being of this human being.  In the face of Heidegger’s 
lengthy and impressive analysis, Levinas claims that “we must be sure that the analysis of 
being-there, carried out as an analysis of the question in which being is in question, 
develops esse or being in its proper sense, according to its proper meaning and not 
according to a derived deformation of some kind.”231  Levinas’s worry is that Heidegger 
                                                 
230 Heidegger, Being and Time, II, §62. 
 
231 Levinas, God, Death, and Time, 34. 
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has in fact left something out of his existential analysis, which would improperly render 
Dasein’s sense before even beginning a proper interpretation of the sense of being.  
 The issue at hand that propels Levinas toward his critique of Heidegger is the 
realization that death, what Heidegger finds to be mine, is phenomenologically speaking 
not mine at all.  “Death is never now.  When death is here, I am no longer here, not just 
because I am nothingness, but because I am unable to grasp.”232  In other words, I am not 
able to comprehend (grasp) death; I cannot die my own death!  Death, because it is 
precisely ungraspable as an act within my life, must be called into question as that which 
orients Heidegger to nothingness and being.  One must stop at death and ask what is this 
that opens nothingness and being to me?  Death, however, cannot be grasped to answer 
the question.  Even as one may describe the knowledge gained from watching the death 
of someone else, little is graspable beyond the fact that someone who was at one time 
responding and expressing is now immobile and unresponsive.   
The extraordinary depth and possibility for philosophy that death engenders does 
not arise from my contemplation or grasping of my death, which I cannot do, but from 
the emotional stirring that blossoms in my experience of the death of another person.  The 
intentional conscious experience is unable to account for the horror, the courage, the 
disquiet, and the feeling of responsibility for the deceased.  What Levinas is suggesting 
                                                 
232 Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1987), 72.  Levinas also mentions in his later lectures, God, Death, and 
Time, that his understanding of the ungraspable or incomprehensible nature of death 
follows Eugen Fink: “In Fink, the difficulty in speaking of death is presented as its very 
intelligibility.  We must receive death in silence, although philosophy may state the 
reason for this silence.  We know death, but we cannot think it; we know it without being 
able to think it.  It is in this sense that death is a veritable rupture and in this sense also 
that it must be received in silence,” 89.  Levinas specifically references Eugen Fink, 
Metaphysic und Tod (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1969). 
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we resist in Heidegger’s account is the quick passing over of death and anxiety to arrive 
at a description of being by way of nothingness.  It is not my death that I die, however, 
but the death of the other; therefore, even as Heidegger would desire to disclose the being 
of Dasein through what he considers most mine, it would appear, after Levinas’s analysis, 
that the ontic (the other, the being within being, even my own self as a being) is 
consumed as the subject’s own death draws forth the realization of the being of Dasein.  
From the nothingness exposed in my death to the claim that the nothingness is mine is but 
one short and improper step from Heidegger’s conclusion that the nothingness of being is 
the essence of me.  What makes this step entirely improper is the fact that the ontological 
and ontic were supposed to be a distinction for Heidegger, but with death opening onto 
nothingness, the ontic is erased in favor of the totality. 
 This last critique of Heidegger by Levinas is without doubt his most 
comprehensive, for it seems to describe in a structural way the ontological critique which 
Eugen Fink offers and the epistemological critique that Levinas offered earlier.233  Being 
                                                 
233 How remiss would I be if I did not note the critique of Eugen Fink who asks how 
Dasein, in its existential being in the world, makes possible the “clearing” for world-
conditioning while in turn the world conditions Dasein’s very possibility of being “there” 
in the first place.  One can see Heidegger clearly make this dual claim in Questions IV, 
trans. Jean Beaufret et al. (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 317.  Here, Heidegger states that 
Dasein is properly understood as “being-in-an-opening” from which being can be “seen,” 
but he follows this with “Dasein, one has to understand it as being the clearing.”  For 
Fink’s critique see Eugen Fink’s manuscripts Band 1, Z-IX 31a and Z-XV 103a-b.  For 
further explication of Fink’s ontological paradox, see Ronald Bruzina, Edmund Husserl 
and Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928-1938 (London: Yale 
University Press, 2005), 142 or Ronald Bruzina, “Hermeneutics: Another Look and Other 
Questions,” 18ff.  Levinas seems to have a flavor of this critique insofar as he asks how 
Heidegger can truly complete his analysis without transcending ultimate limits, which 
cannot be done, but Levinas never sees the fullness of Fink’s critique.  What we can say 
for sure is that Levinas does not make the same mistake as Heidegger, for once he offers 
a corrective to Heidegger’s existential analysis, he does not then attempt to make an 
analysis of being as a whole.    
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(Sein) and beings (Seindes) represents a distinction for Heidegger and not a separation.  
Levinas remarks clearly that Heidegger would never admit of being without beings.  
Nevertheless, Heidegger’s very notion of “thrownness” (Geworfenheit) suggests that a 
being appears within being, which was already there for a being to be thrown-in.  The 
subsequent analysis of being by Dasein has shown Heidegger’s proclivity for losing the 
ontic side of the ontic-ontological distinction in order to disclose the being of beings, but 
in the disclosed being of beings, the essential ontic nature of Dasein as that entity which 
questioned being is not recovered but found to be essentially ontological, found to be 
bound within/to/as the totality of ontology.  Heidegger makes the essential link between 
Dasein and the ontological over the ontic even as he discusses “The Ontic Priority of the 
Question of Being”: 
Dasein accordingly takes priority in several ways over all other beings.  The first 
priority is an ontic one: this being is defined in its being by existence.  The second 
priority is an ontological one: on the basis of its determination as existence 
Dasein is in itself ‘ontological.’  Therefore, what we have is that the ontic nature 
of Dasein reveals the ontological as the essential character of Dasein.234  
  
We have already seen that Levinas makes a similar critique of the Western tradition in 
chapter two insofar as the tradition takes the oneness of an individual’s uniqueness and 
sacrifices it to the genus.  Here, he finds Heidegger to be making an analogous 
mistake.235 
                                                 
234 Heidegger, Being and Time, Introduction §4. 
 
235At this point, sympathetic readers to both Heidegger and Levinas have pointed out that 
Levinas seems to be making a mistake claiming the being of the individual is lost in 
being as a species loses itself in a genus, for Heidegger points out at the very beginning 
of Being and Time that being, in its transcendental, horizonal way, is not a universal.  See 
Being and Time, Introduction §1.    
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 As we noted in chapter one, Levinas finds the ethical self as the necessary 
addition to Heidegger’s analysis which will subsequently undo ontology as Heidegger 
describes as the essential nature of Dasein.  However, Levinas does not come upon this 
revelation with great philosophical speed.  The 1951 essay, “Is Ontology Fundamental,” 
first broaches the question of the need for an understanding of the ethical relation 
between the self and the other before the work of ontology.  Nevertheless, the work 
Levinas does between his dissertation and the 1951 essay does not investigate ethics at all 
but simply the encounter with the alterity of the other as part of the “what’s Heidegger 
missing?” analysis.  We will take a look at three pieces seminal to Levinas’s later work: 
On Escape (1935), Existence and Existents (1947), and Time and the Other (1947).  
While the first piece does not presuppose the other two, which nearly overlap in their 
publication dates and neatly tie into each other, all three follow a similar genetic 
phenomenological pattern.  The starting point in each is the description of being by itself.  
Having been given the thought that thrownness presupposes being apart from beings, 
Levinas endeavors to describe being without reference to beings.  The second stage of 
description involves the interruption of being by the taking place of the individual self 
situated within being.  The third step involves the possibility that alterity provides for a 
new path out of being.  As we saw in chapter one, Levinas does not consider any 
phenomenological analysis to be “final.”  Each of these three early works covers again 
the same path but with different tracks along the path.  Each going over produces a new 
understanding on the well worn journey.  The eventual conclusion to this journey will be 
the need to see alterity as not only the possibility for escaping the totality of ontology but 
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the possibility for a reconceiving of the self as constitutively embedded in an ethical 
relation that provides a path out of Heidegger’s ontological prison. 
On Escape tackles the need for getting out of the prison of totality.236  
Heidegger’s ontological enterprise attempts to offer a description of being by seeing the 
essential structure of a being as being itself, losing the individual character of the being 
doing the questioning.  In order to save both ontology and the individual which, in some 
way, is always already “thrown in,” the self must escape and look at being from a 
position outside.  But that is impossible!  Being outside of being already has a spatial 
reference which gives away the fact that the supposed position outside was an illusion.  
Levinas notes both necessary conditions: “The need for escape – whether filled with 
chimerical hopes or not, no matter! – leads us into the heart of philosophy.  It allows us 
to renew the ancient problem of being qua being.”237   
 The renewed question of “being qua being” for Levinas starts from the problem of 
the ontological difference wherein one cannot avoid thinking the distinction between 
existence and the existent.  However, this is the very road of Heidegger’s mistake, but if 
one were to linger at the level of thrownness without immediately passing to the 
possibility of ek-stasis, living out into the meaningful world of possibility, then the 
possibility exists of offering a description of being without reference to the way in which 
a being projects itself via being or as essentially being into the world.  The distinction 
still exists, but its distinguished components can now be seen in their individuality.  On 
one very important level, Levinas’s work absolutely depends upon Heidegger’s for its 
                                                 
236Emmanuel Levinas, On Escape, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003). 
    
237 Ibid., 56. 
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beginning.  Heidegger is absolutely right that the being of being can only begin to be 
made manifest from the situatedness of the subject, Dasein.  What Levinas is doing in 
counterpoint is to take the idea of being’s verbal activity and trace back through the 
ontological distinction from being to the individual being in order to find whether or not 
the individual is essentially constituted by the ontological horizon of existence.238 
     To the idea of horizonal being, Levinas gives the name il y a, “there is,” in order 
to emphasize the presencing nature of being which rivets the individual to existence: 
The elementary truth that there is being – a being that has value and weight – is 
revealed at a depth that measures its brutality and its seriousness.  The pleasant 
game of life ceases to be just a game.  It is not that the sufferings with which life 
threatens us render it displeasing; rather it is because the ground of suffering 
consists of the impossibility of interrupting it, and of an acute feeling of being 
held fast.  The impossibility of getting out of the game and of giving back to 
things their toy-like uselessness heralds the precise instant at which infancy 
comes to an end, and defines the very notion of seriousness.  What counts, then, 
in all this experience of being, is the discovery not of a new characteristic of our 
existence, but of its very fact, of the permanent quality itself of our presence.239 
 
What we see here in this quote is a description of the pure fact of being, an accepting on 
Levinas’s part that an escape from the “there is” must surely be chimerical, for existence 
rivets (holds fast) the existent, or in Heidegger’s words, the existent would be thrown into 
existence.  In order to move this analysis from simply a theorizing about Heidegger’s 
world horizon, Levinas is going to have to reverse step and discuss the individual’s 
relationship to being, which we already noted he wants to avoid.  However, if one pauses 
at the level of throwness, then we see something that will linger throughout Levinas’s 
                                                 
238 Levinas never relinquishes Heidegger’s concept of being as verbal, being’s 
constituting the manner in which the individual takes place: “Thanks to Heidegger, our 
ears have been educated to hear being in its verbal resonance, an unusual and 
unforgettable sonority.” Levinas, Proper Names, trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1996), 3. 
 
239Levinas, On Escape, 52.  
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philosophy.  The thrown subject is passive and undergoes existence.  If a mood, like 
Heidegger’s mood of anxiety, can be found that expresses the subject’s passive nature 
riveted to existence, then it would be possible to make manifest the nature of the “there 
is” as it relates to the subject without the subject actively participating in making its own 
existence possible.  Levinas finds such a mood in the experience of nausea.240 
 In order to discuss the way in which nausea delivers up the experience of pure 
being, we must first disconnect the condition from a physical malady.  As an illness, 
nausea has a cause which carries with it the hope of being treated, but an illness is 
something that is open to scrutiny, perhaps even open to being viewed by society.  The 
experience of nausea, however, is not something the one undergoing the malaise is able 
to scrutinize as an objective problem: “The state of nausea that precedes vomiting, and 
from which vomiting will deliver us, encloses us on all sides.  Yet it does not come from 
outside to confine us.  We are revolted from the inside; our depths smother beneath 
ourselves; our innards ‘heave.’”241  The experience of the impending need to vomit does 
not present itself as an objective cause (motion sickness, botulism, liver disease, etc.) to a 
subjective effect (the need to “throw-up”).  Nausea comes from the inside; the subject’s 
innards revolt against the subject itself.  One becomes immediately aware of the inability 
to escape oneself even though the very existence of the victim is characterized by the 
                                                 
240 Jacques Rolland rightly marks Levinas’s use of nausea as similar to Heidegger’s 
discussion of the disposition of anxiety in the seminar “What is Metaphysics.”  Nausea, 
while a noted Sartrean theme, appears in both Sartre and Levinas without any obvious 
connection between the two.  On Escape appears three years before Sartre’s publication, 
but it is clear that Sartre’s work had its first draft by 1931.  While their discussions of 
nausea are similar, any indebtedness from one to the other is impossible to make; 
therefore, we will stay within Levinas’s own discussion without referencing Sartre. 
 
241 Levinas, On Escape, 66. 
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desperate need to get out.  “In nausea . . . we are at the same time riveted to ourselves, 
enclosed in a tight circle that smothers.  We are there, and there is nothing more to be 
done, or anything to add to this fact that we have been entirely delivered up, that 
everything is consumed: this is the very experience of pure being.”242  The postulating 
Levinas has done about the nature of the “there is” and its brutal nature comes through in 
experience for the subject that passively undergoes the malaise of nausea.  Whereas 
Heidegger’s subject quickly moves to take charge of being as mine and actively 
synthesize the objects given in the horizon, Levinas’s pause at the riveted subject reveals 
a relationship with being from which one desires to escape (would “evade” not be better 
here?), and insofar as what has been presented, the very hope for escape was from the 
outset declared to be chimerical, but at the end of this first short essay, Levinas proclaims 
the need to get “out of being by a new path.”  The combination of the need for escape and 
the focus upon the passive subject will be constant themes for the remainder of his work. 
 The passive, riveted subject appears again in Existence and Existents, a title 
Levinas chooses for a discussion of pure being and individual beings simply based on the 
euphony of the words.  Here, Levinas returns to the description of the self as acted upon 
by pure being, but he moves away from nausea for another experience: insomnia.  
Insomnia also works as an orientation within being which the subject passively 
undergoes, promising a look again at the “there is.”  Nausea is left behind because 
insomnia appears as an instance within consciousness that might offer a look beyond 
being.  Insomnia is part of our conscious experience, whereas its relief, unconscious 
sleep, seems to be the subject’s respite from awareness, respite from the brutality of 
                                                 
242 Levinas, On Escape, 66-67. 
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presence – being.  Unconsciousness, however, fails as a path out of being, but it succeeds 
as offering an experience that allows for the realization of the individual as individual and 
therefore a preserving of the ontic within the ontological.  Let us quickly explicate this 
move from the “there is” realized in insomnia to the individual returning from sleep to 
wakefulness. 
 A subject within being has a mastery over being as a naïve and interpreting 
consciousness that ignores the brutality of the “there is” to engage theoretically its 
attention on objects, but what about the subject whose attention is co-opted by insomnia 
such that the subject no longer has the choice about whether or not to gaze at this or that?  
The wakeful subject is forced into vigilance not of its own choosing, lying awake in the 
dark.  The question becomes, is it the subject forced to engage in vigilance, or is the 
subject forced to be under vigilance.  When the night takes away the clarity of objects 
and sleep refuses to let consciousness slip into unconsciousness, Levinas finds an 
anonymous wakefulness where the subject is lost to itself without having a proper object 
on which to focus: “It is not that there is my vigilance in the night; in insomnia it is the 
night itself that watches.  It watches.”243  In this moment the subject feels like an object 
once again held within the brutality of being.  “The rustling of the there is . . . is 
horror.”244  Once again riveted in place, can unconsciousness, sleep, prevail to release the 
individual from being and provide the escape Levinas desires? 
 Sleep appears to be a candidate for an escape from being.  Given the 
epistemological tie between consciousness and relating the structure of being in 
                                                 
243 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 63. 
 
244 Ibid., 55. 
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phenomenology, achieving a state of the unconscious might just work as a way to evade 
the ever present “there is.”  Levinas, however, argues to the contrary that sleep does not 
in fact escape being but is a move of the conscious body to accept its place within 
being.245  In order for Levinas’s argument to work, he must accept that the self is not an 
“abstract being, floating in the air” but a body.  He must accept that the soul and body 
may be ways of distinguishing certain psychic activity from certain physiological 
activity, but the distinction can never admit of a separation such that the ceasing of 
psychic activity by the onset of sleep would extract the self from being because the self is 
not separated from its corporeity which necessarily must exist in a place.  Once again, we 
see in Levinas an interesting assertion of the chimerical hopes of getting out of being, for 
the body in a place is not something asserted by consciousness.  A position is not 
something taken up: “a place is not an indifferent ‘somewhere,’ but a base, a condition.”  
Our conscious attention to objects, in what Husserl would call the natural attitude, often 
overlooks the relationship of a body with a place to such an extent that one feels a certain 
objective disconnectedness from objects with a freedom to investigate an object as 
though the context or horizon surrounding the object does not inform upon the 
                                                 
245 Even in some of Levinas’s most scathing critiques of philosophers – Martin Heidegger 
being the favored target – a glimmer of respect shines through.  In the case of Merleau-
Ponty, there exists magnanimous praise without a hint of criticism, a trend that can be 
followed throughout Levinas’s various readings of Merleau-Ponty.  Two essays that 
cover the fact are “On Intersubjectivity: Notes on Merleau-Ponty,” and “In Memory of 
Alphonse de Waelhens,” both in Outside the Subject, trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1994).  One reason for the preference for Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy is the similarity to some of Levinas’s own positions in Levinas’s early works.  
Levinas suggests in brief many of the things Merleau-Ponty will explicate in great detail.  
For a discussion of Levinas on the body with specific reference to Existence and 
Existents, see Didier Franck, “The Body of Difference,” in The Face of the Other and the 
Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, ed. Jeffrey Bloechl (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 3-29. 
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meaningfulness of the experience.  Sleep, however, when one lies down and attention 
begins to wane, gives over the body to its place and reconnects to a place as its base. 
 Regardless of what must now seem like a concession to the totality of ontology 
within which one is caught-up, Levinas begins to investigate the significance of the ontic 
in the ontological difference.  The individual does not now appear as essentially 
ontological but as a hypostasis within the ontological field, which suggests that 
Heidegger’s ontological program wherein the individual Dasein makes manifest the 
greater ontological structure of Dasein is problematic on account of an incomplete 
understanding of the individual.  In other words, whereas Husserl claims that Heidegger 
has made the mistake of doing anthropology instead of phenomenology, Levinas is 
claiming that Heidegger was not anthropological enough!246  The chosen term, 
hypostasis, immediately recalls Plotinus and his discussion of the hypostasai that emanate 
from the One.  While Levinas does not in any way desire to align his idea with the strictly 
structured ontology of Plotinus, as a metaphor, the concept is important.  An emanation 
from the One is totally dependent upon the One as its source, but at the same time, the 
emanation is not identical with its source; thus it “stands under” the One.247  Invoking 
                                                 
246 Interestingly, Joan Stambaugh’s “Translator’s Preface” to Being and Time makes note 
that “It was Heidegger’s insight that human being is uncanny: we do not know who, or 
what, that is, although, or perhaps precisely because, we are it,” xiv.  Levinas’s counter 
claim must be that what is uncanny is precisely that which most needs investigation, for if 
the investigation of existence is to begin from the existent, one must know the “topos” of 
the starting point before one can even leave for bigger and better things.   
 
247“With regard to the existence that is supremely perfect [i.e. the One], we must say it 
only produces the very greatest of the things that are found below it.  But that which after 
it is the most perfect, the second principle is Intelligence.  Intelligence contemplates the 
One and needs nothing but it.  But the One has no need of Intelligence [i.e. being the 
Absolute Principle, it is totally self-sufficient].  The One which is superior to Intelligence 
produces Intelligence which is the best ex-istence after the One, since it is superior to all 
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Plotinus at the juncture of a conscious body lying down and taking up a position in the 
world serves Levinas in a two-fold way: 1. we see that the individual is absolutely 
dependent for its existence from the conditioning, presencing, anonymous “there is,” and 
2. we see that the assuming of a body, an identity, suggests something more to the 
constitution of the subject than a simple ontological constitution.  For Plotinus, if the 
emanation’s essence was precisely the essence of the One (Unity) then the emanation 
would be indistinguishable from the One.  The same is true for Levinas and his view of 
the ontological difference.    
 The hypostatic emerging of consciousness can be seen in the conscious body 
returning from sleep to wakefulness.  The self that was given over to being in sleep 
awakes in its position, that condition of consciousness, but a condition that is not a 
quality added on to consciousness: “consciousness is here.”  Levinas finds in the moment 
of wakefulness an originating of the existent wherein the very possibility of 
consciousness is the origin of the existent.  This origin takes place within the horizon of 
the “there is” which does not at this point presuppose an objectively existing world.  The 
activity of hypostatic consciousness “gathers itself together, stands up and masters all that 
encumbers it.”  The conscious act encounters a world that is there, Heidegger’s Da, but 
consciousness in itself passively resides in the anonymous “there is” taking up a place, a 
stance, an orientation.  If it is the case that the world of the active consciousness is a 
                                                                                                                                                 
other beings.  The (World-)Soul is the Word (Logos) and a phase of the activity of 
Intelligence just as Intelligence is the logos and a phase of the activity of the One.  But 
the logos of the Soul is obscure being only an image of Intelligence.  The Soul therefore 
directs herself to Intelligence, just as the latter, to be Intelligence, must contemplate the 
One . . . . Every begotten being longs for the being that begot it and loves it . . .” Plotinus, 
Ennead V: i: 6, in The Philosophy of Plotinus, trans. Joseph Katz (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1950), 15-6. 
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world of self-givenness, a gathering to oneself and mastering of objects, then there is the 
possibility that a pre-world of the stance taken up passively could provide an answer to 
the “what’s Heidegger missing” question.248  Levinas finds Heidegger’s beginning with 
the Da and its meaningful structure to be intricately tied to a world of given objects, 
which certainly seems to be the case with Heidegger beginning in factical life describing 
the “handiness” of things, and therefore entrenched in an active consciousness that would 
necessarily overlook the passive structure and constitution of the self.  We already see 
that even the passive consciousness is held fast to the “there is,” but now that the 
conscious body is an existent within existence, we should not leave out the possibility 
that there are other ways in which the consciousness is passively oriented.    
 Understanding how the stance taken up by the subject as condition, which can 
make known certain structures inherent in what is intentionally grasped, is different from 
the naive consciousness which theoretically interprets the world is important for seeing 
how one might now understand Levinas’s need to get “out of being by a new path.”  
Getting out of being would be analogous to Levinas’s later claim to need “to leave the 
climate of Heidegger.”  Active consciousness as a grasping extension into and onto the 
world creates an ontology of the subject’s domination most evident in the concept of 
“mineness.”  The passive, situated subject constituted not only in the ontological 
                                                 
248 Let us take a moment to stop the Heidegger bashing.  While there are certain problems 
with his analysis as we have discussed in this section, Heidegger’s use of the term Sinn 
when discussing the “sensing” or “meaningfulness” of the structures he intends to 
indicate does not have the same connotation as what Levinas is here describing.  Sinn is 
not exactly the mental, grasping word one might expect if Levinas were completely 
correct in his critique.  The structures Heidegger indicates are more “sensed” with the 
double meaning of that word in full operation.  The kind of non-intellectual “feeling” of 
what is going on in Being is closer to Levinas’s idea that in the overwhelming of the 
subject by emotion brings forth a feeling of the “there is.”  See Existence and Existents, 
68. 
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conditions of the presencing “there is” also sits within an ontic world of other things and 
other people.  Alterity holds the possibility of de-centering the self from its conscious 
hold on being.  The way out of being and out of the climate of Heidegger, then, is not a 
denial of ontology but a realization of the necessity of an ontology that repairs the 
importance and the constitutive power of other ontically present people and things.249    
The Other: Which Infinity are We Talking About? 
 Alterity soon takes shape for Levinas as something more than what is simply 
different from the subject.  He investigates the relationship the self has with the other, an 
other that cannot be reduced to theoretical knowledge, an other that must always remain 
outside the confines of ontology.250  On account of its irreducible nature, Levinas 
considers the relationship with the other to be foundational and the event wherein the 
“human, as such, begins.”251  This human beginning takes place within the structural 
relationship with the other, what Levinas will come to describe as the very possibility of 
ethics.  Levinas’s appeal and genius, and perhaps the greatest source of contention from 
his detractors, shines through in what John Wild characterizes as a “phenomenology of 
                                                 
249 Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the body is just such a needed piece of phenomenology 
wherein one realizes that one’s own body is an object for contemplation and 
understanding, but at the same time the body operates as transcendentally constitutive of 
how one encounters the world, so it is both ontic object within being but transcendentally 
constitutive of the self.   
 
250With so much having already been said about the dominating, totalizing ontology of 
Heidegger based on Dasein’s ability to make ontological being “mine,” it should not 
come as a shock that “reduction to theoretical knowledge” and “confines of ontology” 
appear in parallel grammatical construction here.  The two become one and the same in 
Levinas’s critique, but we should not forget chapter one wherein the “spirit of 
phenomenology” is precisely a “showing” beyond theoretical knowledge to something 
perpetually open and non-totalizable.  
 
251Emmanuel Levinas, “Preface,” in Entre Nous: Thinking of the Other, trans. Michael B. 
Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
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the other” in his introduction to Levinas’s Totality and Infinity.252  Our task here will be 
to see how this “phenomenology of the other” or what Levinas willingly calls a 
“phenomenology of the noumenon” escapes Heidegger’s ontological climate in order to 
give a greater characterization of the subject, that being which is not only riveted to being 
but is also oriented within being in certain transcendental ways.  The most important 
understanding added in Totality and Infinity is an explanation of how the other 
undermines the totalizing subject and shows the ego to be more than a knowing, 
investigating quantity.  Our present section, “The Other: Which Infinity are We Talking 
About,” will begin with a short definition of the “other” and several of its meanings (a 
multiplicity which makes speaking of the other even more difficult); and continue with a 
longer discussion of the ego, or that subject which is to be undermined; and finally we 
will explicate the way in which the other as infinity interrupts and de-centers the subject. 
 Levinas uses the term other for a variety of different concepts.  Perhaps the least 
important to his philosophy is the recognition that the “I” can be an other to itself.253  
Each person goes through many alterations in life such that one can say, “I am not the 
same person I was yesterday, a year ago, or even moments ago.”  These different aspects 
or phases of life can be distinguished as other than what the ego now is.  This otherness, 
however, is always rightly reduced to the ego, for “the I is identical in its very alterations.  
                                                 
252 John Wild, “Introduction,” in Totality and Infinity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 1991), 13. 
 
253 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 37. 
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It represents them to itself and thinks them.”254  Consequently, “the difference is not a 
difference; the I, as other, is not an ‘other.’”255 
 More important to Levinas’s philosophy, and yet, more problematic, is when he 
uses the term “other” to refer to some kind of transcendence.  Transcendent otherness 
may be as simple as the computer on which I am typing or the book I am reading or the 
lunch I have skipped – again.  In these cases, the objects are transcendent to me by 
simply being objects that are “not” me or “other” than me.  Husserl and his discussion of 
intentional consciousness showed how the world that is transcendent to me in this way 
can be seen as immanent to my conscious field.  An other that cannot be reduced to a 
figure in my conscious field must be said to remain absolutely transcendent.  Let us 
consider for a moment Levinas’s word choice.  He discusses the other (autre), the 
absolutely other (l’absolument autre), and the personal other (autrui).256  When Levinas 
uses autre only context can tell if he is alluding to something radically transcendent or to 
that which is transcendent but can be made immanent to the conscious field.  When he 
discusses being an other to oneself, the immanent variety, he employs autre.  Often, in 
order to clarify the usage of autre, he adds on the appellation of l’absolument, eliminating 
                                                 
254 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 36. 
 
255 Ibid., 37.  
 
256 Autre and autrui are both rightly translated as other, but the personal nature of the 
second is not easily conveyed.  In an attempt at making a distinction, Alphonso Lingis, in 
his translation of Totality and Infinity, capitalized “Other” in reference to autrui and left 
“other” uncapitalized when referring to autre with Levinas’s approval (See Lingis’s 
footnote on page 24 of Totality and Infinity).  However, the convention has hurt as much 
as it helped.  Levinas sometimes capitalized autre when he used the word in a more 
radically transcendent way, which the convention does not allow.  By the time Lingis 
translated Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence the convention was widely used, but 
in this book he foregoes any such convention and makes no special capitalizations. 
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the equivocation and purposefully referencing an otherness that is irreducible to 
consciousness.  Unfortunately, as soon as it seems that the confusion may be resolved, 
Levinas once again makes a problematic equation: “L’absolument Autre, c’est Autrui.”257  
What is obviously problematic about this equation is that one must question why the 
personal other does not appear before the ego.  Is not the human relation suggested by 
autrui a relation with an alter ego, with someone who can be seen and heard?  Here is the 
root of our dilemma: to show how that which seems perfectly manifest actually signals 
what cannot be made manifest at all.  In order to see clearly how the other person is 
irreducible to something in the conscious field of the ego, we must investigate how an 
ego actively embraces the transcendent within the immanent. 
Beyond the overall critique Levinas levels at Heidegger, Totality and Infinity 
addresses an issue far less discussed in much of the literature being written on Levinas 
today.  It is one thing to say that Heidegger’s philosophy ends in totality, but it is 
something else entirely to claim that his work was based on an improper beginning.  As 
we have seen, Heidegger’s phenomenology begins from factical life, from my being-in-
the-world, but this being-in-the-world must be characterized in order to make manifest 
the being of the being that takes place within a world.  Let us consider the word “world” 
to have two basic meanings: 1. The world is that which designates the collection of 
beings with which one has contact.  2. The world is that which ontologically expresses 
the structure which constitutes the manner in which the collection of objects as a whole is 
there.  In order for Dasein to get to the ontological world, one must first begin in the pre-
ontological, the pre-theoretical, the factical life of simply being there amidst beings.  
                                                 
257 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 39. 
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While Levinas is willing to grant the beginning from factical life, he finds Heidegger’s 
description of an active subject within the world to be impoverished and in need of a new 
phenomenological analysis.258     
 The problem of what the active subject really is begins with Heidegger’s “The 
Being of Beings Encountered in the Surrounding World.”  Surely a discussion of a 
being’s wordliness would involve both things and others, but the apparent ground level 
for phenomenological analysis, according to Heidegger, is “the being of those beings 
encountered when taking care of something.”259  When someone takes care of something, 
there is not necessarily a thought-out plan for encountering the world.  One just does 
one’s business, and the job gets done.  However, even though things can get done without 
thematic consciousness – e.g. Heidegger discusses how one uses a doorknob without 
having to name and become familiar with each and every doorknob before simply 
opening a door.  Heidegger describes this pre-thematized world as one which a person 
uses such that the world (meaning 1) that surrounds us appears as a world of usables.  
This does not mean that one’s surroundings cannot be made thematic.  Having 
encountered these beings in the world (meaning 1), it is not surprising that when 
Heidegger should then ask “which beings are to be our preliminary theme and established 
as a pre-phenomenal basis” he should give the answer of “things.”  For Heidegger, one’s 
                                                 
258 One must beware of the fact that Levinas could be setting up a straw man.  
Heidegger’s analysis is “impoverished” and needs “help” from Levinas.  The “help” that 
Levinas gives will then be seen to lead to Heidegger’s unethical totality he so desperately 
wants to avoid.  If Levinas is to hold valid criticism, then Levinas must actually outdo 
Heidegger at Heidegger’s own game of factical description. 
 
259Heidegger, Being and Time, I §15.  
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primary encounter with the surrounding world is an encounter with objects-for-use, an 
encounter with things.  
Heidegger follows up his self questioning and answer session with an intriguing 
observation: “perhaps we have already missed the pre-phenomenal basis we are looking 
for with this self-evident answer.”  On the one hand, he is absolutely correct and 
expresses how the discussion of handy things has already presupposed the ontological 
fact of thing-ly-ness in the world, but Levinas will side-step the ontological 
presupposition of which Heidegger is well aware and ask how things and tools become a 
self-evident answer for our primary encounter with the world.  Levinas introduces the 
concept of jouissance as even more self-evident in Time and the Other, but he will 
expand this notion in detail in Totality and Infinity: 
What seems to have escaped Heidegger – if it is true that in these matters 
something might have escaped Heidegger – is that prior to being a system of 
tools, the world is an ensemble of nourishments.  Human life in the world does 
not go beyond the objects that fulfill it.  It is perhaps not correct to say that we 
live to eat, but it is no more correct to say that we eat to live.  The uttermost 
finality of eating is contained in food.  When one smells a flower, it is the smell 
that limits the finality of the act.  To stroll is to enjoy the fresh air, not for health 
but for the air.  These are the nourishments characteristic of our existence in the 
world. . . This relationship with an object can be characterized by enjoyment 
[jouissance].260 
 
Levinas’s discussion of enjoyment in “Section II. Interiority and Enjoyment” of 
Totality and Infinity takes place between the first section’s formal discussion of the 
Platonic categories of the Same and the Other and a discussion of the human other’s face 
that interrupts my totality in “Section III. Exteriority and the Face.”  Enjoyment has this 
middle position for it is the necessary, phenomenological beginning that allows for a link 
between the formal other and the apparently concrete face.  It is also here that Levinas 
                                                 
260 Levinas, Time and the Other, 63.   
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must undo the existential analysis of Heidegger in favor of what is more self-evident 
about pre-thematic existence than the idea of laboring with tools.  Not only does Levinas 
echo his earlier critique that Heidegger has missed something in his analysis but clarifies 
that one’s fundamental orientation in existence is one of enjoying fulfillment: “Is not 
enjoyment, as the way life relates to its contents, a form of intentionality in the 
Husserlian sense, taken very broadly, as the universal fact of human existence?”261  
Jouissance characterizes the way in which the individual intentionally, in the Husserlian 
sense, approaches the world in the naïve, natural attitude.262  The human body needs its 
environment, and from its environment the body lives, but this living is not the bloodless 
living of Heidegger’s hardware store.  The moments of life when one thinks, plays, 
sleeps, or eats make up the fullness of existence such that a human existence engaged in 
these activities finds worth. 
Given our forays into Levinas’s early works wherein he describes how existence 
as pure brutal possibility of activity rivets the existent into place, we can see how 
enjoyment follows the argument of hypostasis such that the one who enjoys does so for 
                                                 
261 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, l22. 
 
262 Here I would like to place myself in contradistinction to John Drabinski’s Sensibility 
and Singularity (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001), especially the section “Affectivity as 
Enjoyment and Desire,” 107ff.  It will be very easy from this point to equivocate between 
different notions of transcendence.  I am distinguishing jouissance (Enjoyment) as the 
body’s primordial orientation towards the transcendent world, but as we discussed in 
chapter one, this is the manner of transcendence that is still immanent within 
consciousness; therefore, it is not the case that we have an immediate connection with an 
unrecoverable transcendence that is not immanent within consciousness.  The latter form 
of transcendence is comprehensible through the experience of Desire as distinguished 
from need, but as Drabinski equivocates between two different notions of transcendence, 
he is unable to clearly make the distinction between Desire and need.  While I will make 
positive reference to Drabinski’s book in the rest of this chapter, he is evidence of the 
difficulty in keeping straight the multi-faceted meanings in phenomenology and 
Levinas’s work. 
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him/herself.  Out of enjoyment one becomes a “subject” of being, thrown under or into 
the brutality of existence, but thrown in as “autonomous.”  As a subject whose existence 
is made worthwhile in enjoyment, we can see the connection with Levinas’s discussion of 
the “Same and the Other (autre).”263  On the one hand, autonomy expresses a sense in 
which the subject sets itself apart from its world (meaning 1) where those things 
encountered are other than the subject; however, on the other hand, enjoyment reaches 
out to fulfill the needs of the subject by contemplating what is confusing, breathing in 
what is refreshing, eating what is nourishing, subsequently making what is other than the 
subject interior to the subject and the same as the subject. 
 It is now imperative that we understand how the section on enjoyment, Section II, 
bridges the opening section of “The Same and the Other” and “Exteriority and the Face.”  
Given that jouissance as it regards fulfilling one’s needs, the journey of the soul out into 
the world to fill an emptiness, is a description of factical existence making a home for 
itself, then this existence ties neatly into “The Same and the Other” as an explanation of 
why so many philosophers have reduced experience to a concept of the same.  Levinas 
points to Plato and Socrates as the instigators of this primacy.  He reads these ancients as 
asserting that nothing of what is other can be received unless that otherness is already a 
part of the inner soul.  Cognition becomes for the theory of recollection nothing more 
than the identification of the self with objects in the world.264   
                                                 
263 Here we have one of those ambiguous uses of autre since there is no context with 
respect to the title.  It seems as though, from the content of the section that the ambiguity 
should not be excised.  Autre implies both the simple diversity of objects in the world and 
the difference between that which constitutes the Same and that which can possibly be 
absolutely other than the Same. 
 
264 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 43. 
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In ontological description, otherness is something always other than the 
investigator who is doing the describing; however, the investigator inevitably reduces the 
world into terms familiar to him/herself.  Phenomenology appears capable of avoiding 
this error on account of the realization that an observer could not somehow escape his/her 
own situatedness and extricate the object from its horizon to give an account of the 
essence of the object in question.  Phenomenology done with deference to the reduction 
contained the conditions for righting this mistake by creating a methodology that could 
make known various presuppositions in order to finally get at the proper essence of the 
things themselves without the interference of the Ego’s propensity for finding itself 
wherever it looks.  What Levinas wants to argue, however, is that even after 
phenomenology’s recognition of the situated subject in its milieu, phenomenology still 
made the same mistake, reducing the world to be described to the world grasped by the 
subject.265  As Levinas complains in his essay, “Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,” 
concerning Heidegger’s ontology, “Being is inseparable from the comprehension of 
Being.”266   
 The same represents the activity of the self that fulfills its needs.  Levinas often 
makes etymological use of the term “comprehension.”  While the word defines a mental 
                                                 
265 Let us not renew what was so heavily discussed in chapter one concerning how much 
Levinas got right or wrong about phenomenology.  Suffice to say that by the writing of 
Totality and Infinity, Levinas held a fairly narrow view of what Husserl and Heidegger 
were in fact doing and took time to criticize both.  Let us keep in mind that the concepts 
and practices he claims will right the problems of phenomenology are all born within 
phenomenology.  For the record and to clarify this material with chapter one, we should 
not confuse Husserl’s eidetic analyses as his attempt to once and for all provide absolute 
answers or a system that promises to provide absolute answers.   
 
266 Emmanuel Levinas, “Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,” in Collected Philosophical 
Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), 52. 
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activity, its root is metaphorically physical.  Comprehension grasps things.  The active, 
intentional consciousness, à la Husserl, takes hold of the world and masters it by making 
everything immanent to consciousness even as Dasein, à la Heidegger, makes the world 
mine.  However, Levinas’s first section which places the same and the other in 
conjunction also makes the claim that the other is not reducible to the same and 
subsequently not simply “other than” the same.  To make this argument, Levinas will 
need something more than need fulfillment.  We have already suggested in this chapter 
that the possibility of an absolute alterity must deal with a passive consciousness, but this 
seems difficult if the subject’s orientation in the world is characterized by an enjoyment 
that fulfills needs.  In keeping with his more self-evident idea of jouissance, Levinas adds 
that not all enjoyment is grounded in the fulfillment of needs.  This enjoyment is taken up 
and actively manipulated by the self.  There is, on the other hand, an enjoyment of the 
desirable.  Desire, as a part of enjoyment, allows for the bridge to be completed to the 
other section, “Exteriority and the Face.”  
 In hypostatic solitude, the subject’s enjoyment of the world arises from both need 
fulfillment and desire.  Levinas distinguishes between the two with reference to the 
manner in which these intentions originate.  Need arises from a deficit in the self.  
Hunger and exhaustion drive one to seek out food or repose, and each of these has the 
possibility of being satisfied.  We should see in this need fulfillment Plato’s most base 
structure of the soul as it relates to appetites, internally driven emptiness that demands 
fulfillment.  However, Plato’s psychology of the soul does not apply.  The self does not 
become overwhelmed and ruled by appetites.  The active subject embraces and enjoys 
fulfillment.  Plato, however, also gives the hint of something other than base need 
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fulfillment in his myth of love that rejects Aristophanes’ myth of the androgynous being.  
The myth suggests a desire for that which cannot be attained rather than a desire for 
something that once was had but is now lost.267  Plato’s discussion of love and desire, 
however, are only glimpses of the absolute Desire of which Levinas writes.  When the 
subject experiences Desire, it reaches for that which has already overwhelmed the 
striving consciousness with the realization that regardless of how great the Desire 
satisfaction will go unrequited.  
 Desire is unrequitable and receives the capital “D” on account of its relation to 
infinity, which we have already seen invokes both religious ideas of God and Descartes’ 
description of God as infinite in the way that God overflows conscious thought.  Levinas 
is not concerned with the proofs for the existence of God, but, rather, with the way in 
which the infinite overflows and yet remains an idea within consciousness: the ideandum 
described in chapter two.  Despite his constant criticism of western philosophy and 
ontology, Levinas appears more than able to find examples from that very history which 
illustrate that which could never be present.  Descartes describes how the infinite places 
itself in the finite so that the finite may know what it could not know on its own.  As 
Descartes described the infinite God as more than what could be grasped by the subject, 
he, nevertheless, claimed the idea to be in us already, a claim which Levinas duplicates in 
his own phenomenology.  When Levinas discusses the relationship of infinite to finite in 
his own philosophy, he emphasizes the “in” of the infinite as withinness along with its 
                                                 
267Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 63.  Find this discussion in Plato, The Symposium, in 
The Collected Dialogues of Plato, trans. Michael Joyce, eds. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (New York: Pantheon Books, 1961), 191a ff. for Aristophanes myth 
and 200a ff. for Socrates discourse on the longing of love.   
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expected meaning of negation.268  Because the finite is incapable of grasping the infinite, 
we must recognize the affection of the infinite upon the finite during a moment of the 
finite’s passivity, just as in Descartes’ claim that the idea has to be placed in us.  This 
affectivity of the infinite should be distinguished from Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit 
wherein one always finds oneself in a world already mine.269  The infinite affects the 
finite in such a way as to think more than what is mine, to think more than it can think.  
In effect, the affectivity of the infinite introduces the finite self to an excess which cannot 
be reduced to a totality.  
 The effect of the infinite within the finite is the arousal of Desire.  Given the 
natural orientation of enjoyment wherein the self attempts to reduce otherness to an 
economy of the same – an “ego-nomos” – it must be considered a special situation when 
that which is to be reduced cannot be brought into the economy because the experience 
constantly overflows the idea.  That does not mean that the nature of jouissance is 
undermined, for the active self continues its attempt at reduction, but the failure to reduce 
that which appears as infinite arouses Desire within the self: “The infinite in the finite, 
the more in the less, which is accomplished by the idea of Infinity, is produced as Desire 
– not a Desire that the possession of the Desirable slakes, but the Desire for the Infinite 
                                                 
268 The idea of the infinite “in” us is prevalent through much of Levinas’s work and 
signifies what Levinas will call a “transcendence in immanence.”  Transcendence 
becomes interchangeable with the idea of the infinite.  See “Metaphysics and 
Transcendence,” in Totality and Infinity, 33-52, and the following selections in Entre 
Nous, trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1998): “Hermeneutics and Beyond,” 71-75; “Philosophy and Awakening,” 84-86; 
and “The Idea of the Infinite in Us,” 219-222.   
 
269 See Emmanuel Levinas, “The Idea of the Infinite in Us,” in Entre Nous, 221, for a 
discussion of Levinas’s passivity and Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit. 
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which the desirable arouses rather than satisfies.”270  This Desire, Levinas claims is 
“perfectly disinterested – goodness,” but how does Desire gain a positive moral 
valuation?  It is important not to put too much emphasis on these valuations which appear 
early in the argument of Totality and Infinity.  The crucial point will come when the 
argument is specifically applied to the other person (autrui) as regards the human in 
human relationships.  To be sure, Levinas discusses the human other with respect to 
infinity and desire in the first section of the work; however, the argument is solely formal 
at this point and in need of fleshing out.  Somehow, that which goes beyond one’s ability 
to encapsulate and categorize it draws the self forward with Desire to strive to get what 
cannot be drawn into the self.  Consequently, one is drawn beyond the solitude of the 
self, or at least drawn beyond thinking of oneself as a solus ipse, but what is most 
important is the manner in which the self is conditioned by what is in excess of 
consciousness.  What we have here, and why we cannot yet answer why we can give any 
positive valuation to Desire, is the indication of our transcendental horizon that 
conditions the self beyond the confines of an ontology encountered by the active self.  As 
a transcendental horizon from which the individual acts, it cannot be made a manifest 
object of description.  The next step in the argument will hopefully clarify some 
                                                 
270Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 50.  There is a surprising parallel with Levinas’s 
argument to be found in Rudolph Otto’s The Idea of the Holy.  At once we should be 
skeptical of making reference to a book that is declared by its author to discuss religious 
themes, but given the fact that Levinas has referred to his philosophy as a 
“phenomenology of the numinous” and that Otto claims his book goes beyond any 
particular religion to investigate the “numinous category,” it is not surprising to find 
some interesting similarities.  Akin to Levinas’s discussion of Desire, Otto refers to “the 
element of fascination” where in the “mysterium is experienced in its essential, positive, 
and specific character, as something that bestows upon man a beatitude beyond compare, 
but one whose real nature he can neither proclaim in speech nor conceive in thought, but 
may know only by a direct and living experience.”  See Rudolph Otto, The Idea of the 
Holy, trans. John Harvey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 31ff.  
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questions such as why the need for moral valuations, but it will also extremely 
complicate the entirety of Levinas’s project since he will equate the arousal of Desire that 
originates with the infinite in the experience of the self’s relationship with a “face.” 
 Already, in chapter one, we found the discussion begun concerning whether or not 
Levinas was indeed doing phenomenology, and at one point this question was 
specifically raised with regard to Levinas’s discussion of the “face.”  By what right does 
Levinas make such outlandish statements as equating the face with infinity or the face 
with an insatiable desire?  By what philosophy does Levinas claim that what is really 
designated as “face” to be that which one experiences but cannot reduce to the simple 
equation of eyes plus ears plus nose plus etc?  The human other (autrui), whether 
mystified with a capital “O” or demarcated with a definitive article as in “the other” when 
the French only speaks of autrui, surely confronts me as another person, as a human body 
right there in front of me, a human body that when oriented a certain way presents with a 
face.  The question for Levinas, however, is not whether or not the human being has a 
face which can be analyzed and described, for this is unquestionably true, but whether or 
not the face that presents to me a sign of someone who exists as an alter ego can be 
meaningfully reduced to nothing more than a set of perceptible qualities.  Even if 
phenomenology were to plumb its depths for analysis that could intimate what is not even 
readily apparent in simple physical presentation by a process of empathy (Einfühlung), 
feeling one’s way into the other person’s shoes, so to speak, by an analogy with the body 
known best by the investigator, the investigator’s own body, the question must still 
remain whether or not the ontic presentation of the other human being in a face-to-face 
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relationship might not condition beyond what is able to be made manifest and so 
constitute a horizon of experience.  
 Having designated Levinas’s understanding of “face” to be linked with a 
forgotten horizon, we must clearly distinguish what horizon means.  One definition of the 
horizon of an object would be the sum of things that surround the object and provide it 
with a context, and so discovering the horizon would be the daunting task of cataloguing 
and orienting those objects which surround the focus object.  Perhaps the face itself, as a 
horizon, designates the total of activities and involvements of the person, referring to the 
more ancient renderings of the word such as Greek’s πρόσοπον , which refers not only to 
a face but to a mask that carries with it the sense in which the actor is engaged in the 
world, or Latin’s persona.  Levinas rejects this as naïve: “the who involved in activity is 
not expressed in the activity, is not present, does not attend his own manifestations.”  
Whatever is manifest in the body and actions of another person, the totality of all that can 
be viewed, reduces the other person to quiddity rather than answering the question “who 
is this?”  Therefore, Levinas is not interested in a phenomenology of what one sees when 
describing the other person but in the manner in which the other person, the who this is, 
engages and affects the subject in the world, which returns us to the overwhelmed idea 
and the experience of Desire such that “the who correlative of Desire, the who to whom 
the question is put, is, in metaphysics, a ‘notion’ as fundamental and as universal as 
quiddity and being and the existent and the categories.”271  A “notion as fundamental” 
also helps orient the investigation of what sort of horizon it is for which we are looking.  
Something about our contact with another human being places us within a fundamental 
                                                 
271 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 177. 
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horizon that cannot be made manifest as a concept but must remain enigmatic as a 
‘notion’ since it must now be a horizon from which experience is oriented and within 
which experience takes place. 
 Unlike time and space, the face operates as a horizon of ontic proportions which 
challenges the totality of the same, the actively cognizing subject: “The face, still a thing 
among things, breaks through the form that nevertheless delimits it.  This means 
concretely: the face speaks to me, and thereby invites me to a relation incommensurate 
with a power exercised, be it enjoyment or knowledge.”272  Enjoyment, here, refers to the 
active needs fulfillment that a body naively accomplishes in the world, and knowledge 
refers to the active interplay of concepts and intuitions.  The face does not cease to be a 
thing among things, which seems to put it within the power of enjoyment or knowledge, 
but when the face speaks, a relationship is established with something that cannot be 
made the same as, interior to, the subject; thus, Levinas calls the face-to-face relationship 
a relation with exteriority.273  The sheer manifestation or presence of a face already 
engages one in discourse because the other person already signifies an interlocutor, 
meaning that a subject, as a language user, is already thrown into a milieu of language 
users, such that the intersubjective, insofar as it is necessary for language and discourse, 
                                                 
272 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 198. 
 
273For a discussion on the way in which discourse affects the Same see Levinas’s 
discussion in Totality and Infinity, p.66ff.  Bernhard Waldenfels does an excellent job of 
laying out the basic discussion of the face in “Levinas and the Face of the Other,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Levinas, ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 63-82.  However, whereas Waldenfels 
writes of a change in “tonality” with regard to Levinas’s discussion of the face in Totality 
and Infinity and the subsequent Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, I would stress 
a change in what is being described, a move from the otherness of the other to the 
constituted self in the experience of otherness. 
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is constitutive of the subject’s experience as linguistic.274  However, the claim that a 
human being is definitively a “political animal” is not new, but Levinas sees something 
more profound in the experience of one subject speaking face-to-face with another.  
Phenomenologically speaking, from the position of a subject within a milieu, the 
approach of another person, represented by the face, does not allow the subject to carry 
out normal activities.275  From the vantage point of a subject in a face-to-face 
relationship, when another person speaks about their experience, it becomes clear to the 
subject listening that there are others who also encounter and experience the world, and 
regardless of the clarity of the content of speech there comes with the hearing a 
realization that the content of speech cannot be equated with the speaker’s actual bodily 
event in the experience undergone.  Consequently, the irreducibility between the report of 
                                                 
274 So Levinas will claim that “it is not the mediation of the sign that forms signification,” 
meaning that signification is not first the function of using linguistic signs but it is 
“signification (whose primordial event is the face to face) that makes the sign function 
possible”: Totality and Infinity, 206.  Language occurs first, then, from an experience of 
the other person wherein the face of the other person already stands in as a sign for what 
is not present even as linguistic signs stand for an absent object.  Levinas enhances this 
with a play on the French word signifiant, which can have both a verbal or substantive 
meaning, either the “act of signifying” or the “signifier” respectively.  The face is the 
locus of both senses at the same time.  The face is the “signifier” which makes possible 
the very “act of signifying.”  See for example, Totality and Infinity, 153 where “The face 
. . . forms the first word,” and Jeff Kosky, Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 21. 
 
275We should mention here that Levinas places himself clearly contrary to Sartre’s 
position.  While Levinas appreciates Sartre’s insight that another person is a “pure hole in 
the world” (Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: 
Washington Square Press, 1956), 344, he does not agree with Sartre’s maintaining of the 
primacy of the subject.  Sartre’s subject acts from a privileged perspective that recognizes 
the way in which the other is absent but not the way in which that absence conditions the 
subject.  In other words, Sartre’s subject takes up a place outside its experience as though 
that were possible.  For Levinas’s critique specifically on this subject see “Meaning and 
Sense,” in Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1987), 103.  “Meaning and Sense” was originally written in 1964, a 
close contemporary of Totality and Infinity. 
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an experience and the actual undergoing of the experience by the reporter discloses to the 
subject the essential, non-totalizable otherness of the other person.     
 The incomprehensibility of the face of another, we can now affirm, has nothing to 
do with either the attributes one can distinguish in the physical features of the body nor 
does it involve the way in which the other person presents personal history, viewpoints, 
opinions, or experiences.  All these things can be grasped in intentional analysis.  What 
escapes the viewing subject is the very otherness of the other person.  Every moment of 
disclosure between faces is a moment which contains more to be disclosed.  
Consequently, Levinas will see in the face-to-face a relationship that also transposes the 
transcendental condition of temporality into a meaningful dimension of one’s time as 
lived.  The future must have a distance from the present, and this distance is made 
possible and made absolute in the excess offered by the other person.276  The future 
comes to disrupt the present, the totality that is created by the activity of the subject; the 
face comes to disrupt, by its otherness, that which is understood as the same.   
 Now we can connect the various themes that have been running through our 
discussion of the way in which jouissance bridges the gap between the sections of “The 
Same and the Other” and “Exteriority and the Face” in Totality and Infinity.  The 
                                                 
276 For Levinas, the contemporaneous is always associated with the comprehensible.  
Even in the structural explanation of time as given by Husserl wherein the “now” 
moment reaches into the past by retention and into the future by protention, both of these 
structures are part of the “now.”  Retention and protention work to make “present” what 
has passed and what is to come, essentially making the past and future contemporaneous 
with the present.  This problem of the always “now” of time existed for Levinas since his 
earliest philosophical work of translating N. Khersonsky’s “The Notion of Time.”  In 
order for there to be a real sense of the future and the past, especially the future here in 
Totality and Infinity, the future must be something that is experienced as something not 
reachable but inevitably “promised.”  See Totality and Infinity, 220ff. 
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experience of Desire, specifically Desire for another person has the other person as its 
object, and this object appears to me through the manifest body of the other, most 
specifically through the face.277  There is, undoubtedly, a concrete reading that permeates 
Levinas’s first major work, and he prepares the reader for this in the preface with the 
reminder that intentionality, at root, “is the search for the concrete.”278  Desire, however, 
goes beyond the simple wanting of another as object because the experience of the other 
person is the experience of a transcendent beyond what the subject is able to make 
immanent to consciousness: “The face of the Other at each moment destroys and 
overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to my own measure and to the 
measure of its ideatum – the adequate idea.  It does not manifest itself by these qualities, 
but καθ’ αυτó.”279  The subject’s orientation in the world as enjoyment can be 
described by the active consciousness that sees its needs fulfilled, but Desire always 
experiences an absence or emptiness, “the infinite distance of the Stranger,” that cannot 
                                                 
277 Merleau-Ponty discusses the “Human Order” by referring to the extraordinary 
attachment each human being has to the concrete faces of other human beings, especially 
noted in infants.  He takes the article by Shinn, “Notes on the Development of a Child,” 
University of California Studies, I, 1-4, 1893-1899, to be indicative of how necessary a 
child’s orientation to the face of another person is to that child’s development.  It is 
important to mention Merleau-Ponty here because of his discussion of the importance of 
the physical face to development, leaving us just one step away from Levinas’s argument 
concerning the face as the concrete indicator for what is developmentally necessary for 
ethics, for if the face is necessary for development even as ethics is necessary for the 
binding of humans together such that development can occur, then we have an interesting 
parallel that suggests the face and ethics might have something in common.  Levinas 
believes he can demonstrate the link between ethics and the face.  See Merleau-Ponty, 
The Structure of Behavior, trans. Alden Fisher (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1983), 160ff. 
 
278Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 28.  
 
279 Ibid., 50-51. 
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be encompassed and as such cannot quench Desire.280  The ungraspable, unsatisfying 
absence encountered with the experience of the otherness of the other person shows itself 
in the effects of Desire, but such effects are not indicative of the concreteness graspable 
by intentional analysis but are indicative of a transcendental conditioning within the ontic 
of the ontic-ontological distinction.281  The conditioning that occurs in the “more than can 
be grasped,” which affects the subject without knowledge in its passivity, is the very 
possibility of ethics.  We are now in a position to understand why Desire gets its positive 
moral valuation. 
 The entirety of Totality and Infinity can be summed up in one remark from 
Difficult Freedom: “Moral consciousness is not an experience of values, but an access to 
exterior being.”282  In other words, coming into contact with the excess of the face is not 
a coming into contact with values or even with the source of values.  The more than can 
be grasped provides a certain experience that has the force of an imperative and the 
characteristic of the subjunctive within the subject that elicits an ethical response.  By 
                                                 
280 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 50. 
 
281 Robert Bernasconi notes the tension in Totality and Infinity which “appears to be 
offering a concrete description” while it “seems to explicitly evoke a transcendental 
reading.”  I want to emphasize here Bernasconi’s “appears” and “seems” for Levinas 
distances himself from the term transcendental on page 25 of Totality and Infinity with 
the fear that the term is too tightly tied to idealism.  However, phenomenologically 
speaking, Levinas is attempting to show not only that the active subject already 
presupposes the intersubjective but that the presupposition is fundamentally necessary for 
the activity of the active subject.  See Bernasconi’s following essays: “The Alterity of the 
Stranger and the Experience of the Alien,” in The Face of the Other and the Trace of 
God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, ed. Jeffrey Bloechl (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2000), 84ff.  “Rereading Totality and Infinity,” in The 
Question of the Other: Essays in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, ed. A. Dallery 
and C. E. Scott (New York: SUNY Press, 1989), 23-40. 
 
282 Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 293. 
 
          
168  
 
resisting the subject’s efforts to create totalities, the face asserts a world which can only 
be controlled by the subject by extinguishing the life of the human other, which in fact 
still does not result in control but the erasing of what cannot be totalized.  The face, 
however, in the expression of its world demands to go on living: “This infinite, stronger 
than the murder, resists to us already in the face, it is its face, it is the original expression, 
the first word: ‘Thou shalt not commit murder.’”  The possibility of ethics begins with a 
subject no longer capable of completing its activity of categorizing all it meets in the 
world because the other has already placed a demand upon the subject from a position 
beyond the subject’s reach.  The possibility of ethics, then, lies in the demand by the 
other to the subject that the subject let the other remain as other.  Insatiable Desire 
brought on by the infinite distance between the self and the other culminates in an 
accepting that Desire will always be unrequited and the object of Desire must remain a 
non-object, absolutely other. 
 The dealing with an absolutely other simply cannot be by command alone.  If the 
absolutely other is not present as an object but as an unencompassable excess, then the 
response to the other can only be a response to the other “as though” the other were 
something to which a person could respond “in a way.”  Richard Cohen discusses this “as 
though” as the force of the subjunctive in the face-to-face relation.283  Problematically, 
the subject is described as relating to the other “as though” the other were God: “The 
dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face.”284  In addition, the invisibility 
                                                 
283 Richard Cohen, “The Face of Truth and Jewish Mysticism,” in Elevations: The Height 
of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 
271. 
 
284 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 78. 
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of the excess behind the face reminds us of the invisibility of God; consequently, it seems 
natural to compare the two types of transcendences or even to equate them.285  
Nevertheless, the “as though” alleviates much of the pressure if we understand that the 
“as though” adds the subjunctive in the form of a contrary to fact condition.  The other 
approaches and commands “as though” the other were God, BUT because of the force of 
the subjunctive, we are assured that the other is NOT God.  Having already claimed in 
chapter two that God was used in a descriptive sense rather than surreptitiously letting 
ontological claims in through the back door, we are now in position to understand the 
comparison.  The other, whose otherness seems invisible just as God is invisible and who 
represents a dimension that the subject cannot ever fully realize, “as though” it were “on 
high,” places a demand upon the subject that the subject not commit murder “as though” 
the other were God who gave the command “Thou shalt not kill.”  Just as God’s 
commandments can be considered as the origin of ethics, the experience with the other 
“as though” the other were God is, for Levinas, the origin – as the very possibility – of 
ethics.286  
                                                 
285Waldenfels claims to see this as a problem in his explication of Levinas’s discussion of 
the face in “Levinas and the Face of the Other,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Levinas, 67.    
 
286 It is still important to emphasize that the face-to-face relationship is not fundamentally 
ethical but fundamentally conditions the possibility for ethics.  Again, let us make 
reference to Rudolph Otto’s The Idea of the Holy.  For Otto, when Isaiah makes the claim 
before God as recorded in Isaiah chapter 6 that he is a man of “unclean lips,” Isaiah is not 
making a moral valuation.  The feeling is more fundamental.  In the face of the 
numinous, the subject experiences the feeling of “profaneness.”  The height, infinity, 
excess, glory, etcetera of the numinous makes apparent the baseness, lowness, finiteness, 
etcetera of the human subject.  Upon the numinous, the self recognizes the contrary of 
“profaneness” and describes the numinous as “holy.”  Holiness originally signifies that 
which is set apart from the human world, precisely what Levinas seems to be suggesting 
about the otherness of the other person, and while holiness does not equate with 
perfection, beauty, or goodness, “it has a definite, perceptible analogy with them.”  Otto, 
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Totality AND Infinity 
 Admittedly, Levinas’s work has a seductive pull.  His basic argument purports to 
find a seed of ethics that must remain even after the twentieth century seemed to demand 
an admission of the reality of evil and the absurd, potentially burning away any hope of 
ethics.  Both the religiously minded and staunchest atheist have reason to be interested in 
Levinas’s philosophy, but more than that, they have reason to want his philosophy to be 
true, at least on some level.  Indeed, much of the commentary on Levinas rarely makes 
the stinging critical attack one might find in other philosophical discussions.  However, to 
even try to stand against Levinas is to already be at a disadvantage.  To simply lay him 
and his work aside is to seemingly take up the already condemned position of subjecting 
not only Levinas’s work but Levinas himself to a critic’s own totality.  Actually 
commenting beyond his text would almost surely entrap one in some form of disrespect 
which Levinas has already laid out within his text.287  The issue is not whether critical 
scrutiny can be done respectfully but whether critical scrutiny can be done without 
totalization, and if not then a certain violence and disrespect has already occurred.  Such 
immanent difficulties did not, however, stop Jacques Derrida from writing “Violence and 
Metaphysics.”   
                                                                                                                                                 
The Idea of the Holy, 50ff.  The “analogy” Otto finds is precisely the “as though” 
Levinas grants to the other as God. 
 
287 For a clearer understanding of this dilemma, see Bloechl, Liturgy of the Neighbor 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2000), 1-4.  The issue of totalization and a 
critic’s scrutiny threaten to run afoul of Levinas’s critique of the manner in which theory 
totalizes while ignoring the individual author.  The disrespect that occurs is simply the 
manner in which the author is ignored while reducing the text to its contents without a 
sense of the manner in which language is attempting to connect the author Levinas with 
the critic.  More on language in chapter four.  
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 We might first wonder what Levinas did to attract Derrida’s attention?  Derrida’s 
philosophy, alone, is difficult to grasp, but risking having Derrida direct his philosophy at 
one’s own text seems to promise the same outcome as coming between a grizzly and her 
cubs – a perilous venture sure to end with a lot of screaming.  The most difficult question 
to ask, of course, is what exactly did Derrida mean by “Violence and Metaphysics,” or 
perhaps to reword the question in a better way, we should ask what was Derrida doing 
with this particular essay?  There can be no doubt that Derrida had an effect on Levinas 
which can be felt in Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, but it is also clear that 
Levinas never responds directly to Derrida.288  If anything at all is clear, most 
commentators took “Violence and Metaphysics” to be a “forceful critique.”289  However, 
as previously warned, Derrida’s philosophy is difficult to grasp.  We have already had a 
taste of the comments made in this essay in chapter one, but it is time to move deeper.  
Our effort here is to further the understanding of what Levinas means by discussing 
totality AND infinity, with special interest paid to the ontic reparations made under the 
power of the conjunction.  By picking through the subsequent responses by Paul Ricoeur, 
Richard Cohen, John Caputo, and Robert Bernasconi concerning the meaning and impact 
of Derrida’s commentary, holding aloft our own discussion on the place of a transcendent 
                                                 
288 The only evidence of a direct response is Levinas’s short essay, “Wholly Otherwise,” 
in Re-reading Levinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1991), 3-10.  However, this essay does not attempt to undo 
Derrida’s deconstructive reading, but to engage Derrida in an entanglement that could see 
Derrida’s critique and Levinas’s work as interdependent rather than as dominant and 
dependent. 
 
289Robert Bernasconi, “Skepticism in the Face of Philosophy,” in Re-reading Levinas, ed. 
Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 
153. 
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horizon within the ontic, we will be able to ease the remarks seen to be the most scathing 
and to read Derrida in a different light altogether. 
 So what, in fact, did Derrida mean?  To begin, and to pick up from chapter one, 
Derrida responds to Levinas in the name of “two Greeks named Husserl and Heidegger.”  
Levinas, Derrida claims, accuses Husserl and Heidegger of the violence of covering over 
the other with horizons that confine the other person within the order of the “same,” 
which is to say within the order of the philosophically describable and therefore 
theoretically possessable, within the order of the self.  The transcendence of the other that 
escapes these horizons would be impossible to utter in a philosophical discourse since 
“the founding concepts of philosophy are primarily Greek, and it would not be possible to 
philosophize, or to speak philosophically, outside this medium.”290  Unfortunately, 
Derrida laments, Levinas wants to hold onto an other unaddressable by philosophy as 
well as hold onto language, which commits him to the ontological horizons inscribed by 
philosophy, especially those inscribed by the two named Greeks.  Negative theologians 
have long taken the route to disdain what language can achieve in a description of the 
wholly other, transcendent, infinite, but not only does Levinas not disdain language, he 
claims that when the other person speaks “bonjour!” the very moment of encounter has 
occurred.  This means, for Derrida, that Levinas’s attempt at suggesting an absolute 
otherness that is signaled by the advent of language fails on account of the fact that 
language wipes out the very trace of the other, since language itself is bound to the 
ontological horizons of our experience.    
                                                 
290 Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 83. 
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A Being without violence would be a Being which would occur outside the 
existent: nothing; nonhistory; nonoccurrence; nonphenomenality.  A speech 
produced without the least violence would determine nothing, would say nothing, 
would offer nothing to the other; it would not be history, and it would show 
nothing: in every sense of the word, and first of all the Greek sense, it would be 
speech without sentences.291       
                            
 In order for a face-to-face relationship to occur wherein one person communicates 
with another person, there must be some ontological structure already in place for the 
possibility of an ontic encounter.  Even if we grant Levinas the need to designate the 
human person as a hypostatic being which is not essentially ontological, he runs afoul of 
the ontological again when the hypostatic being must communicate, for language depends 
upon possessing a conceptual totality, which would again be underpinned by the 
ontological and which Levinas has already associated with violence.  The possibility of 
ethics would need to be situated, at least, on an arche-violence, which once passed could 
allow for an ethical metaphysics.  Derrida’s title, then, should be read as “VIOLENCE (at 
least once) and (after that) metaphysics (if metaphysics can be done at all).”  However, 
Derrida’s critique about the necessity for an arche-violence stems from his reading that 
Levinas’s philosophy is rooted in empiricism, an assumption with which both Bernasconi 
and Cohen take issue.292 
 Derrida asserts several times that Levinas’s questioning of philosophy is 
“legitimate” and “does not seem to us any less radical” than what Derrida himself was 
doing.293  What Levinas lacks in order to complete his work and make his absolute 
                                                 
291 Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 147.  
 
292 See both Richard Cohen, “Derrida’s (Mal)reading of Levinas,” in Elevations: The 
Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994), 305ff, and Robert Bernasconi, “Re-reading Totality and Infinity,” 23ff. 
 
293 Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 133. 
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heterology a successful endeavor, of course, is Derrida’s deconstructive eye (Who’d have 
thunk?).294  Once Levinas recognizes his need for an arche-violence, the play of 
difference, then the boundaries of philosophy will be approachable as porous rather than 
impenetrable and the “possibility of the impossible system will be on the horizon to 
protect us from empiricism.”295  Since Levinas’s system, however, is not deconstruction 
and does not first seek to lodge itself within a tradition wherein violence has already 
occurred before seeking a way out, the face-to-face is not immune from the problems of 
empiricism, which Richard Cohen finds to be the “morass” of how to conceive of 
exteriority.296  Some of the pressure applied by Derrida can be relieved if we recognize 
that Derrida appears to remain within a traditional understanding of experience in 
contrast to Levinas’s reformulation of experience to encompass a broader notion of the 
self.  Consequently, the empirical, the description of the face-to-face, must remain within 
an ontological horizon, on Derrida’s reading, but the empirical, which gives way to 
something concrete, gives way to a certain kind of transcendental sense within Levinas’s 
methodology, placing in question Derrida’s apparent game of priority. 
 Derrida concludes “Violence and Metaphysics” with a series of questions, 
presumably inspired by his reading of Levinas, one of which sheds light on his 
understanding of experience: “Has not the concept of experience always been determined 
                                                 
294 It is important to note that Derrida does not, by the time of “Violence and 
Metaphysics,” use the term deconstruction to describe what it is he is doing, but this 
essay does work as a pre-deconstructive figuring of what Derrida later takes as his 
philosophical approach. 
 
295 Ibid., 84. 
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by the metaphysics of presence?”297  Bernasconi cautions the reader not to take such a 
question as rhetorical, but considering its place at the end of the essay, even though it is 
not rhetorical, the question goes unanswered.298  However, it is only at the end of the 
essay that the question is even posed, meaning that this statement is, in fact, not in 
question throughout.  Experience, then, for Derrida, in this essay, at this time, rests 
entirely upon the presence of the other before the ego and how well such a presence can 
be received, but this is completely antithetical to what Levinas clearly outlines as the 
nature of experience in his introduction.299  Levinas clarifies his own definition of 
experience as follows: “The relation with infinity cannot, to be sure, be stated in terms of 
experience, for infinity overflows the thought that thinks it . . . . but if experience 
precisely means a relation with the absolutely other, that is, with what always overflows 
thought, the relation with infinity accomplishes experience in the fullest sense of the 
word.”300   
 Levinas’s discussion of the face-to-face certainly appears to be rooted in the 
ontical, in the relation between an ego and an alter-ego, for he expresses that his program 
is challenged to describe “the relation with a being that maintains its total exteriority with 
                                                 
297 Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 152. 
 
298 Bernasconi, “Re-reading Totality and Infinity,” 26. 
 
299 That Derrida would defend this notion of experience or even assume it given his 
lengthy career challenging the metaphysics of presence should give us pause to 
reconsider what Derrida was doing precisely, but for now, we must continue with the 
question of what he meant.  We shall, however, not hesitate to pause later. 
 
300 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 25. 
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respect to him who thinks it.”301  Nevertheless, if the description must begin with the 
relation, it does not have to end with a relative other and, consequently, an other 
determined already by the ontological.  Again, Levinas’s introduction, to which Derrida 
should have paid more attention, outlines the methodology undertaken to describe the 
face-to-face relationship where in “we can proceed from the experience of totality back to 
a situation where totality breaks up, a situation that conditions the totality itself.”302  If the 
methodology is regressive, beginning with a certain experience and uncovering the 
conditions of that experience, then we would have at least a condition that would no 
longer be governed by the laws of the totality; however, we must focus on at least two 
more aspects of the methodology to assure that we are no longer working under an 
inescapable ontology: 1. insofar as comprehension is structured ontologically, that which 
cannot be comprehended cannot be ontologically described and 2. insofar as the 
methodology reflects a Husserlian turn toward meaningfulness, it is not necessary for 
what manifestly appears to be first ontologically determined to be meaningful; thus, 
Husserl explains that the first step of the reduction is to bracket one’s presupposition that 
the object at hand exists, in any naïve sense of the word.   
The condition of going beyond ontological comprehension has already been met 
by arguments previously considered.  It is extraordinarily important to see the difference 
set up between need fulfillment and desire, between active grasping and passive 
conditioning.  The critique offered by Derrida presumes an all too monolithic notion of 
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the self in Totality and Infinity which appears to lead to the equation of the Same and the 
Self: 
Levinas often warned us against confusing identity and ipseity, Same and Ego: 
idem and ipse.  This confusion, which in a certain way, is immediately practiced 
by the Greek concept of autos and the German concept of selbst, does not occur 
as spontaneously in French; nevertheless, in spite of prior warnings, it returns as a 
kind of silent axiom in Totality and Infinity.303 
 
The combination of the overflow of the active, comprehending self and the passively 
conditioned self completes Levinas’s understanding of experience in the fullest sense and 
allows for an area of human experience not capable of grasping the infinite as a content, 
but it does allow for the possibility of recognizing the ungraspable as meaningfully 
conditioning the experience of the subject in everyday life.   
 If we take a brief look at an extraordinarily difficult passage from Totality and 
Infinity, we will see the tying together of many of the themes of the present chapter as 
well as a coalescing of factors that conclude our response to Derrida: 
The method practiced here does indeed consist in seeking the condition of 
empirical situations, but it leaves to the developments called empirical, in which 
the conditioning possibility is accomplished – it leaves to the concretization – an 
ontological role that specifies the meaning (sens) of the fundamental possibility, a 
meaning invisible in that condition.304 
 
First, the conditioning possibility is accomplished within empirical developments; the 
ontic is no longer simply structured by the ontological but, properly repaired, acts in a 
conditioning way in an “ontological role.”  It is here, however, that we may run afoul of 
Caputo’s seemingly reluctant claim that Levinas is “far too Heideggerian,” seeing how 
                                                 
303 Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 109.  Even sympathetic commentators 
make the same equation, erroneously I might add; see Jeff Kosky, Levinas and the 
Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 6, where he 
specifically claims that “within Totality and Infinity, the Same is equivalent to the I.” 
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the relationship acts in an “ontological role.”  “Ontological” seems more a poor choice of 
words than an intended grounding, especially regarding the way in which the face-to-
face’s role renders meaning (sens).  The ego’s orientation in the world is meaningfully 
directed by the conditions engendered in the concrete experience of the face-to-face 
relationship.  The ontic face of the other, approached with a sense of disinterest (i.e., dis-
interest etymologically speaking, without questioning whether or not the other person 
actually exists), provides meaningful sense to experience in a transcendental way, once 
again noting Levinas’s discomfit with the word transcendental because of its ontological 
ties. 
 We have, now, the ability to answer Derrida, if we understand Derrida to mean by 
his critique that Levinas has engaged in a relationship (the face-to-face) that must first be 
qualified ontologically before the ethical ramifications of that experience can be 
disclosed.  Derrida’s question concerning the “metaphysics of presence” which ends his 
essay actually concerns Levinas before he even writes Totality and Infinity.  In Levinas’s 
work “Is Ontology Fundamental,” written immediately before his first major work, he 
asks, possibly rhetorically, “Does not all knowledge of relations by which beings are 
connected or opposed to one another already involve the comprehension of the fact that 
these relations and these beings exist?”305  The answer comes in the form of Totality and 
Infinity.  Intentional consciousness as active comprehension can certainly investigate 
along ontological lines the likewise structured pairing of subject and object, which as we 
have seen leads to an even deeper understanding of an ontological structuring of world in 
general, and can certainly produce an intelligible totality, which upon reflection can be 
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done and redone in ongoing investigation.  However, in the experience of the world as 
meaningful, some experiences do not have to begin with the comprehension of existence, 
as one understanding of Levinas’s question would suggest.306  The subject is 
meaningfully conditioned within face-to-face relationships in the overflow of experience 
that affects the self in a passive manner that suggests an infinity that restores the chimera 
of escape.  The ontic manifestation, by being manifest before the subject, regardless of 
existence claims, directs and structures the ego within an ethical horizon.  So Derrida is 
soundly defeated. . .  
 After having written “Re-reading Totality and Infinity” wherein Bernasconi 
discusses the difficulties of Derrida’s empirical take on Levinas claiming, in effect, that 
simply reading Levinas on an empirical level is incongruent with much of what is going 
on in Totality and Infinity, Bernasconi writes somewhat later another essay, “The Alterity 
of the Stranger and the Experience of the Alien,” putting in doubt how effective his first 
essay was in dealing with Derrida.  It is not the case that Bernasconi’s earlier essay was 
incorrect and that Derrida was right all along; rather, the new essay suggests that Derrida 
already knew that his empirical reading was too strong and already knew that Levinas 
was aware of the ontological tradition within which he worked and, consequently, 
already knew about the manner of Levinas’s regressive phenomenology from the 
manifest experience to the structural conditioning.  Does not Derrida in fact claim that 
                                                 
306Immanuel Kant echoes the sentiment that with judgement, at least, some experiences 
do not demand a knowledge of existence: “if the question is whether something is 
beautiful, what we want to know is not whether we or anyone cares, or so much as might 
care, in any way about the thing’s existence, but rather how we judge it in our mere 
contemplation of it.”  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. Werner Pluhar 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), §2.  In parallel with Levinas, Kant is claiming that the 
existence of the piece of art is immaterial with respect to how we perceive the beauty of 
that which manifestly appears before us at a certain moment.  
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Levinas’s return to the language of the sameness and otherness derived from Plato carries 
with it “the necessity of lodging oneself within traditional conceptuality in order to 
destroy it?”307  In essence, it seems as though Levinas may in fact have already been 
doing, and knowingly doing, what many others believe Derrida did not think Levinas 
knew or did – and Derrida already knew that too.  Thus, Bernasconi cautions that 
Derrida’s work can be “too easily read as a critique.”  Now the question arises, if Derrida 
was not nearly as critical as commentators, and even close friends of Derrida, sometimes 
suggest, then what did he, in fact, mean?  Bernasconi’s answer is that Derrida invokes the 
tradition of Husserl and Heidegger, not to criticize Levinas, but as a way of showing that 
Levinas has tried to cast off certain philosophies that would help his cause, specifically 
Heidegger’s assertion in the letter on humanism that “original ethics” is a “thinking 
which thinks the truth of being as the primordial element of man,” and Husserl’s 
discussion of the alter ego in the “Fifth Cartesian Meditation.”  Derrida’s essay is still a 
question of language, but it is not how Levinas is stuck in a tradition he tries to destroy 
but how Levinas lambastes a language and tradition he should not have rejected, and 
which allows Levinas to do what he claims to do. 
 Consider Heidegger’s following quote on the nature of law and ethical directives 
which admits of an original sense of law:  
Νόμος is not only law but more originally the assignment contained in the 
dispensation of Being.  Only the assignment is capable of dispatching man into 
                                                 
307 Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 111.  Bernasconi already notes Derrida’s less 
than critical stance with this reference in another rethinking of “Violence and 
Metaphysics,” in “Deconstruction and the Possibility of Ethics,” in Deconstruction and 
Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida, ed. John Sallis (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987), 122-139. 
 
          
181  
 
Being.  Only such dispatching is capable of supporting and obligating.  Otherwise 
all law remains merely something fabricated by human reason.308 
 
Political, moral, or ethical rules refer, in some way, back to the dispensation and destiny 
of Being such that an “original sense” is lodged within the conditioning aspect of 
humankind’s being rather than within the cultural, contractual fabrications of human 
effort.  Derrida’s essay finds Levinas to be attempting just such an exposure of the 
original sense of ethics: 
It is true that Ethics, in Levinas’s sense, is an Ethics without law and without 
concept, which maintains its non-violent purity only before being determined as 
concepts and laws.  This is not an objection: let us not forget that Levinas does 
not seek to propose laws or moral rules, does not seek to determine a morality, 
but rather the essence of the ethical relation in general.309 
 
What Derrida appears to be pointing out is that Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” 
properly suggests the very conditioning horizon that Levinas finds missing in Heidegger.  
This leaves in question, though, why Derrida consistently seems to point out the need to 
address the ontic-ontological distinction as though Levinas somehow misses his own 
dependence upon it, although we have seen how Levinas already begins with that 
distinction in his regressive methodology.   
 The problem for many commentators who read Levinas in light of what they 
believe to be Derrida’s critique is their inability to see Derrida’s essay as pre-
deconstructive.  Deconstruction typically works by revealing places within a text that go 
beyond what the author appears to have intended.  Derrida, however, notes that “Levinas 
                                                 
308 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Krell (San 
Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 262. 
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is resigned to betraying his own intentions in his philosophical discourse.”310  Levinas is 
already about the task of saying more than he can and meaning more than he can say.    
The deconstruction is already implicit within the text; Derrida’s essay is in some sense, 
then, to show the opening in Heidegger that allows the ontic-ontological distinction to be 
addressed in an ethical dimension.  This often means subduing the harsher critique made 
by Levinas against Heidegger as well as against Husserl.  Commentators sympathetic to 
Husserl and Heidegger rush to correct Levinas’s critique in Totality and Infinity as not 
nearly nuanced enough or inclusive of the broader picture of the respective 
phenomenologies, failing to realize that Levinas does not intend, at least in his first major 
work, to give a full account but, rather, to show how the major thrust of each 
phenomenologist fails to disclose the ethical horizon, regardless of whether or not a close 
inspection of the obscurities in Husserl and Heidegger might render such a path possible.  
Derrida appears to show in the name of Heidegger not how Heidegger already answers 
the question of ethics but allows for the possibility of ethics at the most fundamental 
level.  If our assertion concerning Derrida’s essay is correct, then we should be able to 
see a similar movement with respect to Husserl, and Bernasconi seems to suggest just 
that. 
 Once again, Bernasconi argues that Derrida’s essay is “not suited” to challenging 
Levinas’s critique of traditional phenomenology, in this case, that of Edmund Husserl.311  
When Derrida discusses the intentionally mediate nature of the subject’s encounter with 
the other, always performed by analogous appresentation rather than by immediate 
                                                 
310 Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 151. 
 
311 Bernasconi, “The Alterity of the Stranger,” 71ff. 
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presentation, he finds Husserl to affirm the “radical separation of the absolute origins, the 
relationship of absolved absolutes and nonviolent respect for the secret: the opposite of 
victorious assimilation.”312  Bernasconi finds Derrida’s conclusion about Husserl to be 
less interested in what Husserl himself was arguing than about judging “Husserl by 
Levinas’s standards and [finding] him meeting them.”313  Consequently, Bernasconi 
focuses next upon Derrida’s claim that Levinas should not abandon the language of the 
alter ego.  However, perhaps we might turn Derrida’s essay into more than simply a 
game of semantics, for it sure seems too involved an essay to be merely arguing that 
certain words are just as good as and perhaps better than Levinas’s own chosen “absolute 
other.”  If we consider that what Derrida is, in fact, doing with his essay is making clear 
how Levinas’s own betrayed intentions must not only begin in a situated tradition, which 
Levinas does, but must also find within that tradition the space to stretch what has been 
said, which Levinas apparently does not want to do having witnessed his thorough 
critique of tradition, then we can see that even in the case of Husserl as previously was 
the case with Heidegger, Derrida seems to be properly constructing the tradition for the 
deconstructing already done in Levinas’s text. 
 What began as a question of priority, whether the ontological must take 
precedence over the ontic, reading Derrida’s essay as a critique of Levinas’s oft obscure 
discussion of the concrete, empirical face, ends with a suggestion of spaces within the 
tradition wherein Levinas’s philosophy might situate itself in order to more effectively 
actuate the deconstructive type moves Totality and Infinity performs.  However, whether 
one reads “Violence and Metaphysics” as critique or complement, it is interesting to note 
                                                 
312Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 72. 
  
313Bernasconi, “The Alterity of the Stranger,” 72.  
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that Levinas’s one essay that actually acknowledges Derrida directly, although many 
themes in Levinas’s later work can be seen as subtle responses to Derrida, does not 
attempt to defend Totality and Infinity from hostility but intends to “meet him [Derrida] 
on his way” without the ambition to improve a “true philosopher.”  With humility 
Levinas declares “in underlining the primordial importance of the questions posed by 
Derrida, we wished to express the pleasure of a contact made in the heart of a 
chiasmus.”314  Levinas apparently sees within Derrida’s work an intertwining with his 
own as though even the most critical words by Derrida held connections with what 
Levinas was already doing.  In large measure, this chapter works as both a discussion of 
the manner in which the ontic works as horizonal with respect to ethics but also with an 
eye toward the phenomenological underpinnings needed to carry out such an 
investigation.  The spirit of phenomenology, to which we found Levinas adhering in 
chapter one, arises here as answer to any Derridean critique, meaning that 
phenomenology must be more than the description of brute presence.  Wherein Derrida 
means only to make a space within established traditions from which to catapult 
Levinas’s argument forward, rather than leaning on broad based criticisms of western 
tradition, one need only look to Levinas’s title, Totality and Infinity.   
 Levinas’s conjunction between totality and infinity does not situate two polemical 
poles against each other.  The suggestion of the “and” holds that Levinas is well aware of 
the necessity of totality and the difficulty of expressing the concept of infinity when 
discourse must start out within conceptuality.  The chimera of escape proposes infinity, 
not as a means of doing away with ontology or totality but as a means of going beyond 
                                                 
314 Levinas, “Wholly Otherwise,” 8. 
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what has already been done in the name of ontology or totality.  Therefore, when Derrida 
finds ethics to be possible in Heidegger’s account of being itself or the absolutely other to 
be possible in Husserl’s account of the alter ego, Levinas in no way disputes these claims.  
The issue at hand is whether phenomenology, as laid out by Husserl and as reconceived 
by Heidegger, can go about the disclosing of the ethical as a simple extension of their 
original programs.  Levinas certainly comes to see the methodology of phenomenology 
as offering the possibility of such a disclosure, but he does not see the content of their 
work as engaging the problematic in a helpful way, since it can be argued that their 
phenomenologies do create totalities in one sense or other.  What we find in the 
suggestion that Derrida’s critique offers a possible chiasmus already suggested in the 
conjunction between totality and infinity is more clearly worked out in the 
phenomenology of otherness as done by Paul Ricoeur. 
 Bernasconi sees Ricoeur’s analysis of otherness as following along some of the 
same basic lines as Derrida’s “Violence and Metaphysics,” questioning the extent to 
which Levinas can properly escape Husserl’s original analysis of the alter ego, seeing at 
least the need to connect Levinas to Husserl in the discussion of sameness and 
otherness.315  What seems strange in Bernasconi’s assessment is the degree to which he 
feels the need to answer Ricoeur in the name of Levinas.  If we find Levinas to still be 
within the tradition of phenomenology, to which Derrida reconnects him and from which 
Levinas never claims to be in flight, separating himself from the content of past 
phenomenological investigation rather than the methodology, then we should find 
Levinas as simply adding to the multiplicity of layers of description that must be done in 
                                                 
315 Bernasconi, “The Alterity of the Stranger,” 79ff. 
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order to fully describe lived experience.  For Ricoeur, “resemblance and dissymmetry 
have a bearing on the sense of ego and on that of alter ego,” meaning that the sense of 
otherness must be arrived at from both a sense of the likeness between the subject and the 
alter ego and the otherness that cannot be gathered into apperception.  He continues that 
“if this second movement has priority in the ethical dimension, the movement from the 
ego toward the alter ego maintains a priority in the gnoseological dimension.”316  We 
should conclude, here, that Ricoeur suggests at least an ethical and gnoseological 
dimension as relevant to lived experience and that within the realm of ethics, the 
dissymmetry of otherness and its unlikeness to anything in conceptual totality should at 
least be investigated.317 
 What Ricoeur’s assessment of Levinas does not answer, however, is how much of 
the human order in its various layers is founded upon the ethical structure.  Ricoeur 
assumes the lion’s share of human epistemology to be grounded in Husserl’s 
phenomenology and only an ethical portion allocated for Levinas, but Levinas seems to 
suggest that the ethical horizon is more than just a structure for getting along but also a 
structure that makes even the gnoseological layer of investigation possible.  We saw 
some indication of this in chapter one and Husserl’s move in “The Fifth Cartesian 
                                                 
316Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 334-335.  
 
317 It bears saying at this point that Ricoeur does not recognize the problem with 
conceptual totality for which Levinas argues consistently.  Bernasconi finds difficulty 
with such a claim and references James Swindal, “The Other and the Foreign,” in 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, 21, nos.5-6 (1995), 122, as an example of one who finds 
Ricoeur’s disavowal of totality untenable.  However, I believe the tension here is slight.  
Whether we desire to name ontology as totalitarian and what does not have such a focus 
on existence to be beyond totality or whether we follow Ricoeur and avoid all talk of 
totality in favor of a multifaceted nature of lived experience, it is important to note that 
Levinas’s idea of dissymmetry in the relation between oneself and another is a viable 
piece of phenomenology.   
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Meditation” to find the beginning of phenomenology’s investigation to be well begun in 
either the traditional, egoic mode or in the intersubjective mode.  Levinas’s claim will be 
that if phenomenology needs to move to an intersubjective mode for investigation, then 
that mode must hang together on a structure that ensures the intersubjective relations.  
Consequently, the ethical is necessary for the gnoseological.   
  Finally, what we have discovered in the phenomenology of Totality and Infinity 
and the spurring critique/complement of Derrida is at least the need to hear more on the 
structure of the ethical, which Levinas’s first major work only begins.  As we investigate 
Levinas’s later works and place them in the context of various readers of Levinas, we will 
be touching on the following important questions: 1. How might the structure of the 
ethical be described when the question focuses not upon the other but upon the 
conditioned subject?  2. What are the phenomenological analyses that indicate the formal 
description of this horizon?  3. How does the other in this newly oriented analysis 
appear?  4. To where does this analysis lead?       
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Infinity at the Origin 
 
Introduction 
 
But Derrida was right – sort of . . . How can such a vigorous attempt at a defense 
in the name of Levinas, as was seen in the last third of the last chapter, lead to the simple 
statement that Derrida has something truly critical to offer?  The answer is simply that 
Derrida fired the right arrow at the wrong target.  The arrow represents the accusation 
that Levinas’s philosophy depends on an ontological existent even as it makes the claim 
that the existent is not grounded in the ontological order.  Our defense has been, up until 
now, a defense of Levinas’s description of the other, and Levinas makes such a defense 
with his essay, “Wholly Otherwise.”  Nevertheless, a shift occurs in Levinas’s philosophy 
in the 1960’s, in no way comprising a turn or demarcating an early or late Levinas where 
the later is intended to supplant the earlier.  However, the shift is significant and 
represents the acknowledgement that Derrida’s accusation was correct if only it had been 
aimed at the ego who experiences the face of the other.318  The problematic that 
surrounds the ego is the realization that oneself “is already constituted when the act of 
constitution first originates.”319  This means that the act of constitution performed by 
consciousness is being performed by that which is already constituted, presenting a 
problem for Levinas’s problem for Levinas’s philosophy in the following way: if the 
coming of the other constitutes the self in such fundamental terms that the formation of 
                                                 
318 I have, undoubtedly, pigeon-holed Derrida with this assertion, surely inviting a retort 
to the contrary, but I am not unaware of Derrida’s comments about the ego in “Violence 
and Metaphysics.”  See for example page 213 of this chapter. 
 
319 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981), 105. 
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the ethical should be metaphysics’ first philosophy, then how is there a self in the first 
place already there capable of receiving the other.320  It is not, then, the ontological 
presence of the other that is problematic for Levinas, but the ontologically constituted self 
that encounters the other.    
 Those who have argued for a turn in Levinas’s philosophy usually do so while 
holding on to the misconception dealt with in chapter three that Derrida was intending his 
work, “Violence and Metaphysics,” to appear as a critique of Totality and Infinity.  As 
Roland Blum argues, “Levinas’s subtle interweaving of themes inspired by Edmund 
Husserl and Jacques Derrida leads him, in Otherwise than Being, to a ‘deconstructed’ 
view of the self which cannot be harmonized with the ethico-religious concerns 
fundamental to Totality and Infinity.”321  This newly “deconstructed” subject, Blum 
claims, obscures any conceptual continuity between the two works.322  We should be 
careful, however, not to assert too much, as does John Llewelyn, that Levinas had in his 
                                                 
320 We are beginning to run into another problem with terminology.  While Levinas is 
comfortable with the word constitution, it is not necessarily best suited for what he 
wishes to do.  Constitution presumes a conscious agent, which would imply a conscious 
agent behind the constitution of the self.  Since the self cannot be its own agent, it could 
be that the other might assume that function.  However, as we shall see argued, the other 
person is not constitutive of the human, but the intersubjective milieu of which the self 
and other are a part constitute a formal structure out of which the human arises.  The 
structure of the intersubjective milieu would more appropriately be called the origin of 
the ego.  We will endeavour to offer this corrective in Levinas’s language. 
 
321 Roland Paul Blum, “Deconstruction and Creation,” in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 46 (1985), 293.  For other such readings of Levinas’s 
Otherwise than Being as a turn in philosophy, see: Stephan Strasser, “Die Kehre im 
Denken von Levinas,” in Jenseits von Sein und Zeit: eine Einführung in Emmanuel 
Levinas’ Philosophie (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), 219-51.  
 
322 Ibid., 294. 
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early work a “foresight of what he intends to say in detail later on.”323  What I will 
endeavor to achieve in this chapter is the laying out of the phenomenological analysis 
done by Levinas after Totality and Infinity such that the differences between his two 
major works are not seen as a thought necessarily reconceived but as a broadening and 
deepening of Levinas’s thought with a greater eye toward transcendental origination.  To 
accomplish this goal, we will investigate those experiences in Totality and Infinity that 
undergo re-analysis in Otherwise than Being and are suggestive of this broader 
fundamental origin; we will lay bare the structure of this transcendental origination by 
examining the central chapter of the second work, “Substitution”; and we will finally re-
connect the analysis to the possibility of Blum’s “ethico-religious concerns.”  Ultimately, 
with these three investigations in place, we will have successfully argued for viewing the 
human subject as that which gets originated as human by the transcendental horizon of 
the infinite. 
 The need to re-evaluate and re-focus one’s philosophy in a direction 180º from 
one’s first major work could appear as a turn, but in phenomenology, it is nothing more 
than the going back over of already analyzed ground with the new tools discovered in the 
last analysis in order to make a deeper re-analysis.  In order to describe the ethical 
relationship in Totality and Infinity, Levinas began in Heidegger’s factical position of 
being at home.  The self was already oriented toward things which the self recognized as 
its own, and by means of which, the self could find enjoyment.  At this stage of being at 
home, the self also encountered others in a complementary relationship which one might 
                                                 
323 John Llewelyn, Emmanuel Levinas: The Genealogy of Ethics (London: Routledge, 
1995), 5. 
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recognize as analogous to Heidegger’s mit-dasein.324  Mit-dasein, however, does not 
describe a fundamentally ethical relationship, but only a possibility of a constitutive co-
being-in-the-world where the presumable constitution of the there by the self and others 
is mitigated by Heidegger’s emphasis of the world as mine.  The advent of the face 
disrupts the comfort of being at home, placing the self in a linguistic framework that 
begins with hearing a “hello” but also demands a response.  Within this newly 
encountered world comes an ethical milieu that reaches beyond the initial encounter to 
experiences described in terms of the erotic, the fecund, and the voluptuous.  What 
Levinas came to realize, however, was that everything he described, even down to the 
very first encounter with the face in which the greeting was comprehended, occurred 
within the intersubjective wherein the ethical was always already in play.  The self was 
not completed as a self by the ethical moment; the self originated as human always 
already within the ethical.  The texts of the 1960’s leading up to and including Levinas’s 
last major work, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, had to shift focus in order to 
describe the self’s origination within the infinite alterity of the other.  Let us delve into 
this alternative focus by first looking at Levinas’s broadening of the philosophy of 
language. 
 
                                                 
324 Several defenders of Heidegger have offered mitsein as the topos in which Heidegger’s 
own ethics could be disclosed: François Raffoul, “Being and the Other: Ethics and 
Ontology in Levinas and Heidegger,” in Addressing Levinas, eds. Eric Sean Nelson, 
Antje Kapust, and Kent Still (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005), 138-152 
and Edward Wingenbach, “Liberating Responsibility: The Levinasian Ethic of Being and 
Time,” in International-Philosophical-Quarterly, Mr 96; 36(1): 29-45.  However, both of 
these readings make the same mistake that Levinas is already trying to correct in 
Otherwise than Being by assuming a ready made subject in a meaningful world needing 
only the addition of an ethical encounter to fully realize the implication of mitsein. 
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Language as Communication and Exposure 
 Any attempt at broadening must first begin with a word on methodology, which 
we have often supplied on account of Levinas’s usual unwillingness to make his 
methodology explicit beyond the claims that he is doing phenomenology, with special 
affinity for Husserl’s idea of intentionality.325  What would make any researcher 
uncomfortable with Levinas’s phenomenological claims, as was pointed out in chapter 
one, is that he often admits to not following all of Husserl’s precepts; however, Levinas 
does give us insight into his method of describing the linguistic components of the Said 
(the coherent text of language) and the Saying (the on-going possibility of 
communication).  In the language we have used up until now, the Saying would be linked 
in some way to a transcendental condition for the Said, but Levinas states in a Q&A 
session in 1975 that, with respect to his phenomenological methodology of Totality and 
Infinity, “it is not the word ‘transcendental’ I would retain, but the notion of intentional 
analysis.”326  This statement would be particularly damning to us insofar as this 
dissertation has sought to link Levinas’s methodology with a similar broadening and 
deepening that took place in the move from Husserl’s philosophy to a transcendental 
                                                 
325 For a brief explanation of Levinas’s reluctance on methodology, see Emmanuel 
Levinas, “Questions and Answers,” in Of God Who Comes to Mind (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 89.  Pardon the long quote: “That is what I would respond as far 
as method is concerned.  I will tell you also that I know nothing more about it.  I do not 
believe that there is a transparency possible in method.  Nor that philosophy might be 
possible as transparency.  Those who have worked on methodology all their lives have 
written many books that replace the more interesting books that they could have written.  
So much the worse for the philosophy that would walk in sunlight without shadows.” 
 
326 Ibid., 87. 
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phenomenology with the goal of disclosing origins.  Nevertheless, in Levinas’s 
clarification, the issue and methodology become clear – and amenable to our analysis. 
 The primary reason for Levinas avoiding the term “transcendental” lies solidly at 
the feet of philosophy’s new gadfly, Jacques Derrida.  Insofar as transcendental seeks that 
which is foundational, the word remains tied to an ontological framework.  “Foundation 
is a term from architecture, a term made for a world that one inhabits; for a world that is 
before all that it supports, an astronomic world of perception, an immobile world; rest par 
excellence; the Same par excellence.”327  Whether Levinas is responding with heightened 
awareness or a knee-jerk duck-and-cover at anything that can be semantically linked to 
an existent is unclear, but what is not unclear is that Levinas still retains a transcendental 
like phenomenological methodology.  The Saying, we will see, is the opening in 
existence in which the Said can take place.  That analysis will reveal the need to situate 
language in its very possibility, what amounts to a reduction of the Said to the Saying.  
This reduction does not imply that the Saying is a greater genus of language of which the 
Said is but a species.  If this were the case, the Saying could be turned into a greater Said, 
a content identified as a firm foundation; however, the possibility of language can only be 
hinted at as that which cannot be thematized, for it is the very possibility of 
thematization.  Having placed his own philosophy within the confines of intentional 
analysis, Levinas bows to Husserl’s phenomenological design in which the primary aim 
of phenomenology is epistemological, concentrated on the meaningfulness of experience 
as the contents of experience appear.  Saying, on this account, works as a horizon of 
meaning, making possible the human action of language. 
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 The philosopher newly indoctrinated to the basic themes of Levinas would 
probably find strange the fact that Levinas dismisses, by way of ignoring, the work of 
linguistics in the matters of language.  Whether it is the structuralist linguistics of 
Saussure or the ontological interpretations of language from Heidegger, Levinas avoids 
them all as though, in the words of Bernhard Waldenfels, “linguistics were a reign of 
traitors.”328  It is not the case that Levinas finds these thinkers to be lax in their work; 
rather, they are too focused and elevate the Said, the content of language, to the supreme 
height and reduce the Saying of language to another Said.  In the case of the 
structuralists, the components of language owe their meaning to the linguistic system’s 
internal working relationships, effectively reducing language to its own distinct structural 
body that acts upon and through a subject.  Language becomes, again, such a master of 
the subject in the ontological theory of language.  Beginning with Heidegger’s often 
quoted statement in the “Letter on ‘Humanism’” that “language is the house of being,” 
we find the culmination of Heidegger’s earlier analysis in which being-in-the-world was 
already a being in language.  In these two cases, the sharing of language was merely the 
deepening of meaning for an already present subject whose goal would be an ever greater 
comprehension of the system of language or the question of being.329 
 Perhaps most surprising of all is Levinas’s avoidance of Austin’s speech act 
theory.  In the Saying/Said distinction, the Saying looks to have a verbal aspect that could 
                                                 
328 Bernhard Waldenfels, “Levinas on the Saying and the Said,” in Addressing Levinas, 
eds. Eric Sean Nelson, Antje Kapust, and Kent Still (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 2005), 87. 
 
329 For more in depth analysis on Levinas’s position with respect to structuralism and 
ontologism, see John Llewelyn, “Levinas and Language,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Levinas, eds. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 119ff. 
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parallel the linguistic philosophy of speech investigated in terms of its activity.  If one 
promises to do something, the thing that is promised clearly appears as a content of 
language; however, the very act of promising is not something governed by the rules of 
language, it is an event of language itself.  Unfortunately, speech act theory does not truly 
encompass the Saying/Said distinction.  Even though the Saying appears as a verbal 
modality of language, Levinas’s concept of Saying cannot be rendered as a thematized 
object, as promising not only can be but already is rendered.  Whether as noun or verb, 
the Said encompasses all that is available for thematization.          
 Out of the anonymous and horrifying il y a, phenomena appear as this or that.  
Intentional analysis has already shown that consciousness is consciousness of an object 
that appears to a subject as this or that.  Husserl’s principle of principles underscores the 
central truth of this realization: 
Every originarily given intuition is a source for the legitimation of knowledge; 
everything that presents itself originarily to us (so to say in bodily actuality), must 
be simply accepted as that as what it gives itself, but only within the limits within 
which it therein gives itself. . . . Every enunciation that does not do anything else 
than to give expression to such givens through mere explication and adequately 
corresponding significations, is therefore actually . . . an absolute beginning.330 
     
For the purposes of our discussion on language, the principle of principles reveals that 
our every intuition can find an enunciation as a point of absolute beginning.  From 
Levinas’s perspective, this possibility of enunciation reveals the kerygmatic character of 
language: “identification is kerygmatical.”331 
                                                 
330 Edmund Husserl, Ideas I, trans. F. Kersten (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1998), §24. 
 
331 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 35. 
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 Identification begins with the logical rule A is A, where the entity identified 
appears as both the subject and predicate of the statement.  The subject, which is declined 
in the nominative, nominates, points out, or designates an object in a way that holds the 
subject synchronically, as somehow the same regardless of time.  The predicate, which by 
rule also appears in the nominative, is inextricably tied to the verb to be.  By virtue of the 
verb, the predicate nominative does not simply sound again the subject nominative, but 
allows the identification to resound diachronically (through time).  For an example, 
Levinas restates the identity equation of red is red as red reds.332  Quine has pointed out 
that logical identity statements can be dealt with as paraphrastic and shortened in the very 
manner Levinas suggests: “The teacher of Plato socratizes;” “Pegasus pegasizes.”333  In 
these constructions, the familiar noun has been verbalized, revealing both its temporality 
and manner in which the entity is expressed in time.  Consequently,  
language qua said can be conceived as a system of nouns identifying entities . . . 
but also, and with as much right, language can be conceived as the verb in a 
predicative proposition in which the substances break down into modes of being, 
modes of temporalization.  Here language does not double up the being of 
entities, but exposes the silent resonance of the essence.334    
   
By being both synchronic and diachronic, the Said of language is the thematized milieu 
of a subject, the explication of things and events, the self’s kerygma. 
 Interpretations of language as thematic or kerygmatic serve to deny what Levinas 
finds to be primary.  Language is first and foremost communication – a relation between 
                                                 
332 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 38-9. 
 
333 W. V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Logico-Philosophical Essays 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 8, 167. 
 
334 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 40. 
 
   
197   
 
oneself and someone else.  While a thematic understanding of language is in no way 
shocked by the claim that language is communication, such thematic ways of looking at 
language eventually undermine the very possibility of describing the fundamental 
structure of communication.  The origin of the mistake of the thematic analysis is in the 
expectation that communication takes place between language users participating in 
signifying acts.335  On the surface, such an analysis must be considered correct, and this is 
the analysis that lies behind Heidegger and Austin.  Nevertheless, it is the superficiality 
of such an understanding of language that Levinas desires to transcend.  Language users 
participating in signifying acts already exist as fully constituted selves within a semiotic 
milieu, but the foundational act of communication is the opening up of one to another.  
Whereas the Said is content, Saying is an act of exposure: 
Here exposure has a sense radically different from thematization. . . On the hither 
side of the ambiguity of being and entities, prior to the said, saying uncovers the 
one that speaks, not as an object disclosed by theory, but in the sense that one 
discloses oneself by neglecting one’s defenses, leaving a shelter, exposing oneself 
to outrage, to insults and wounding.336 
 
 The Saying acts on a level far broader than verbal sharing; it operates as the 
presenting of one’s own body, one’s own skin to the unknown.  Such bodily references 
should resound with echoes of Merleau-Ponty, whose Phenomenology of Perception 
Richard Cohen assures us played a great role in the formulating of Otherwise than 
                                                 
335 For a further discussion of these errors see Adriaan Peperzak, 'From Intentionality to 
Responsibility: On Levinas's Philosophy of Language,' in The Question of the Other: 
Essays in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, eds. A. Dallery and C. Scott (New 
York, SUNY Press, 1989), 12-5. 
 
336 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 49. 
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Being.337  Levinas has already echoed Merleau-Ponty’s explication of our thinking nature 
where Mereleau-Ponty links language with identification stating that language 
“transforms me into an object and denies me.”  Such actions “call a halt to 
communication.”338  In Levinas’s view, as soon as human beings turn to empower their 
objectifying gaze, their turning, gestures, expressions of intense scrutiny, expressions of 
apathetic distaste already place themselves in a communicative plane not ruled by 
identification – a plane that can only exist with subjects exposed to one another.  Saying, 
then, is the condition for the possibility of discourse wherein the Saying precedes the 
Said by logically providing the possibility that the message can be given and received.  
The structure of the Saying reveals that in entering discourse the speaker has already been 
exposed. 
 Levinas was already preparing readers for this interpretation of language with an 
essay that appeared in 1967, “Language and Proximity.”  Communication was there, too, 
perceived as both kerygmatic in terms of language content, but it was clear that this 
content appeared in such a way as to be for everyone.  At this point comes the realization 
that the “possibility of communication is given as a simple corollary of the logical work 
of speech.”339  This possibility of communicating-with, however, could not appear as just 
                                                 
337 Richard Cohen makes the claim in his “Foreword” to Otherwise than Being, p. xiii, 
that “Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception . . . presented brilliant and novel 
analyses of perception . . . Levinas is quite influenced by this work, transforming and 
integrating its analyses into his own ethical vision.”  
 
338 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New 
York: Routledge, 1996), 360.  
 
339 Emmanuel Levinas, “Language and Proximity,” in Collected Philosophical Papers, 
trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), 115.  This piece 
first appeared in the expanded edition to Emmanuel Levinas, En découvrant l’existence 
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another “cognition of this interlocutor in his particularity.”340  Such a reading would once 
again reduce the situation to a thought that would already be within the workings of 
language rather than getting at the originative possibility of language.  We are now 
familiar with the problem of attempting to place within view that which defines the very 
meaningfulness of the view in the first place.  Any attempt at this kind of disclosure 
marks a necessary “betrayal” for Levinas that must occur but which must also be undone, 
where the content of the betrayal is destroyed, leaving only a formal designation that 
designates paradoxically.  The first betrayal of the structure of anarchical language comes 
with the 1967 article and is repeated again in Otherwise than Being, that the exposure 
enacted by language reveals an ever more primordial proximity between interlocutors.341  
This proximity begins its un-saying in the re-analysis of the significance of the other, 
which will finally reconnect us with the end of chapter one and Levinas’s analysis of 
hetero-affection in the light of a new sense of temporality and sensibility. 
Temporality and Sensibility at the Beginning 
 We must, now, solidly reassert that the analysis of Totality and Infinity is not 
placed aside, for the movement Levinas makes in the 1960’s is absolutely dependent 
upon the basic interpretation of the face as that which interrupts the ego and breaks into 
the ego’s home.  Levinas’s post- Totality and Infinity and post-Derrida essays reflect this 
earlier position when they claim that consciousness “loses its first place” in favor of the 
order of the other, but because the ego was then already fully involved in the world, a 
new question could surely arise, one which Levinas did not ask in his first major work: 
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“How is the face not simply a true representation in which the other renounces his 
alterity?”342  What this question suggests is that the analysis of the face’s interruption is 
phenomenologically accurate, but it does not explain why the ego, temporarily displaced 
from home, could not simply shore up the rent with a reconstituted home that now 
includes the other as revealed by the face.  The answer to this question is already being 
suggested in this chapter: the other is not that which breaks into the home but is that 
which is already there structuring the home in its human manifestation providing, at least 
in part, the structural meaningfulness of language.  If such is the case, then the face of the 
other does not signify alterity but signifies what Levinas calls the trace of the other.      
 “A trace signifies beyond being” because it signifies that which is utterly 
transcendent to consciousness, that which can never be made to appear as present.343  
This definition echoes so much of what was said about the face it is hard to see why a 
new term is necessary.  What is at issue for Levinas and the question posed above 
appears in Derrida’s essay “. . . that Dangerous Supplement . . .” where “the sign is 
always the supplement of the thing itself” and the supplement adds its own positivity.344  
The face before a language-ready ego acts as just such a supplement undoing the 
otherness in the breach of consciousness.  What was needed for the self at the moment of 
primal impression was a word that already implies absence even in its positivity.  The 
very presence of a trace is already the signaling of an irrevocable absence.  Nevertheless, 
                                                 
342 Emmanuel Levinas, “Trace of the Other,” in Deconstruction in Context, trans. 
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the trace cannot be taken as transcendental, for it does not posit “a world behind our 
world,” which would run afoul of the architectural metaphor previously mentioned.345  
An absolute absence of this sort, however, can only be possible if we understand trace in 
a new temporal light.     
 The trace of the other, as signified by the face, transcends the previously 
explicated notions of time.   Via Husserl, we have understood time by way of the 
structure of the now moment which is inextricably tied to a protended future and a 
retended past.  This structure lies behind the synchronic and diachronic nature of time as 
expressed in language, for it is the ability to present what is in memory to the conscious 
moment that allows for recognizing what has appeared as an eidetic unity throughout 
(synchronic) and what has appeared as different (diachronic).  The trace, however, does 
not act in such a way as to make an object appear in the memory such that the 
synchronicity or diachronicity of the other can be judged.  The trace defines that which 
has already passed before one has arrived on the scene.  Herein we find one of Levinas’s 
classic critiques of Husserl and the entire Western tradition of philosophy, which he 
claims has always too narrowly relied on presence or the ability to make present for its 
metaphysics and epistemology.  The trace, as absolute absence, exemplifies an 
immemorial past. 
 The face, now seen to act as the trace of the other rather than as the coming in of 
the other, is the “unique openness in which the signifyingness of the transcendent does 
not nullify the transcendence and make it enter into an immanent order; here on the 
contrary transcendence refuses immanence precisely as the ever bygone transcendence of 
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the transcendent.”346  Temporality is the immanent order here that the trace escapes, 
avoiding the possibility of shoring up any breach in consciousness, but it does not escape 
by being a-temporal but radically dia-chronic.  Rather than the traditional understanding 
of diachrony as something that can be traced through time, the trace signifies that which 
sounds across time.  Having made our ontic reparations in chapter three, we would be 
tempted to declare the intersubjective as part of the world’s temporal horizon, but 
recalling Levinas’s assertion that intentional consciousness is at the root of all such 
ontological disclosures we begin to see the emergence of Levinas’s transcendental 
argument apart from architectural underpinnings.  Ontological disclosure presupposes 
language as well as a conscious ego, but experiencing the world in its ultimately 
meaningful way already appears as part and parcel of the human intersubjective as 
revealed in the Saying/Said distinction.  Consequently, Levinas avoids reference to a 
temporal world horizon in favor of the temporally constituted world of experience which 
is incapable of placing within historical time the original moment out of which the ego 
emerges.  This case of being acted upon outside of the historically recoverable memorial 
time reveals within the ego’s hetero-affection a radical passivity of sensibility. 
 Passivity must first be understood in Husserl’s terms, for it is from his analysis of 
passive and active syntheses that Levinas takes his beginning.  Active synthesis is 
intricately tied to predicative thinking and so is not far removed from our discussion of 
the kerygmatic nature of language.  Indeed, Don Welton finds it useful to connect active 
synthesis with Searle’s principle of expressibility which would uncover the varieties of 
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mental acts through an analysis of various speech contexts.347  However, since the nature 
of propositional language has already been discussed, we should turn our attention to the 
manner in which passive synthesis is already, in its own realm, an active synthesis.  That 
a transition occurs suggests that these are not unrelated modes, as the names might 
suggest.  In fact, the explication of passive synthesis begins as easily as active by virtue 
of the fact that Husserl uses passive synthesis to describe the undergoing of the subject 
due to the “affective power that perceptual fields exercise on acts of perception.”348  The 
subject, as bodily active, “yields” constitutively to original sensations.  Conceivably, the 
impression that affects the passive synthesis of the subject could be ultimately 
incomprehensible considering that the impression takes place in a pre-reflective moment 
between perceptual impression and the propositional expression of active synthesis.  
However, Husserl’s designation of synthesis in both active and passive forms belies 
another kind of activity.  Passive synthesis is the ground for not forgetting what is 
experienced in the perceptual field that is engendered by this proto-active synthesis.  The 
active work of passive synthesis can be seen in the manner in which this synthesis is 
already at work in retentional passivity: “an intentional modification in the realm of pure 
passivity.”349  Even though retentional passivity does not involve the radiating intentions 
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of the ego, the retentional mode still operates “according to an absolutely fixed law.”350  
The idea that what first affects the ego in the perceptual field can undergo modification in 
passive retention according to a fixed law actively working in passive synthesis suggests 
that what is experienced in this pre-egoic moment is recoverable in egoic consciousness.  
What remains in question for Levinas is whether or not everything passively experienced 
can be recovered.  
 The primal impression, as we have seen, lies as the “source-point” of the 
retention-now-protention field that makes up lived experience.  Husserl assumes that the 
primal impression is recoverable in retention, even after it is modified (contextualized), 
through a series of reflective acts.  This recuperability is precisely what Levinas wishes to 
challenge: 
In Husserl, the time structure of sensibility is the time of the recuperable.  That 
the non-intentionality of the proto-impression is not a loss of consciousness, that 
nothing can be clandestinely produced, that nothing can break the thread of 
consciousness, excludes from time the irreducible diachrony whose sense the 
present study aims to bring to light, behind the exhibiting of a being.351   
  
What Levinas wants to claim is that since Husserl revealed the subject as both passively 
affected and actively constituting, we must not overlook the affected, non-intentional 
nature of the subject in the primal impression, the non-intentional value of which Husserl 
overlooks in favor of the ego as active even in its retentional passivity.  The very idea of 
a non-intentional sensation may appear as anathema to most Husserlian readers, and, 
indeed, we might say that such a reading has “almost” been universally rejected.352  
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Levinas’s appeal to a non-intentional sensation leans heavily on the ontic-reparations 
made with chapter three and the idea that Otherwise than Being does not undermine what 
phenomenological analysis was done in Totality and Infinity.  He appears to be making 
just such a stand when he asserts that the face signifies a sensible that is “in contrast with 
a phenomenon.”353   
 Levinas’s argument for the possibility of a non-intentional sensation and the 
subsequent conditioning of the face as trace of the other remains within his understanding 
of the primal impression (Ur-impression) connected with a fully repaired understanding 
of the ontic.  Within the primal impression, no production occurs on behalf of the subject.  
The impression “does not spring from anything,”354 but without production, the 
impression occurs to an ego that sits freely in what can only be a conceptual moment 
wherein the subject is open to the givenness of the world: “what is ‘there’ of itself, and 
indeed originally: namely, what is pre-given to the Ego, presenting itself to the Ego in the 
manner of something affecting it as foreign.”355  What Levinas finds important about 
Husserl’s explanation of the pre-given affecting the ego is the manner in which the pre-
given is described as foreign, or in Levinas’s terms, as other; clearly this is the sense of 
autre.  The recovery of that moment, however, is not possible, as we have seen, without 
the work of retentional passivity, which alludes to a passing of time before the moment 
becomes meaningful, what Levinas describes as “a first intentional thought that is time 
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itself, a presence to self across the first gap, an intention in the first lapse of time and the 
first dispersion.”356  One’s presence to self across the gap is a presence to that which is 
already affected by the foreign, already constituted in the horizon of otherness – once 
again, from the root of autre. 
 We are, however, at this moment ready to turn back to the very beginnings of this 
chapter to see how Derrida’s proper arrow at the wrong target is dealt with by Levinas.  
What needs to be explicated is the role the other (autrui) plays in the passive attitude of 
the subject and the extreme limits of retentional passivity’s constitution of the primal 
impression.  Beginning with the latter, the first limit is one oft repeated in this 
dissertation: one cannot bring to consciousness as an object or phenomenon that which 
operates in the manner of transcendental horizon.  Insofar as we have already seen this 
result with respect to the radically diachoronic, we must now recognize the limit as a 
constitutive factor of sensibility as well.  The open subject passively receives the 
givenness of the world through its perceptual field, and one can speak of the foundational 
horizons of meaning as being sensed if we broaden the meaning of sensibility to include 
all openness to both objects and conditions, but retentional passivity only recovers for 
consciousness objects as conditioned rather than conditions themselves.  Levinas’s 
methodology of betraying and unsaying the betrayal in a formalistic structure marks the 
only way in which one may properly “glimpse” these conditions.   
                                                 
356 Emmanuel Levinas, “Intentionality and Sensation,” in Discovering Existence with 
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 With the end of chapter three and with the previous discussion of the other person 
in relation to temporality, we have already proposed the possibility that the otherness of 
the other person disclosed as trace in that person’s ontic presence can still operate in the 
manner of a foundational horizon, but as an ontic incarnation, we have yet to explain in 
terms of sensibility why the other is not entirely recuperable.  Levinas’s answer depends 
upon the broader notion of sensibility as open to object and conditions as well as his 
insight into Derrida’s truest critique of his philosophy.  Levinas moves to address in 
“Language and Proximity” what he sees to be the real threat to his work from Derrida.  
Putting together the entire force of his arguments from sensibility, temporality, and 
passivity, he claims: “there is a consciousness which is a passive work of time, with a 
passivity more passive still than any passivity that is simply antithetical to activity, a 
passivity without reserve, the passivity of a creature at the time of creation when there is 
no subject to assume the creative act.”357  This thought culminates Levinas’s addition to 
Husserl’s analysis of the primal impression and his shoring up of his own philosophy 
against meaningful ontological critique.  Husserl’s passivity tends to assert the ability of 
an ego to make sense out of the entire milieu of conditioned phenomena as though the 
ego is entirely capable of giving meaning to phenomena when, in fact, the ego itself is 
simultaneously emerging as a conditioned being in the field of consciousness.  The 
emerging ego must be parsed out in terms of its many originative layers, no longer under 
Derrida’s onus of justifying an assumed ontology,  as it is conditioned in terms of 
absolute horizons as investigated by the likes of Heidegger and Fink as well as in terms 
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of semi-recoverable horizons such as Merleau-Ponty’s corporality and finally Levinas’s 
intersubjectivity.   
 What serves to set Levinas’s analysis apart from the others is his assertion that 
within the intersubjective layer lies the beginning of the human itself.  The very presence 
of the other person’s otherness affects the subject in a way that conditions the emerging 
ego to meaningfully interpret the world in a way that is first and foremost ethical, all of 
which inevitably brings us back to our discussion of language.  The Saying of language, 
occurring in the initial openness of the emerging subject, presents the uninitiated ego to a 
world of exposure, as a result of which through its exposure the ego is called to response.  
The Saying operates on the level of the primal impression when there is no subject as the 
non-recoverable origin of the Said.  Confronted by the face of another, hearing the Said, 
awakens us to responsibility – not initiating responsibility – but awakening the subject to 
that which has always already held the self.  The Saying of the intersubjective milieu 
establishes proximity and responsibility between the self and the other such that the 
subject is already accused, called out to be one for the other.   
 Our analysis of the ego’s emergence into a milieu of the intersubjective would 
certainly re-appropriate Heidegger’s analysis of Mitsein for a more fundamental 
constituent of human-being-in-the-world.  It is not simply the existential fact that we are 
with others but that we are already called to respond to the other, the very force of such a 
call originating at the core of the ego itself.  Insofar as the call conditions without content, 
specific moral actions cannot be determined at this level, but certain characteristics of the 
call can be described.  The call to response, the call to place oneself in the place of 
another originates from a time one cannot make present and a sensible one cannot reach 
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out and touch and a face one cannot count as phenomenon.  Every aspect of the call is 
ungraspable by the subject but is always grasping the subject.  In this way, we might 
begin to see why the fundamental ethical command is infinite in its origination.  
Substitution as Phenomenological Construction for Infinite Origination 
 Because Levinas’s philosophy is so often associated with ethics, the responsibility 
opened up by the Saying seems to indicate the responsibility of a subject involved in 
ethics, but a direct correlation between the two is expressly denied: “The ethical situation 
of responsibility is not comprehensible on the basis of ethics.”358  Apparently, what is 
ethical about the responsibility exposed in communication is a situation, which can only 
be the site out of which the ego originates.  Levinas’s pointing again and again to the 
immemorial time and structure at the origin of the ego will finally necessitate a 
description of this very origin in itself.  “Language and Proximity” was already preparing 
the way for the beginnings of this attempt which he makes in his 1967 lecture in Brussels 
entitled, “Substitution.”  This lecture was slightly revised for publication the following 
year but received a greater re-tooling and expansion as the “centerpiece” of Otherwise 
than Being.  Therein, Levinas repeats the discussion of language, the Saying/Said 
distinction, and the responsibility inherent in communication, but this only leads to the 
idea of one being first and foremost constituted as “one-for-the-other,” as substitution.  
 “Substitution” as a philosophical piece contains several oddities that help it to 
stand out beyond its obvious placement in Levinas’s second major work.  While 
references to God and neighbor have often reminded readers of theology, Levinas always 
made a strong effort to distance his philosophical work from his theological and 
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confessional writings.  “Substitution” however not only carries these reminders but 
boldly offers an array of unexpected vocabulary, e.g. “hostage” and “persecution,” which 
would appear quite at home in a religious context.  In fact, in order to find the first 
instance of substitution as a concept for Levinas, one would have to look into his 
confessional writings on the Talmud.   
 Levinas introduces the religiously reminiscent vocabulary with the clear intent of 
avoiding a language of traditional ontology, a move we have already explicated with 
respect to his use of the term God; however, expansion of the phenomenologically 
questionable vocabulary is evidence of more than a fully expected critique but of a 
discomfort between Levinas and his own work.  Greater attempts to distance oneself from 
ontology only reveal the fear that past attempts were simply not enough.  At issue is 
Levinas’s effort at making “Substitution” his final word on the realization of Derrida’s 
real threat to his philosophy with the result that there would, under Derrida’s reading, 
remain “no interior difference, no fundamental and autochthonous alterity within the 
ego.”359  With so much work having already been done to show that the other appears at 
work already at the emergence of the ego, evidence can be found in Levinas’s early and 
late version of “Substitution” that suggests his fear of an activity at work behind the self’s 
passive openness: “how can the passivity of the self become a ‘hold on oneself’?  
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Leaving aside a play on words, does this not presuppose an activity, a hidden and 
clandestine freedom?”360  It could certainly be argued that this question holds only 
rhetorical value with the expectation that the answer will be “no” and that Levinas will be 
explaining the difficulty away in a matter of moments.  The reason for arguing that this 
question acts as something more than a device is in the difference between the early and 
late version of the text that follows the question.  The greatest amount of reworking done 
to the first essay comes here.  
 “Substitution” as either a concept or essay apparently comes with a lot of 
confusion at the very moment in both Levinas’s career and this dissertation that one 
would hope for the greatest clarity.  This confusion prompted Robert Bernasconi to write 
for the Cambridge Companion to Levinas an essay entitled, “What is the Question to 
which ‘Substitution’ is the Answer?”  In his essay he recounts even more difficulties 
surrounding this idea and preliminarily answers his Jeopardy style question with, “what is 
the most obscure philosophical concept of the twentieth century?”361  Clearly, little to 
nothing is clear, and this can be the result of fuzzy thinking or the production of 
something extraordinarily difficult – of the two, the latter being the case.  Let us 
undertake to comprehend how our own research into Levinas’s philosophy as a study in 
infinite origination necessarily leads to the concept of substitution.  We will begin with a 
short definition of the concept, continue with Bernasconi’s question wherein we will have 
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to modify his answer with an extra bit of explication of phenomenology’s transcendental 
method, and end with the infinite as originative of the human as human.      
Substitution is What? 
 Sometimes the first formulation of a concept is the clearest, standing as it does 
without mountains of clarification to cloud the idea.  In this case, going back to the first 
appearance of substitution would lead us to Levinas’s Nine Talmudic Readings, which 
we have generally avoided for reasons outlined in chapter two.  However, we have here a 
special case, for Levinas breaks his interpretation in “The Temptation of Temptation” to 
end with “a few philosophical considerations, either inspired by this commentary or 
which inspired the commentary in the first place” (italics mine).362   
 The Talmudic commentary in “The Temptation of Temptation” concludes with a 
description of uprightness and the man of integrity, Jacob.  The sudden break into 
philosophical considerations brings the beginning of a phenomenology into the very 
essence of this uprightness, no longer simply alluding to it by way of deduction from 
other phenomena.  Such a description is admittedly speculative, and the short nature of 
the discussion at the end makes clear that the real work is yet to come, but it is here that 
the first formulation is produced: 
The ego’s exit from being occurs before the ego-which-decides.  This exit is not 
accomplished through a game without consequences played in some corner of 
being in which the ontological warp is loose.  It happens through the weight 
exerted on one point of being by the rest of its substance.  This weight is called 
responsibility.  Responsibility for the creature – a being of which the ego was not 
the author – which establishes the ego.  To be a self is to be responsible beyond 
what one has oneself done.  Temimut consists in substituting oneself for others.363 
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The first line is reminiscent of our discussion of Existence and Existents, for the ego’s 
exit from being is not death but birth, an ontic instantiation that must be considered in its 
own right distinct from ontological being if not apart from it.  Problematic to the issue of 
the ego’s birth is that such an event is not available to the ego for reflection.  There is no 
ego that can view its own emergence; consequently, Levinas begins to use creature and 
creation freely in his philosophical work.  The creature references the fact that the human 
being is constructed even if the human cannot recall its own beginning.  With these 
impossibilities in mind, it must be the case that the ego-which-decides does not decide to 
exist but is the product of that which is other than it.  The emergence of a being, 
according to Levinas’s quick explanation here, occurs when the rest of being’s substance 
exerts “weight” on a single point.  An ego, then, comes about within ontological 
possibility and the decision of beings to create and let be the new subject.  The new 
being, by virtue of its existence, owes a debt, bears the weight of responsibility to that 
which the new creation was not an author.  The creature arises in place of all that which 
moved aside to let it be; the creature stands as substitute, one for the other, one for all that 
allowed it to be.  Substitution, the very situation of responsibility, establishes the ego. 
 Levinas’s formulation of substitution dares to undermine the logical premise of 
A=A.  In essence, the ego-which-decides cannot be identical with its essence, for its 
essence is always, first and foremost, the other.  In an attempt to explain the difficulty of 
this concept, Levinas borrows a phrase from Arthur Rimbaud: “Je est un autre.”364  In 
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Rimbaud’s case, he uses the phrase to suggest alienation in the self wherein the self 
experiences a reflexive foreignness or betrayal.  Levinas, on the other hand, twists the 
meaning to offer a definition for substitution, an explanation for how a person can have 
an identity without identifying with the self.  He explains in his 1970 essay, “Without 
Identity,” that it is not the betrayal of self he seeks but the idea of a “subjectivity 
incapable of shutting itself up.”365  Undoubtedly, the self must always be itself, but at 
root, the whole of creation plays an originative role in the self’s creation. 
Substitution as Transcendental Construction 
 Explicating substitution in terms of a transcendental argument should be well 
expected after the constant stream of exploring the problematic of describing an 
originative horizon after fully understanding substitution as that fundamental structure 
that makes ethics possible.366  There should also be a level of comfort to continue with 
such a reading after having alleviated Levinas’s own fears concerning the transcendental 
as just another architectural foundation.  However, credible readers of Levinas, like 
Peperzak and Derrida, seem to caution against transcendental interpretations without in 
fact declaring a transcendental reading to be out of bounds.  Derrida on the one hand 
gives a brief transcendental reading in Adieu, while asking if Levinas could in fact mean 
such a thing.367  One would expect that Derrida’s reluctance is comparable to Levinas’s 
own cautions against transcendental theory with the express worry that such philosophy 
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could only end up in ontology.  Adriaan Peperzak echoes the same cautions but attempts 
to alleviate the problem with the claim that transcendental method in Levinas’s 
philosophy is neither “founding, planning, and constructing.”368  Any such notions of 
founding must inevitably lead, for Peperzak, to some kind of ontological egoism. 
 Peperzak’s caution arises from his association of transcendental theory with the 
most basic form of Husserl’s phenomenology in that anything transcendentally described 
must be done from the position of a reduced or foundational consciousness.  Avoiding 
this pitfall while maintaining anything like transcendental theory requires that “one 
should disregard its connection to a transcendental and foundational consciousness.”369  
A phenomenology that arises from a foundational consciousness must be, for Peperzak, 
egoistic and, consequently, tied to ontology.  Anything like a transcendental argument in 
Levinas, he claims, is better understood along the lines of intentional analysis, which we 
have seen as Levinas’s favored Husserlian insight.   
 Peperzak’s reliance on a “more modest and less suggestive” intentional analysis, 
however, appears to overlook Levinas’s clear understanding that consciousness “is” 
intentionality.  As a result, any transcendental methodology that revolves around 
intentionality still holds to a phenomenology of consciousness.  What relieves the 
pressure of Levinas simply creating another egoistic interpretation is the progression of 
his phenomenology from Totality and Infinity to Otherwise than Being wherein the ego 
first appears unquestioned in the first work but is reanalyzed in the second to find the ego 
already emerging from an originative intersubjective milieu such that consciousness 
                                                 
368 Adriaan Peperzak, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1993), 232. 
  
369 Ibid. 
   
216   
 
cannot exist as a separate singularity.  This suggests that as long as we can connect 
Levinas’s philosophy to the late work of Husserl and the transcendental method of Fink, 
we can feel secure that Levinas’s understanding of phenomenology can surpass Husserl’s 
early methodology wherein the foundational ego appeared as an unassailable monolith at 
the origin of phenomena.  What inevitably keeps one worried about placing Levinas 
within a tradition of transcendental methodology seems to be that once we go beyond the 
simple origination of the human by the world’s weight and ask in what way the letting be 
of the self by others (autrui) affects the subject, a worry arises about the link between the 
transcendental condition of the intersubjective and the concrete expression of ethics. 
 Theodore de Boer, who has been a long-suffering voice for Levinas as 
transcendental philosopher, clearly fears a transcendental theory that would somehow 
divorce Levinas’s philosophy from the world of ethics, when he says “I am not 
‘constituted’ by the Other.”370  A theory of constitution, even if not grounded in a 
singular ego, runs the danger of being nothing more than a formalism that, once 
expressed, can be divorced from life in the same way that Levinas has already suggested 
a separation between existence and the existent.  Bernasconi resonates with this problem 
when discussing substitution as the possibility of both ethics and sacrifice.  It is clear that 
Levinas does not say that one should sacrifice or that every event with another is an 
ethical or sacrificial one, only that the possibility of such exists on account of 
substitution, but this leads Bernasconi to ask with some trepidation whether or not “this 
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exhausts the positive doctrine of ‘Substitution.’”371  Levinas’s transcendental method, 
then, must not only avoid a central, unmolested ego but must also keep its relevance to 
the ontic situation of ethical encounters.  This is, in fact, possible if we understand 
Levinas’s transcendental methodology to be constructive in a sense analogous to Fink’s 
introduction of the term in The Sixth Cartesian Meditation.   
 One can make direct connections between Fink and Levinas, for it is clear that the 
latter has read The Sixth Cartesian Meditation and is familiar with Husserl’s manuscripts, 
much of which gave Fink his direction.  The direct link, however, still finds Levinas 
leveling some of the same criticisms against Fink that he held for Husserl; whether these 
criticisms can be legitimately transferred from teacher to student should not concern us 
here.372  To find the real connection between Fink and Levinas which could produce an 
appreciation for transcendental theory, one must follow the indirect link through 
Merleau-Ponty.  Merleau-Ponty’s mature work reflects both his readings of Fink’s 
published essays as well as a personal meeting in 1939.373  In contrast to most of 
Levinas’s critique of the founding phenomenologists, he rarely has a critical word for 
Merleau-Ponty.  In fact, in those cases in which he addresses Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology directly, he never makes the case for overturning the impressive analysis 
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of the body and perception.374  As might be expected, Levinas desires to expand the 
description of the body into realms of the intersubjective and ethical, but he goes so far in 
accepting Merleau-Ponty as to state his agreement with the transcendental nature of the 
body.375  This acceptance not only supports seeing the ontic other as constitutive in part 
of the self’s transcendental origin, but it also defines the methodology of Otherwise than 
Being with respect to the phenomenological construction of the horizon of the ego.     
 The discomfort shown by Levinas, Derrida, Peperzak, and even, though to a lesser 
extent, Bernasconi concerning a transcendental understanding of substitution can be 
alleviated by following the proposals given by Merleau-Ponty for his Phenomenology of 
Perception as presented in the “Preface.”  Ultimately, whether these cautionary voices 
fear an ontological absolute within the transcendental, an egological absolute at the 
beginning of exegesis, or an irrelevancy between the transcendental and the world of 
ethics, all these fears arise out of the general interpretation of transcendental theory as 
described in the 1930’s, Fink excluded.  The layout of the Phenomenology of Perception 
begins undermining this view with the idea that the eidetic sense of experience arises out 
of a horizonal framework of pre-reflective experiences, which is the very goal of the 
analysis.376  The term framework, however, is still too reminiscent of Levinas’s 
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architectural concerns.  However, the process of realizing the framework cannot consist 
in achieving an absolutely reduced state, for such a state would surely violate the very 
nature of phenomenology’s description of lived experience, which determines the subject 
as always part of an ongoing process of further engagement with the world.  The result of 
this determines that any reduction must be without a fully disclosed telos, since the 
reduction itself must rely on the experience of an ever happening engagement with 
objects in the world upon which its reflections are based.377  The determination of a 
transcendental cannot be absolutely made, then, for more reasons than simply being 
unable to take up a position outside the constitutive horizon but because the unfolding of 
experience can always bring about a heretofore unrealized permutation of the 
transcendental in the living subject.  The process of reduction must be an ongoing 
recovery of a condition that is always being revealed and is always imbuing the world as 
experienced with potentiality, effectively undermining any understanding of the reduction 
as that which delivers anything absolutely.  In addition, the very nature of the 
development of the horizon in the lived experience of the individual determines an 
absolute relevancy between the ontic experience, ethical case in Levinas’s instance, and 
the horizonal frame.  
 If we read Levinas with an eye towards Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
method, then we are able to correct Bernasconi’s correction of how to appropriately read 
Levinas’s discussion of substitution.  Bernasconi willingly keeps the idea of substitution 
as a transcendental or perhaps quasi-transcendental but refuses to allow the reading if the 
methodology does nothing more than a transcendental deduction to an empty a priori 
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discovered in but subsequently severed from concrete experience.  He positively claims 
that “if one asks how sacrifice or giving is possible, one will ultimately be led behind 
consciousness and knowing to the one-for-the-other of substitution, but his [Levinas’s] 
thought remains directed toward the concrete.”378  This comment suggests that 
Bernasconi sees a disconnect between transcendental methodology and considerations of 
the ethical situation.  In addition to the disclosure of substitution as transcendental, there 
must also be the question of the taking place of substitution for, indeed, “substitution 
happens.  In some sense it has already happened.  But in so far as this is so, then this 
radically alters the meaning of the transcendental question.”379  Unfortunately, this last 
quote comes at the end of the essay, leaving many readers to wonder how the 
transcendental question is radically altered.  What new ground has Levinas broken in 
seeing a radical intertwining of transcendental analysis and concrete experience such that 
the mark of substitution on the human ego reaches not only into the originative structure 
of the subject but into the milieu of ethical possibility from which the realization of the 
transcendental not only arises but continually comes into actualization?  The answer is 
that Levinas has broken no new ground at all, but is firmly situated within a methodology 
of phenomenological construction which realizes the ongoing event in which 
“substitution happens” with the result that substitution is not deduced but properly 
constructed with an eye not on the final telos but on the possibility of an ever better 
description of such telos. 
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 If we return to Levinas’s attempt to disclose the full impact of the passive moment 
in which the subject emerges as an ego, it is clear that the phenomenology done is not a 
simple work done in immanent reflection.  Because the nature of hetero-affection that 
occurs in absolute passivity is to be precisely arche and condition for conscious 
experience, it does not occur within the conscious experience, and, as we see now, cannot 
be absolutely deduced as the origin from observation of conditioned phenomena.  The 
formal description to be offered to indicate the human horizon will not simply be 
metaphorical in the sense that what may have been deduced is simply akin to some other 
knowable condition, but the description is given as a guiding idea to direct future 
analyses.  The given name for the condition, however, cannot come from limited 
involvement with immanent reflection or ungrounded guesswork but must emerge as 
descriptive of what has been indicated in phenomenological investigation.380  
Consequently, we must see Levinas’s attempt at describing an ethical horizon as the most 
general of guiding ideas, further illuminated in the ontic condition of the face-to-face, 
further radicalized in the condition of the self as responsibility via the immanent 
reflection of language as communication, and finally recast as the very act of substitution 
– the self as originatively one-for-the-other. 
 Substitution, as the newly constructed guiding principle for the very origin of the 
ego, displays its intertwining of transcendental condition of the ego and the very 
development of the ego’s sense-bestowal to the intentionally realized world (i.e., as that 
which is played out in the concrete).  As transcendentally originative, Levinas asserts that 
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“the self is the sub-jectum; it is under the weight of the universe, responsible for all.”381  
Sub-ject, then, etymologically describes the nature of the self as having been thrown 
under, in this case thrown under the world by the world, a reiteration of what was 
discovered in the description of language toward responsibility.  However, as under the 
world, the subject necessarily supports the world, so that responsibility becomes the 
condition for “beings” – not only in the manner of their phenomenality but, humanly 
speaking, in the manner of their ethicality.  The origin for Levinas now appears clearly as 
origination in terms of the good rather than in terms of being: “the self is goodness, or 
under the exigency of an abandon of all having, of all one’s own and all for oneself, to 
the point of substitution.”382 
 In the passive subject, the ethical self originates in passivity, summoned before 
conscious thematization, and thus in a time before conscious time.  Originating, then, 
before the arrival of consciousness and active intentionality, the constituting role of 
consciousness does not affect the responsible self, for it is always, already there.  
Consequently, before consciousness, the ethical self is irreversibly affected by the other 
in the intersubjective milieu, called without consent of the subject, ordered “without 
asking myself: What then is it to me?  Where does he get his right to command?  What 
have I done to be from the start in debt?”383  With consciousness being that very part of 
the self capable of activity but unable to hold responsibility in its grasp, substitution, as 
origin of responsibility, must therefore be primal.   
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 The irreversibility of the affected self prior to consciousness keeps the ethical 
origin from ever showing in the present.  It is always late, remaining in an immemorial 
past, which is another way of saying that substitution acts as the ultimate horizon of the I.  
So founded, the self is “anachronously delayed behind its present moment and unable to 
recuperate this delay.”384  Because the present moment of consciousness is always after 
the self, which has been summoned in affectivity, thus never present to consciousness, 
immanent reflection is unable to make up the temporal lapse between the summons and 
knowing self.  Consciousness has already lost the proximity of the other in responsibility, 
so where there is consciousness, responsibility has been forgotten.385  Therefore, the 
moment of identity born from substitution is always an-archical with respect to 
consciousness.  This means that the arche principles of appearing phenomena which 
govern conscious awareness are preceded by an arche that can never be made present in 
the synchronic/diachronic temporality of the conscious self (thus an an-arche).  The result 
of this belatedness and immemorial responsibility is that the self is never fully present to 
assume the tasks to which it has been summoned; the other affects me without my 
awareness – my present comes too late.  Coming too late, then, leaves me unable to 
respond and accused for my lateness as Levinas claims, “my presence does not respond 
to the extreme urgency of the assignation.  I am accused of having delayed.”386 
 Substitution is more, though, than the call to be responsible to the other; it is one-
for-the-other, which will demand that one be responsible for the responsibilities of the 
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other as well.  Levinas often illustrates this point with reference to Dostoevsky’s The 
Brothers Karamazov: “every one of us is guilty before all, for everyone and everything, 
and I more than others.”387  As Levinas’s new guiding principle, substitution allows 
interpreters interested in the concrete aspects of his philosophy to address even what 
Simon Critchley has called his Achilles heel, politics, by substitution’s connection with 
justice and the entire community of the intersubjective.  The ethical relation revealed in 
the face exhibited an asymmetry in the summons.  The accused subject owes everything, 
meaning that if there could possibly be oneself and one other person, everything would 
be owed to the other.  This hypothetical duality, however, simply cannot account for the 
call of justice when the other is accompanied, bringing a third into the relation.  The 
third, or any multiple of others, do not even need to be present to disrupt the ethical 
asymmetry in favor of justice, for the face already implies the intersubjective milieu.  
Substitution not only retains the asymmetry of the face to face, but the placing of oneself 
for the other engages the self in an asymmetrical relation with all: “no one can substitute 
himself for me, who substitutes myself for all.”388  Crossing the temporal gap and 
shouldering the world’s responsibility becomes the self’s infinite task.  This task reveals 
the infinity in the very nature of the finite subject. 
 To this point, our description of the self’s nature as substitution has relied upon 
the infinite without explicitly naming it as origin.  The horizonal ground for 
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consciousness lies in the infinite as condition for human emergence as ethical.  Totality 
and Infinity suggests an infinity behind the face of the other person, as though the advent 
of the other initiates the infinite.  While this reading is alluring and easily made due to the 
confusion between the face as seemingly both concrete and transcendental, it must be 
resisted.  Even as early as Totality and Infinity, Levinas references Descartes’s 
description of the infinite overflowing the subject.  This would intimate that even in this 
early work, Levinas at least had an idea that the infinite condition might be realized in the 
subject rather than, one-sidedly, through the otherness of the face.  What the approach of 
the other person does, then, is open the conscious subject to the realization of excess, 
confirming the subject’s relation with the infinite horizon.  The encounter with the other, 
then, is evidence of the binding between self and infinity.  The face, consequently, 
signifies as ethical because it orients the self to an excess of consciousness, which has 
already shown to sub-ject the subject in infinite responsibility, the result of the interplay 
of self and other in the intersubjective. 
 Levinas’s connection to Descartes and infinity assumes a particular understanding 
of infinity as well as Descartes’s concept of God.  Infinity, revealed as the face in a 
simple sense but also as responsibility and ethical demand in its originative sense, must 
be connected to transcendence insofar as any historical comprehension of infinity without 
transcendence once again involves the problematic of totality.  For example, an infinity 
without limits but without transcendence would be akin to a being with no other, as is 
Spinoza’s God, the “absolutely infinite being.”  As a result, all that is is in infinite being, 
the same par excellence.  The opposition over such a being follows Kant’s move to 
describe the finite in other terms than the negation of the infinite such that the infinite 
   
226   
 
becomes a regulative idea, which Levinas claims “illuminates the infinite horizon on 
which the [finite] datum appears.”389  This concept grows through Husserl’s idea of the 
originative temporal horizon to Heidegger’s horizon of horizons.  The transcendental 
horizon of the human as human endeavors to retain the move away from an infinite being 
without falling prey to the same mistakes Levinas finds in Heidegger’s ontology.  This he 
achieves with the help, once again, of Descartes’s discussion of the infinite and God. 
 As we already saw in chapter two, Descartes’s description of the infinite was 
helpful for Levinas in his attempt to describe the way in which the other person is not 
simply reducible to another me.  However, as the phenomenology has forced a reanalysis 
of the ethical condition, it is possible that the earlier comparison is no longer applicable, 
but Levinas retains the analogy of the ethical infinite and Descartes’s philosophy, only 
updating the way in which the infinite now appears as the unending, ethical task 
originative of the human.  God, for Descartes, represents an idea that overflows 
consciousness; the essence of this concept has not been given up by Levinas and remains 
central to both the earlier reading as well as the later reading.  The first shift arises in the 
necessity of associating infinity with transcendence, which could be difficult in a simple 
relating of infinity with the face for all the ontic-ontological reasons previously 
discussed.  Levinas finds Descartes’s notion of the infinite as close to the idea of 
transcendence when Descartes declares that “I conceive God as actually infinite in so 
high a degree that nothing can be added to the sovereign perfection which he 
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possesses.”390  This statement suggests transcendence in the sense that there is a 
qualitative difference of degree between God and whatever might be added to the very 
idea of God such that God’s infinite perfection is disconnected from any relation to ontic 
data in part or as a whole such that the infinite collection of data would constitute the 
infinite.  One might expect that the disconnection severs any possibility of a recognizable 
relation with this infinite, but Descartes declares the opposite, as does Levinas, in that the 
infinite affects the individual absolutely.  Thus Descartes claims, “I have never treated 
the infinite except to submit to it, at no point to determine what it is or what it is not.”391  
Pulling both transcendence and submission together, we finally have full evidence and 
descriptive vocabulary for explaining precisely what it is Levinas is shooting at: the self, 
in certain situational structurings, specifically the intersubjective milieu grounded in the 
face-to-face, is transcendentally conditioned to encounter the world as ethically 
meaningful in such a way that every human interaction originates, develops, and submits 
in the ethical, which imposes an infinite task upon the self calling forth the human as 
human.  
 Once again, we should give due warning that God, as an object of investigation, 
has been ruled out, and the manner in which God acts as the infinite against which the 
finite cogito is defined for Descartes has been reinterpreted.  Truly, Blum’s assertion at 
the beginning of this chapter that Levinas’s ethico-religious concerns cannot be carried 
through after Otherwise than Being appears a plausible outcome, but we must, of course, 
rephrase the claim, after having shown in chapter two that Levinas did not have ethico-
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religious concerns in his earlier work, to say that Levinas’s reinterpreting of religious 
language and traditional accounts for God appear to make any ethico-religious 
connection implausible.  Truly, one might ask along with Bruzina, “How in principle 
could the Deus Absconditus be accessible?”  He further adds for justification, “In that, 
such a deity fits with the meontic as a critical device, it seems to me that the whole 
methodology of the intelligibility of the meontic, the ‘logos hamartikos,’ precludes there 
being any comfort in that situation. It is utterly ‘a-theic,’ in any of the sense that religion 
wishes ‘theos’ to possess. In short, faith in a ‘theos’ cannot be rational and may not be 
intelligible.”392  Nevertheless, even as the subject’s origination derives from the infinite 
task set forth in the irreducibility of the interpersonal to any sort of objective limits, the 
discourse appears relatable to both the philosophical and religious traditions’ discussion 
of the infinite.  To this point Levinas ponders whether or not his philosophy “is not 
drawing close to that [religious] tradition, even when it expresses itself in a deliberately 
and rigorously atheistic way.”393 
Levinas, the Human, and the Holy 
 Among present day philosophers, few have inspired students of both the 
philosophical and theological schools as has Emmanuel Levinas.  While we have 
attempted to show that Levinas properly sits within the tradition of phenomenology, at 
times arguing that his work be considered as “rigorously atheistic” even while making 
reference to God, it is important to note that his philosophical work has influenced a host 
of religiously minded thinkers like Jean-Luc Marion and Michel Henry in France, Roger 
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Burggraeve in Belgium, and John Caputo and Merrold Westphal in the United States to 
name a few.  Even though we have had occasion to note his deep and abiding devotion to 
Judaism, he has deeply affected Christian thinkers as well, speaking during the Week of 
Catholic Intellectuals, an event held in Paris in April 1968, on the subject of “A Man-
God?”394  Of course, Levinas has never distanced himself from matters of religion, only 
his properly phenomenological work from such matters, but what refuels interest between 
his philosophy and theology are some of his later comments that admits of a possible 
connection.  Levinas writes in the preface to the second edition of Of God Who Comes to 
Mind: 
We have been reproached for ignoring theology; and we do not contest the 
necessity of a recovery, at least, the necessity of choosing an opportunity for a 
recovery of these themes.  We think, however, that theological recuperation 
comes after the glimpse of holiness, which is primary.395  
 
What remains to be argued in connection to the infinite as originative of the human as 
human is the way in which this origination is that opportunity for the glimpsing of 
holiness. 
 Once again, we are reminded of those like Janicaud who would quickly douse any 
zealous fire that might arise from the phenomenological method he deems to be relegated 
to rigorous science without God, but instead of delving again into those arguments, let us 
pause for Husserl’s own positive words on the subject: “In spite of everything, I once 
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believed – today it is more than belief, today it is knowledge – that exactly my 
phenomenology, and it alone, is the philosophy that the Church can use because it 
converges with Thomism and extends Thomistic philosophy.”396  Prima facie, the 
statement is almost unbelievable; however, the further link given by Husserl in the quoted 
conversation that follows Aquinas back to Aristotle at least indicates Husserl has not 
taken leave of his phenomenological senses.  Aquinas asks in the Summa Theologicae (I, 
q. 84, a. 7) whether one can understand anything using only the species one has without 
turning to the senses, and he answers, “It is impossible for our intellect, in its present 
state of being joined to a body capable of receiving impressions, actually to understand 
anything without turning to sense images.”  Such a statement sounds strikingly similar to 
Aristotle’s method of discerning the form through the particular instances of perception 
of material objects.  All of this would corroborate our earlier connection in chapter one 
between Husserl’s epistemological program for phenomenology and the ancient works of 
Aristotle.  What ultimately connects Aristotle, Aquinas, Husserl, and “the philosophy that 
the Church can use” is the relationship between phenomenality and revealed theology.  
As Marion writes, “the question of God is played out as much in the dimension of 
immanence as that of transcendence.”397  If we accept theology as something more than 
theoretical conceptualizations about the Deus Absconditus and recognize it in the very 
least as humanity’s opening up to the question of God and at the most humanity’s very 
                                                 
396 Adelgundis Jaegerschmid, “Conversations with Edmund Husserl, 1931-1938,” in The 
New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy I (Seattle: Noesis 
Press, 2001), 338. 
 
397 Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2000), 28. 
 
   
231   
 
relationship with God revealed, then there must be a phenomenal character to this 
opening which belongs “rightfully to phenomenology, since revelation itself claims to 
deploy a particular figure of phenomenality.”398 
 Even if phenomenology and theology are not necessarily in opposition, as the 
claims to revealed religion would argue, it is important to note that Levinas does not then 
simply dive into the depths of theology but, rather, only seeks an “opportunity” to recover 
theology’s themes, which would be first a recovery of holiness.  Any and all such 
recovery must be done in lived experience, which on Levinas’s account is ethically 
meaningful on account of the human’s origination in the infinite.  Consequently, 
whatever theological move one wishes to make, the move must first be meaningfully 
conditioned as ethical (i.e., first theology is first first philosophy, which is ethics).  
Richard Cohen makes this point nicely when he reads Levinas’s intent even in his 
Talmudic interpretations as offering a new humanism.399  The ethical is first and foremost 
human access into a world not dominated by the self; it is one’s opening up and the only 
theological opportunity for which Levinas can be looking.  In “Loving the Torah more 
than God,” this very order of approaching the divine or the holy is made explicit.  One 
loves God’s law more because it is through the doing of the law that any access to God is 
possible, but the law is clearly understood as bringing about contact between the human 
and God only through the prescription of doing ethical service to others.  In addition, lest 
we believe that these arguments are not at least mentioned in Levinas’s philosophical 
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works, he clearly argues in Totality and Infinity that “without the signification they draw 
from ethics theological concepts remain empty and formal frameworks.”400   
 We can see this very concern for desiring a full theological concept when we look 
at Levinas’s short essay on the Christian idea of an incarnate God entitled, “A Man-
God?”  What is even more interesting than Levinas’s willingness to discuss the very idea 
of Jesus as divine, a belief which he willingly admits to his Christian audience that he 
does not share, is the manner in which he approaches the subject phenomenologically 
with the very eye to the way in which his philosophy brings light to the paradoxical idea.  
For a Christian, the title is the first indication of something theologically unusual, for 
Christian theology typically prefers the term “God-Man” when referring to Jesus.  This 
solidly reflects Levinas’s idea that “the idea of God is an idea that cannot clarify a human 
situation.  It is the inverse that is true.”401  This echoes Husserl’s own idea of a religious 
path: “Human life is nothing but the path to God.  I attempt to reach this goal without 
theological proofs, methods, or aids, namely to reach God without God.  I must, as it 
were, eliminate God from my scientific existence in order to blaze the trail to God.”402  
The idea of a Man-God is meaningful insofar as the very activity theologically proposed 
by Christians to describe Jesus’ crucifixion and resurrection as substitution and expiation 
for humanity is precisely the very nature of the human self given over to the world in 
substitution from the beginning.  God’s “self-inflicted humiliation,” bringing together 
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human and divine, transfers what is most active into what is most passive to become 
called forth to take responsibility for all.  Consequently, incarnation, now first and 
foremost the human incarnation of the self “is already its expulsion into itself, exposure 
to offense, to accusation, to grief.”403  Incarnation would be revealed as “the idea of the 
hostage, of expiation of me for the Other.”404  
 The Christian claim that Jesus of Nazareth was both human, divine, and substitute 
for the world, under Levinas’s reading, can be theologically meaningful apart from other 
historical anthropomorphic deities like the Greek pantheon as long as one begins from the 
embodied human in its intersubjective milieu.  What we see in Levinas’s discourse on an 
incarnate God is precisely what Jeff Kosky was arguing when he asserted, “the religiosity 
met in Levinas’s phenomenology of responsibility is not an actual religion but the 
possibility or nonnoematic meaning of religion.”405  In other words, Levinas’s 
phenomenological analysis of the human acts as a springboard into the theological, not 
necessarily a proof for a theological concept.   
Kosky, however, in my reading of his work, is also an example of the problem 
that must be addressed if we are indeed to see Levinas as grasping an opportunity for 
theological discourse in his philosophy.406  The issue at hand would be, if clarity into the 
theological is gained by first analyzing the human condition, are we not in danger of 
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creating a god in our own image?  Kosky realizes that his book will conclude with this 
problem left unanswered and so attempts to forewarn the reader in the introduction: “the 
anonymity of this God and the trauma suffered by the self are disturbingly close to a 
more menacing form of the anonymous as that anonymity was described in Levinas’s 
earliest work under the ‘name’ il y a.”407  What makes this assertion a prime example of 
our new anthropomorphic problem is the manner in which the il y a would be disclosed is 
in the very nature of a transcendental phenomenological methodology as we have 
employed throughout this dissertation.  The there is, we recall, acts as Levinas’s 
reappropriation of the discussion of Being, and while any disclosure of Being must be in 
terms of the transcendental, the transcendental is still within the human scope.  For the 
anonymous God and anonymous there is to be different, the latter must remain with the 
transcendental while the former refers to the transcendent.  Kosky’s introduction seems to 
assure the reader that this distinction cannot be easily made if made at all. 
 Richard Cohen, in contradistinction to Kosky’s problem, asserts that Levinas’s 
argument for the primacy of ethics “links transcendence, sociality, morality, and social 
justice.”408  The link between Kosky’s springboard into theological discourse and 
Cohen’s assurance of transcendence in Levinas rests in Levinas’s own statements about 
holiness.  If we are to recognize a theological opportunity, it must come with the idea of 
holiness.  At root, that which is holy is considered to be set apart, separated from the 
secular, and the theme of separation is basic for Levinas’s philosophy.  Separation first 
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appears as a theme, before Levinas discloses the origination of the self in others, as the 
description of the solitary self, a self which is completely atheistic if “one can call 
atheism this separation so complete that the separated being maintains itself in existence 
all by itself.”409  However, as any phenomenologist must recognize, consciousness as 
intentionality already undoes the ego as purely solipsistic.  Intentionality, then, is the first 
move toward transcendence, what is truly other, but even this move can still serve to 
produce only a human structure as the world is disclosed within transcendental limits.  
The link between Levinas’s transcendental ethics, transcendence, and holiness arises in 
the idea of infinity: “the idea of infinity, revealed in the face, does not only require a 
separated being; the light of the face is necessary for separation.”410  While this quote 
from Totality and Infinity can reveal the interruption of consciousness at which point the 
ego places itself in question, we still need Levinas’s later work to adequately express the 
two movements at work in this quote.  The first movement is the accretion of totality as 
the intentional ego recognizes itself as at home.  The disruption of life at home by the 
face, the trace of alterity, reveals the intersubjective as the origin of the human self, 
meaningfully conditioning the self’s intentional movement as “for-the-other,” as oriented 
toward that which cannot be subsumed under any totality, as that which is illuminated as 
ultimately separated, or experienced as holy.  While it has been argued throughout that 
this second, ethical movement is to be understood in very humanistic terms, it is the 
newly understood orientation of the self as being toward the transcendent other that 
brings this philosophy so close to a theological opening.  To go any farther would be to 
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question the very idea of God “in any of the sense that religion wishes ‘theos’ to 
possess.” 
 We must expunge from our presuppositions whatever it is that theology, 
philosophy, and their marriage as the philosophy of religion have presented as God in the 
history of Western philosophy.  Levinas’s note at the beginning of Otherwise than Being, 
which Blum has suggested undermines any religious concerns, claims that the difficult 
ascent of the book will reveal the importance of hearing a “God not contaminated by 
Being.”411  The opportunity for theological discourse which Levinas’s philosophy carves 
out stands in stark contrast to traditional conceptualizations of transcendence.  Attempts 
to describe God with notions of height or as eminent metaphorically place God in the 
heavens, but not beyond the limits of being.412  Traditional concepts of infinity place God 
as the Highest Being, but still a being.  The infinite originative of the human self is not a 
being as agent but the orienting of the self toward the other who remains 
incomprehensible in ontological categories.  This transcendent other, placed into 
relationship with the self at the origin of the ego, is palpably absent, un-thematizable, 
uncontaminated by being.  The possibility of religious discourse in the wake of this 
attitude is revolutionary for both philosophy and religion:  
Nothing is less opposed to ontology than the opinion of faith.  To ask oneself, as 
we are attempting to do here, whether God cannot be uttered in a reasonable 
discourse that would be neither ontology nor faith, is implicitly to doubt the 
formal opposition, established by Yehuda Halevy and taken up by Pascal 
between, on the one hand, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob invoked without 
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philosophy in faith, and on the other the god of the philosophers.  It is to doubt 
that this opposition constitutes an alternative.413 
 
 To think God not contaminated by being necessarily upsets both religious and 
philosophical traditions, complacent in the basic Aristotelian framework of categories.  
Consequently, it is easier to use Levinas’s opportunity for theology as a door that shuts 
rather than one that opens, so that one may be ever vigilant against the 
“pseudophenomenological literature” Jean Hering so feared in 1925.  It is, therefore, 
important to see at least a taste of what can be done with Levinas once this ground has 
been laid.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Ronald Lynn Mercer, Jr., 2007 
                                                 
413 Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” 57. 
   
238   
 
CHAPTER SIX 
What Can We Do with Levinas? 
 
Introduction 
 
 Jean-Yves Lacoste reminds us in “The Work and Complement of Appearing” that  
 
Things exist inasmuch as they invite themselves to us.  Were we but able to 
render account of this invitation, were we only to perceive that it is not in disguise  
that things appear to us, and were we, finally, to know the conditions under which 
consciousness is open, all the work of philosophy would be, by right, 
achievable.414  
 
“Were we” – a contrary to fact conditional.  If we were to have made these accounts, 
perceptions, and conditions – but we have not – then all of philosophy’s work would be 
achievable – but it seems as though it is not.  Whenever philosophy flags, 
phenomenology trumpets the need to go back to the beginning, so we must return to ask a 
better question.  Since “all the work of philosophy” as such is beyond the scope of this 
essay, let us focus upon that work which endeavors to move from the immanent to the 
transcendent, the move at the heart of Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn”.415  
Transcendence, in this context, must mean something more than the “not-I.”  In 
simple terms, all worldly objects that can be classified as “not-I” are transcendent to me; 
however, these objects are reducible to a realm of immanence, my conscious field.  The 
transcendence which we seek must be classifiable as “other-than-I,” irreducible to my 
conscious field while yet integrally related to my consciousness in such a way that the 
practicing of phenomenology can bring the “other-than-I” into relief. 
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Dominique Janicaud surely lies in wait.  I must be making reference to God, 
having invoked the terms transcendence and an irreducible “other-than-I.”  To begin with 
the notions of phenomenology and God is surely to castigate Janicaud, prompting him to 
call for further de-nuding of the transcendental I, which I have dressed up in the antithesis 
of the emperor’s new clothes – meaning clothes that everyone can see but pretends are 
not there.416  If this were the case, I must admit to being in good company: Emmanuel 
Levinas, whom Janicaud finds to be the master-weaver of the theological covering; Jean-
Luc Marion and Michel Henry, those most likely to don the inappropriate material and be 
chided by Janicaud, who plays the part of the bothersome but well-intentioned child in 
our tale.  Beginning again, we must ask a question that both sides would allow, one that 
starts at the beginning, at immanence. 
To propose a question relevant to achieving a sense of transcendence from 
immanence I will adapt Lacoste’s third condition for the proper working of philosophy: 
“what are the conditions, what is the structure, of human consciousness such that it is 
open to the invitation of transcendence, if an irreducible transcendence could give such 
an invitation?”  This question strikes at the heart of Pope John Paul II’s challenge to 
philosophy to “vindicate the human being’s capacity to know this transcendence.”417  In 
Biblical terms, we are seeking the very ground of St. Paul’s “measure of faith,” an 
openness to transcendence.  Exegetically, Paul’s reference to a “measure of faith” in 
Romans 12 is restricted to Christian believers; however, phenomenologically I will show 
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that we can argue for a constitutive structure that grants a universal possibility of faith. Of 
course, after quoting a Pope and St. Paul, there seems little chance that Janicaud would 
endorse my question; however, let us not forget that according to his own assessment of 
the “Contours of the Turn” he is not entirely averse to discussing a “dimension of height” 
only the idea that this height must lead to a “Most High.”418  I will answer our question 
by looking at Michel Henry’s work, but insofar as I believe Janicaud can be appeased, I 
will argue that Henry’s transcendent does not account for any measure of faith.  I will 
then add a corrective based on Levinas’s discussion of the transcendent other.419   
In order for a Levinasian corrective to be added, however, it must first be the case 
that Levinas and Henry are engaged in the same game, a game which I have claimed 
involves the rules of understanding transcendence.  There should be little debate as to 
whether or not Levinas concerns himself with such material, for the other person has 
often marked a paradox of transcendence in his works.  On the one hand, the other, while 
transcendent to me in a bodily fashion, appears well within one’s conscious field as an 
object.  Does one not see the other’s face and body, smell the odor of clean soap or lack 
of deodorant, and hear the words when the other speaks.  On the other hand, however, the 
other person is never reducible to any definitive totality within the conscious field on 
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account of the ego’s inability to know the other’s experiences from the viewpoint of the 
other person, effectively negating the possibility of sharing in any unmediated way the 
meaningfulness of the world from the other’s perspective, preserving the transcendence 
of the other.   
Henry, however, clearly wants to distinguish his work from any discussion of 
transcendence as something ultimately beyond the conscious ego.  He will claim that 
God, whom Henry equates with Absolute Life, is experienced in a straightway 
phenomenological fashion.  Nevertheless, Henry is careful to distinguish this experience 
from the simple intending of an object.  God does not appear out of the bright light with 
the long robe and glowing hair.  This straightway fashion must also not be confused with 
the act of protending.  Protention is the cognitive filling-in consciousness does with each 
adumbrated viewing of an object, and even though the protended aspect of an object (e.g. 
the back-side of a mirror) is necessarily absent in viewing, one can always take up a 
position such that what was merely a conscious protention becomes what is intentionally 
viewed.  God, while absent, is not hiding behind Calvary’s cross or in a cave on Mt. Sinai 
in such a way that one can merely walk around and find God hiding in those shadows.  
Absolute Life, as we shall see, acts upon the living in a transcendental way such that Life 
is ever present, but forever un-objectifiable.   
Consequently we now have a solid link between Levinas and Henry that can be 
expressed in transcendent terms.  As the other person acts in transcendental fashion by 
conditioning the human in terms of substitution but doing so in a way that cannot be 
objectified, so acts Henry’s Life, which constitutes the human condition as living but 
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which also cannot be made into an object of consciousness.  As non-objectifiable 
transcendental conditions, these conditions remain transcendent to my conscious field.   
Any phenomenology that involves some indication of transcendence must be 
regarded as, in some sense, radical.  The problem with laying out a brief explanation of 
radical phenomenology is that everything after Ideas I must look like radical 
phenomenology to someone like Janicaud.420  However, it is not just Henry, Marion, and 
the other new phenomenologists who discuss Life, the gift, and the call, or even Levinas 
and Derrida, who discuss the other and différance, who have radicalized phenomenology.  
Husserl’s protégés, Heidegger and Fink, also moved beyond Husserl’s central period with 
discussion of world horizons, the absolute, and the meontic.  Fink, as Husserl’s confidant 
during the last years of his life, moved Husserl to radicalize himself.421  Radical 
phenomenology begins with the movement from the description of a viewed object to a 
comprehension of the conditions necessary for that object to be viewed, and this entire 
process of analysis, which must be supplemented by re-analysis, constitutes the 
phenomenological reduction itself.  These conditions are transcendent insofar as they are 
not perceptible, for they are that which we are always already in and no position can be 
taken up “outside” these conditions such that a proper viewing can take place.  
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Consequently, they can only be suggested, hinted at, or metaphorically named.422  Henry 
and Levinas both attempt such a radical phenomenology that reaches for such conditions 
of the human experience, Life in the former case and the other in the latter, and each 
finds reason to name (perhaps metaphorically or perhaps not) their respective conditions 
as God.    
Henry, God, and Absolute Life 
Our investigation of Henry will begin with his recognition of the Gospels’ 
assertion that we are “Sons”; however, this sonship does not resemble in any way the 
biological notion of offspring.423  To be a biological child is to be begotten into the world, 
originating from the genetic material of a woman and a man, growing in the womb, 
replicating cells and ordering cells in a human fashion.  When born, the expectation of 
biology is that the parents have made a new life, but Henry finds a disparity between the 
description of various biological processes and being alive.  The formation of the body is 
the formation of an external manifestation, the rules of which do not guarantee that the 
body be any more than a cadaver: a body reduced to its pure externality.424  Parents, then, 
are not the originators of the new life but simply two who participate in Life.  This Life, 
which receives a capital L, the sign for Janicaud that a term is about to get a divine 
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designation, is indeed defined as the very essence of God such that the living are more 
truly the offspring of God than of parents.425 
As a living child, the only true parent is God, such that “no man is the son of a 
man, or of any woman either, but only of God.”426  The extraordinary universality of this 
claim that all are somehow children of God should alleviate some of the pressure of 
charges that Henry is directly linking his philosophy with one form or another of 
Christian dogmatism.  Take for example the conversation between Jesus and the “Jews” 
in John 8:41-44 (NRSV): “They said to him, ‘We are not illegitimate children; we have 
one father, God himself.’  Jesus said to them . . . “You are from your father the devil, and 
you choose to do your father’s desires.”  Consequently, Henry’s understanding of a 
universal progeny need not be related to doctrinal questions of inclusion or exclusion.  
This clearly seems to be the case when Henry argues that the one living as a child of God 
is able to experience the condition as straightway phenomenological and, thus, as 
something discoverable in immanence.427 
The assertion that living as a child of God is something universally 
phenomenological already seems to have two strikes against it.  On the one hand is the 
religious claim that evidence of God is not secularly manifest but divinely revealed, while 
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on the other hand is Husserl’s prescription, of which Janicaud is so fond of reminding the 
new phenomenologists, that any notion of God as an object of phenomenology must be 
bracketed off.  Both of these objections, however, begin with the idea of God as a being 
in the world, existing in some special way such that God is in hiding and will not come 
out except under miraculous circumstances, but as Henry explains, the Truth of 
Christianity is not about God as a being but about “a transcendental phenomenology 
whose central concepts are Father and Son,” God and Christ.428  The essence of God as 
Life, then, is not only transcendental but absolute, being fundamental ground for the very 
goings on of the living of lived experiences.  At this point, we see the need for a radical 
phenomenology to be performed within immanent life, for while that which is absolute is 
integral to the coming to pass of living, it does not appear in the world as an object; 
therefore, it is not observed in the manner of things.  Life is also not observed in the 
manner of the ontologically disclosed, wherein a regression is made from what is 
manifest to the conditions of manifestation.  What we mean here is clearly evidenced at 
the seminal stages of a phenomenology of life when we see Husserl introduce his widely 
applauded concept of the life-world, that analytic concept used for disclosing the 
experienced “being-in-the-world”.  Emphasis has been placed continually on the side of 
the world, leaving under-developed and presupposed the investigation of life.429 
A study of life would have to mean a phenomenology that is essentially aware of 
itself.  Inasmuch as phenomenology is expected to be that philosophy of disclosure of an 
object intentionally grasped in lived experience via acts of analysis and reflection, a 
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phenomenology aware of itself is more insofar as the acts of reflection and analysis do 
not just reveal the lived experiences of a consciousness but reveal instances of living 
itself.  In the doing of phenomenology, we find some of the intricate goings on of life, 
and if we recognize that reflection and analysis are but parts to the whole of living, then it 
becomes apparent that all conscious intending are acts of life that find fulfillment in the 
apprehending of an object.  The self, then, is a Son, in Henry’s terms, “generated in 
absolute phenomenological life” because the self is grounded in life in an absolute sense, 
meaning the self does not partake of a portion or even of all of life.430  A self is a corporal 
instance of life engendering itself as a person, which Henry expresses in the double 
claim: “Life self-engenders itself as me . . . Life engenders me as itself.”431  If we can say 
that God is Life, and we are only hinting at our readiness to make this statement, then we 
can now see why Henry so often invokes Meister Eckhart who echoes the double claim 
about life wherein “God is begotten as myself. . . God gives birth to me as himself.”432   
Have we gone too far?  Surely Janicaud’s concerns are validated, and Henry’s 
priestly robes, supposedly locked-up in the closet of the epoché, were never truly 
discarded. 
Let us turn to two non-doctrinal sources that suggest Henry’s equation of God to 
life is not a violation of phenomenological bracketing: a Hebrew-English lexicon and the 
work of Eugen Fink, who would never be confused with the new phenomenologists or 
with any theological preoccupation.  What we will find is that Janicaud presupposes the 
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term God to be necessarily laden with religious assumptions.  The word God, however, to 
suit Henry’s purposes, only needs to represent the absolute origin of life, names for 
which, Husserl has reminded us, we only have metaphors.  The meaning of God’s name, 
the Tetragrammaton, is philologically debatable, but recent scholars tend to agree that 
YHWH represents a lost causal form of the verb to be (Hifil 3rd masc. sing.).  Therefore, 
without any orthodoxy attached, YHWH suggests the “one who brings to pass,” an 
equation with the origin of life.433  Echoing this absolute usage is Fink, whose work 
centers on the methodology of disclosing and the disclosing of that which is originally 
constitutive of lived experience.  Fink writes that even though the absolute cannot be 
brought directly into view, phenomenology transforms philosophy such that “philosophy 
is the manifestation of God in us.  God is not a transcendent idol, but rather is the me-
ontic depth of the world and existence.”434  In this disclosure of the manifestation of God, 
there is an “un-nihilating of the Absolute” which Fink recognizes as “true theogony.”435  
In essence, the disclosure of the Absolute is linguistically compatible with watching the 
birth of God, simply describable in the equation of God and Life.  
Janicaud’s accusations that Henry has done nothing more than disclose a 
transcendental ego already dressed in religious raiment seems untenable given that the 
conception of God as life appears a well accepted term for the very origination of life.  
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However, it is not necessarily the case that we have found that structure of the human that 
guarantees the possibility of a connection to the transcendent.  Can we in any way 
consider his work as actually Toward a Christian Philosophy or actually fulfilling the task 
set forth in this essay to discover the possibility of a connection between the human and 
the transcendent?  Henry’s absolute life is transcendent in that it is forgotten as I exercise 
those capacities which it enables.  It is ever behind what I do, while never being present.  
However, as argued, this transcendence is the very essence of immanence itself, which 
determines that “[Faith] is simply a name for the unshakeable certainty that life has of 
living . . .  Faith does not come from the fact that we believe, it comes from the fact that 
we are the living in life.”436  In essence, faith is no more than the recognition of our 
ultimate phenomenological ground, an orientation in perception such that the absolute is 
brought to relief by radical phenomenology.  Such faith is, radically put, a faith in oneself 
as much as it might be a faith in God, such that every move toward transcendence brings 
one back to immanence. 
The charge against Henry could be couched in terms of Gnosticism.  Has Henry 
forsaken any recognition of a personal relationship with God, a relationship which 
appears presupposed in any discussion of sonship, for a speculative grasping of God as 
absolute origin, which is reducible to an understanding of the transcendental conditions 
of the self as living?  Henry seems to avoid this charge, at first, in his re-
conceptualization of salvation, for salvation is not in terms of any special knowledge but 
is achieved through acts of mercy that reorient the ego which has forgotten its engendered 
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origin in absolute life.437  We should not fall into debates of salvation by works or by 
grace here, for salvation is also reconceived as less than theological.  Salvation is the 
process of making the self aware of its dependence upon Life; it is a recovery from the 
fall that is the forgetting of sonship.  The ego forgets its origin on account of its active 
life wherein each individual ego is aware of those powers it controls: feeling, movement, 
and thinking.  In the exercise of these powers, the ego forgets the conditioning of life, the 
affective life that makes these powers possible on account of the ego’s mastery of its 
powers in effective living.  “In the action of the ego as action, supposedly issuing from 
itself and aimed only at itself, the very essence of absolute life is ruled out.”438  The 
reorientation necessary for bringing the ego back to itself in the light of its origins does 
not occur in Gnostic speculation but in the doing of acts of mercy.   
If it is the case that Henry’s divulgence of the absolute is not accomplished in the 
speculative sense, then we must discover how deeds of mercy awaken the self to its 
proper origins.  For examples of these deeds Henry refers us to medieval theology’s 
seven works of corporal mercy, which include such acts as feeding the hungry, clothing 
the naked, and caring for the sick.  In these cases, the one who performs these services 
still acts from the ego’s ability to effect changes in the world, but the meaningfulness of 
these acts will also affect the performer in such a way that the condition of Life in which 
the action is done is disclosed.  For Henry, such a merciful act realized as part of the 
absolute occurs in the book of John in the example of Jesus’ healing on the Sabbath.439  
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While it was accepted that working on the Sabbath was forbidden, Jesus’ justification 
was that his deed was not his alone but that he was always at work just as God was also 
always at work.  The connection between Jesus’ act of healing and God’s perpetual work 
as Life, for Henry, is in the realization that the act of mercy is simultaneously an act of 
life affirmation.  That Jesus was aware of the overlap between his particular deed and the 
very possibility of Life that exists in God is the proof of Jesus’ ultimate claim to sonship. 
What becomes ultimately problematic for Henry is the way in which the deeds of 
mercy do not take one beyond the self but firmly return the self to the absolute Life of 
which the particular ego is already an expression.  One can be reoriented to engendering 
Life by performing life affirming acts; however, the reorientation that occurs is not 
toward anything absolutely other but toward something absolutely immanent, as Henry 
asserts in the following: 
One who is born of life finds actions capable of satisfying him only if this action 
suits his condition.  The action can only suit the condition of Son if it comes from 
that condition and returns to it.  Its coming from the condition of Son is what 
makes it possible in the first place.  There is no “I Can” except in life.440   
 
We have already remarked that our discussion must begin from the immanent to be 
properly phenomenological, but in order for our analysis to be anything toward a 
philosophy of Christianity, there must result a sense in which the transcendence in 
immanence points one beyond the conditions of the ego, which Henry’s reciprocal 
engendering between God and self appears to deny.  The unfortunate consequence is that 
either the accusation of Gnosticism must be revisited, or worse, that transcendence 
reveals what is ultimately intelligible and as intelligible does not allow entry into 
anything theic. 
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I do not in any way disparage the impressive discussion of life and the absolute 
and the human’s position as child of life.  Nevertheless, is faith in Henry’s absolute 
“Father” not more properly Christian faith when placed in Abba, daddy?   
A Levinasian Corrective 
Levinas’s concept of the same haunts Henry’s transcendence revealing the idea to 
be insufficient for describing the life of the human being, the new conception of which 
was Henry’s goal.  Levinas agrees with Henry insofar as transcendence “is the very life 
of the human,” and in this case, Levinas recognizes that transcendence “is used without 
any theological presupposition.”  However, that life must already be “troubled by the 
Infinite.”441  What is insufficient in Henry’s work is that life as the field into which living 
being emerges is not specific enough in its essence to describe the living human being.  
Inasmuch as life acts as a coming to oneself, a wakefulness open to the world, the 
transcendence of life does not assure that the living “I” will acknowledge the right of 
anything else to awaken into the world as different.  If living things are the very essence 
of God and the very essence of God is my essence, then all living things and I are 
essentially the same.  Everyone is me. 
It would appear that Henry’s reading would run afoul of Levinas’s harshest 
comments for Christianity.  Levinas critiques the Christian tradition for having 
succumbed to the influence of the Western tradition’s penchant for totalization: 
“Christianity too is tempted by temptation, and in this it is profoundly Western.”442  What 
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he means here is that Christianity sees itself caught in a struggle with the tempter, caught 
in a struggle with temptations, and as Nietzsche and Hegel correctly surmised this 
corporate and individual conflict acts as a high motivator for Christians to evolve in the 
world, constantly overcoming new challenges, conquering, and assimilating.  Any time 
Christianity constructs a new totality, reduction to the same, whether political or 
intellectual, as we have in the case of Henry, Levinas would almost certainly point to 
Christianity’s own scriptures that point the way to the transcendent God through ethical 
human action for the other.  Without religious misgivings, he willingly quotes from the 
Gospel of Matthew where those condemned for their lack of attention to God’s needs ask: 
“Lord, when did we see you hungry or thirsty or a stranger or naked or sick or in prison?”  
God responds, “Truly, I say to you, whatever you did not do for one of the least of these 
you did not do for me” (Matthew 25:44-45).  
Levinas, however, also appears to support Henry when he asks, “is not 
transcendence to God?”443  The important difference of course is the recognition that 
transcendence as a non-theological concept delivers us a-Dieu rather than reveal the 
essence of God itself.  The human, as such, not only emerges at its foundation in life, but 
it is also fundamentally conditioned in the face-to-face, the immanent meeting of one 
person with another.  The otherness of the other, absent in the presence of its face, is also 
a transcendent that receives a divine appellation, but just as the case with Henry, it is 
difficult to see how the other, as God, represents anything of God to whom we pray.  
Nevertheless, it is within these ideas that I believe lie phenomenology’s greatest service 
to religion.  The importance of the other’s description as God is not in the revelation of 
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the divine but in the orienting of the self toward transcendence.  Even if we grant, as I 
will, that the otherness of the other person in no way equates with the God of the 
philosophers or with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the otherness of the other 
person conditions the human such that the human being is constituted as devoted to that 
which is incomprehensible, ineffable, and transcendent to experience.   
Devotion to the other leaves one without Henry’s grasp of God, but realizing the 
problematic nature of such a grasp, it is enough that such devotion leaves one with the 
sense of holiness.  Derrida notes Levinas’s remark, “one often speaks of ethics to 
describe what I do, but what really interests me in the end is not ethics, not ethics alone, 
but the holy, the holiness of the holy.”444  This sense of holiness that so interests Levinas 
originates in the emerging of the I into the world as ethical, the very event of which he 
declares would also be “first theology.”445  Such a theology, however, is not one of 
conceptual/Gnostic proportions in which the deity is grasped in concept but in which the 
deity is brought “to just and human efforts, as one brings the light of day to the human 
eye, the only organ capable of seeing it.”446  Through ethical human efforts, the human 
situation clarifies the idea of God, not in terms of conceptual grasping but in terms of 
familiarity, a drawing near to holiness.     
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To call out Abba, daddy . . . mommy, is to reach away from oneself in the 
ultimate hope that that which is absent will respond in some way.  However, such a 
reaching out must begin with a measure of faith, a possibility within the very structure of 
the human being that is always already oriented toward the transcendent.  Regardless of 
how much Henry’s description of Life is necessary for uncovering the absolute 
foundation of the living being, it is simply not enough to account for the desire to reach 
God.  A fuller description of all the conditions that structure consciousness is necessary.  
However, with the beginnings of this description in hand and the condition of devotion to 
the other disclosed, one can turn back to Henry’s analysis with an affirmative answer 
from Levinas’s question.  Indeed, transcendence does lead us to God, but only if we 
begin with a measure of faith. 
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